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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Courts of each industrialized nation are faced with the adjudication of cases
comporting foreign components. It is nowadays very common for those courts to be
asked by individuals and legal entities evolving in a transnational environment to
determine their rights and obligations with regard to some elements already adjudged in
another legal system. Very often, a party will merely ask the court to accept that the
foreign adjudication as it was rendered is valid and conclusive of the rights of the parties
in the local forum as if it were a local judgment. The question of the effects to be given to
such prior adjudications therefore arises. Most countries will agree to recognize some
effects to the determination of foreign jurisdictions, granted those determinations will
meet some standards which will guarantee the proper integration of the foreign decision
into the domestic setting. These problems are at the core of the general theory of
recognition and enforcement of foreign-country judgments.
"Renewed interest in choice-of-law problems and in jurisdiction to adjudicate
suggests the appropriateness of a fresh discussion on the recognition of foreign
adjudications" 1 . The opening statement of one of the most influential pieces of legal
literature written upon the recognition of foreign judgments, this sentence is as accurate
now as it was thirty years ago at the time it was published in the Harvard Law Review.
Opportunities for "fresh discussion" arose on many occasions, whether following changes
or negotiations towards changes in the law of recognition, or whether some new
1
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition offoreign Adjudications: A Survey and a
Suggested Approach, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1601, 1601 (1968).
1
Restatement of the Law in the field was issued in the United States2 , or else an important
case was rendered in the field of foreign-judgment recognition, prompting the opportunity
for comments.
It is to be observed that these comments were almost always directed at the
recognition of what is known as "money-judgments", that is to say
a final order, decree or judgment of a court by which the defendant is required
to pay a sum of money in contrast to a decree or a judgment of equity in which
the court orders some other type of relief.
Relatively few comments have been directed at the rules governing the
recognition and the enforcement of foreign decrees or judgments issued for a remedy
other than a sum of money. Specific categories of non-money judgments and the extent of
their recognition in other legal systems have been extensively analyzed: this is for
instance the case of judgments affecting family law. However no such analysis was
undertaken regarding non-money judgments as a general class with specific
characteristics and needs, since the considerations involved when a court undertake to
recognize an obligation to pay a sum of money are not the same when that court is faced
with a request for recognition of a decree involving specific performance from the debtor.
This study endeavors to review the law applicable to the recognition of foreign
non-money judgments, generally or with regard to a particular sub-category when
applicable, to assess the particular problems encountered by such judgments with regard
to their recognition abroad and subsequently to define their needs with regard to furthered
acceptance in foreign legal systems. Finally, this study proposes to review the current
alternatives for a reform in the field and define which solution would appropriately lead
2
In the United States, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws was published in 1971, three years
after von Mehren & Trautman's article, supra note 1, was written, and the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Laws of the United States was issued in 1986.
3
Black's Law Dictionary 695 (abr. 6th ed., 1991).
3to heighten the recognition and the enforcement of foreign non-money judgments in a
defined system.
The United States and the French practices will be analyzed herein. These two
systems offer some very different perspectives in the field of recognition and enforcement
of foreign country judgments generally. The American system is shaped by an interstate
practice which, because of the requirement of the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution
,
will bring a favorable opinion towards recognition of foreign-nation
judgments even though those nations are not included in the scope of application of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. On the contrary, the French practice is built upon strong
notions of legal nationalism and unity of structure which have deeply influenced a
restricting practice of recognition of foreign-nation judgments . The countries' respective
approaches towards recognition and enforcement bring into light the factors to be taken
into account at the transnational level when trying to draw some conclusions upon the
topic. They highlight the difficulties arising from differences and incompatibilities in the
laws and the rules of procedures, as well as more generally in the legal philosophies, of
the systems at stake. Such differences indeed start with the very definition of "equitable
remedy" and more generally "non-money judgment" in each system. Judgments
awarding remedies other than the payment of a sum of money may be of various nature
and character. The range of such remedies will also greatly vary from one legal system to
the other.
In the United States, the distinction between money-judgments and non-money
judgments is commonly referred to in legal texts and practice . Remedies other than mere
4
U.S, CONST, art. 4, § 1 . von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 1, at 1601 (synopsis) ("[Development of
sound recognition theory ... has been hampered by overly facile generalizations from domestic ... practice".
5
See Jean-Denis Bredin, Le Controle du Juge de I 'Exequatur au Lendemain de I Arret Munzer, TRAV.
COM. Fr. DR. INT. PR., 1960-1966, 27 ("nationalismejuridique").
6
See, e.g., von Mehren & Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Country Judgments in the
United States, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 37, 72, 74 (1974) (distinguishing the two with regard to
enforcement procedures).
4damages are quite present in the U.S. legal system and are first greatly developed through
the various components of the equity jurisprudence 7
. A notion known only to common
o
law systems
,
equity ''originated to provide a remedy which justice demanded, but which
the law courts did not provide"9
. As a result, the courts of equity 10 created a range of
remedies designed to provide the plaintiffs with a compensation more adequate to the
specific nature of their injury than the payment of a sum of money as damages 12 . In
modern jurisprudence, these remedies are constituted by the following 13 : specific
See infra note 8 for a brief commentary upon the notion of Equity as understood in the American legal
system. An extensive literature exists in the United States upon the concept of Equity. See, e.g. JOSEPH H.
Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as administered in England and America ( 1 886),
John N. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, ( 1 st ed. 1 887), Geo T. Bispham, The Principles of Equity,
A Treatise on the System of Justice Administered in the Courts of Chancery (1 1th ed. 1934), F.
Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (2d ed. 1936), H. McClintock, Handbook, of the
Principles of Equity (2d ed. 1948), T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (5th ed.
1956), Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies (1985), John F. O'Connell, Remedies in a
nutshell (2d ed. 1 985), Robert N. Leavell et al., Cases and Materials on Equitable Remedies,
restitution and Damages (4th ed. 1986), Robert S. Thompson & John. A. Sebert, Jr., Remedies :
Damages, Equity and Restitution (M. Bender ed.) (New York, 2d ed. 1989), Dan B. Dobbs,
Remedies, Damages, Equity, Restitution (2d ed. 1993).
The word "Equity" may be used in various senses. Equity in the general sense of natural justice, founded
upon notions of honesty and right and arising ex aequo et bono is well-known to all legal systems.
However, Equity Jurisprudence as administered in the United States is peculiar to countries governed by
Common Law and originates in English law through the development of the jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery in England. For a summary of the origin and history of Equity Jurisprudence in England and in
the United States and the distinction between the different meanings of the word "Equity", see STORY,
supra note 7, at 1-56. In England and in the United States, "Equity has a restrained and qualified meaning".
The word refers to the rights recognized and protected by the Courts of Equity as opposed to the rights
recognized and protected by the Courts of Common Law. Story, supra, at 19-20. See also Dobbs, supra
note 7, at 28 (" More often today a case is called an equitable one because some equitable remedy, usually
of coercive nature, is sought.").
9
Howard W. Brill, The Maxims ofEquity, 1993 ARK. L. NOTES 29, 29 (1993).
10
Nowadays, this term refers to the states' superior courts and the federal District courts sitting in Equity,
as Courts of Common Law and Courts of Equity have merged in all but a few States. See Dobbs, supra
note 7, at 27-28.
11
For these remedies, the term "decree" is often found instead of "judgment". A decree is defined as "the
judgment of a court of equity or chancery, answering for most purposes to the judgment of a court of law",
Black's Law Dictionary (WESTLA W). Since the merger of the courts of law and those of equity, the
term "judgment" has generally replaced "decree", id
12
See Brill, supra note 9, at 29-30, 32 ("Chancery Courts developed to fill in the gaps where the law and its
remedies where inadequate", id., at 32).
13
The following list of equitable remedies is not exhaustive. It is merely an account of the remedies most
encountered in Equity.
performance
,
injunctions (mandatory, prohibitory, interlocutory, perpetual, ex parte,
after hearing)
,
re-execution
6
,
reformation
17
, rescission
18
, restitution
19
, cancellation
20
,
account
, dower
,
partition
23
,
partnership bills
24
, creditors' bills
2
'", discovery
26
and
BlSPHAM, supra note 7, at 22. Specific performance is one of the most ancient of equitable remedies. It is
also one of the most useful, as it can be applied in discretion of the court between original parties and those
who claim under them to the sale of real estate, to personal property claims but also to other contracts
besides those of sale. BlSPHAM, supra, at 305. However, limitations such as valuable consideration,
meritorious consideration, adequacy, performance in specie, mutuality, certainty and practicability must be
respected and operate as serious restrictions upon the application of the doctrine. BlSPHAM, supra, at 312-
316.
BlSPHAM, supra note 7, at 22. ("The relief afforded by the writ of injunction is probably the most
effective, the most characteristic and the most extensive of equitable remedies", BlSPHAM, supra, at 327).
A mandatory injunction is one that compels the defendant to restore things to their former condition,
BlSPHAM, supra, at 327. A Prohibitory (or negative) injunction restrains the defendant from the
continuance or continuation of some act which is injurious to the plaintiff, BlSPHAM, supra, at 328. An
interlocutory injunction is one granted upon preliminary application and before final hearing. It is a
provisional remedy, BlSPHAM, supra, at 329. On the other hand, a perpetual injunction is made on the
merits, on final decree, id.
BlSPHAM, supra note 7, at 22. Re-execution is applied to cases in which deeds or other instruments are
lost or otherwise destroyed, BlSPHAM, supra, at 378.
BlSPHAM, supra note 7, at 22. Reformation is the refusal of the court sitting in equity to give any effect to
an instrument, or treat it as a nullity, upon proper cause shown, BlSPHAM, supra, at 379.
18
BlSPHAM, supra note 8, at 22. Rescission is the right of the complainant to ask for reconveyance of an
instrument or order than the instrument be surrendered for cancellation, mainly following fraud or mistake,
BlSPHAM, supra, at 383-384.
19
DOBBS, supra note 7, at 26. ("Restitution means restoration, but was given an expansive meaning in
equity"). See also THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, QUASI CONTRACTS & CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUSTS (1937): "A person entitled to restitution is entitled, in appropriate cases, to a remedy by a
proceeding in equity, and not merely to a remedy by a proceeding at law", RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 160,
introductory note. The Restatement states that restitution in equity includes decrees establishing and
enforcing constructive trusts of property, decrees establishing and enforcing equitable liens upon property
and decrees that the plaintiff be subrogated to the position of another claimant against the defendant,
RESTATEMENT, supra.
20
BlSPHAM, supra note 7, at 23. Cancellation occurs after the evidence of a void or voidable transaction is
presented. It is however considered independently from rescission, BlSPHAM supra, at 384.
21
BlSPHAM, supra note 7, at 23. "Account occurs in all instances in which equitable titles are to be
protected and equitable rights enforced", BlSPHAM, supra, at 387.
".BlSPHAM, supra note 7, at 23. "Dower is the right of a married woman to have assigned to her, after the
death of her husband, one third of the land in which [he had some rights] and to enjoy the land thus
assigned for life", BlSPHAM, supra., at 397.
23
BlSPHAM, supra note 7, at 23. The remedy of partition was created in equity to extend the right of
severance ofjoint-ownership and joint-tenancy to cases other than those created by operation of law, the
latter being protected by common law, BlSPHAM, supra, at 392
24
BlSPHAM, supra note 7, at 23. Partnership bills will occur for purpose of administering the partnership's
assets after dissolution. They may also be filed for purpose of "obtaining a decree for dissolution and
subsequent administration", BlSPHAM, supra, at 406.
25
BlSPHAM, supra note 7, at 23. "Creditors' bills are filed by creditors for the purpose of collecting their
debts out of the [...] debtor", when "the process of execution at common law could not afford relief,
BlSPHAM, supra, at 4 1 6.
receivers"
.
Equity also plays a role in the administration of decedent's estates and in the
management of insolvent's estates" . However those latter functions are far more limited
now than they used to be due to the establishment of probate courts in most States and
federal preemption in the field of insolvency.29 . Therefore in general, judgments
connected to bankruptcies and successions will be considered as categories of non-money
judgments linked with equity, due to the awarding of injunctive relief and orders30 .
Aside from equitable remedies, American courts award other types of non-money
judgments, arising from common law rights and remedies '. They comprise all
declaratory judgments ", such as matters related to personal status, also called self-
executory judgments as they are declarative of the rights of the parties
, all decrees
arising from a source other than equity . Judgments for taxes and penal judgments are
also understood to be part of the broad category of non-money judgments .
"6
Bispham, supra note 7, at 23. Before the rule for compelling the opposite party to testify and produce
documents in his possession was a matter of statutory law, it was an equitable remedy. While the subject is
not of as much importance to equity as formerly, certain equity rules regarding this remedy are still in
force. Bispham, supra, at 437-439.
27
Bispham, supra note 7, at 23.
28
See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 24.
29
Id. at 24 n.2.
J
° See infra, notes 571-604 and accompanying text (detailing different remedies available in the United
States with regard to transnational bankruptcy cases)
31
)2
Whether statutory or arising from case law.
A declaratory judgment is a judgment or an order for a declaration as to the rights of the parties : TRENDS
in the Enforcement of Non-Money Judgments and Orders 26 (Ulla Jacobsson & Jack Jacobs eds.,
Norwell Massachusetts, Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers 1988) [hereinafter TRENDS IN ENFORCEMENT
OF NON-MONEY JUDGMENTS].
33
See TRENDS IN ENFORCEMENT OF NON-MONEY JUDGMENTS, supra note 32, at 26.
34
Decrees other than in equity encompass matrimonial law, child custody and child support. However such
decrees will eventually be enforced in case of non-compliance to their terms by one of the parties by means
of equitable remedies (injunction). Accordingly, equity plays a role, to the extent that these decrees are
sometimes referred to in the literature as equitable decrees. See, e.g., David Buzard. U.S. Recognition and
Enforcement ofForeign Country Injunctive and Specific Performance Decrees, 20 CAL. WEST. INT'L L.J.
91 (1990).
35
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES ( 1 987), § 483
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. The Restatement (third) distinguishes penal and tax
judgments from "ordinary" judgments. Therefore these categories ofjudgments are encompassed within
the general category of non-money judgments, as opposed to judgments for a sum of money.
7Classifying and listing categories of non-money judgments rendered by French
courts involves juggling with various categories of judgments and procedures. Money-
judgments and non-money judgments36 are to be found in each category, as the
distinction between those two concepts is not commonly addressed in the French practice.
The French Code of Civil Procedure establishes a distinction between judgments on the
substance («Jugements au fond») and judgments other than on the substance38 . The
different types of non-money judgments existing in the French procedure are to be
extracted from both categories . In the first category, judgments other than for a sum of
money will mostly refer to specific performance40
, and to other orders and decrees on the
substance of the adjudication
,
including matrimonial law judgments
,
child custody
and child support judgments
,
receiverships and administration of insolvent's estates45
,
French law generally distinguishes types of proceedings (summary, dispositive, declarative, ex-parte...)
and procedures but does not formally distinguish such general types ofjudgments as money and non-
money. The latter distinction is therefore arbitrary, for purpose of circumscribing the topic. See LEXIQUE
des TERMES Jurjdiques 268-269 (Dalloz, Paris, 7th ed. 1988).
37 Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile [C. Pr. Civ].
38
See e.g., Jean-Jacques Barbieri, Que Sais-Je n°2988: La Procedure Civile (P.U.F., Paris, 5th. ed.
1995) for a summary of the characteristics of that distinction. Other more subtle distinctions are establishes
by the literature. They resort to the very nature of the judgment : contradictory proceedings as opposed to
ex-parte proceedings, final judgments and interlocutory judgments, judgments of lower as opposed to
judgments in Appeal. See Jean Vincent & Serge Guinchard, Procedure Civile 51 1-522 (Dalloz.,
Paris, 22nd ed. 1991).
9
The distinction between judgments on the substance and other judgments is important for the purpose of
the topic, as the latter category is generally not recognized any res judicata authority in the French system.
See infra, text accompanying notes 330-34 . See BARBIERI, supra note 38, at 99.
40
"Obligation de/aire". The French Civil Code art. 1 142 states that "The obligation to do or not to do
something gives rise, on non-performance, to liability in damages", C. Civ., art 1 142, and thereby seems to
prohibit in terms any judgment which obliges a debtor to act or refrain from acting in a particular way.
However the prohibition does not extent to the obligation to give something and specific performance is
accordingly widely used as a remedy in contract cases where the action involved is giving ("donner")
rather than acting ("/aire"). Also, sales contracts are covered by a special provision of the Civil Code, C.
ClV., art. 1610, allowing the purchaser to require specific performance rather than damages. SeeK.
ZWEIGER& H. KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE Law 509-510 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2d
ed. 1992). Moreover, the practice has implemented some exceptions to the general prohibition of art. 1 142:
See. e.g., Alain Benabent, Droit Civil: Les Obligations 316-318 (Montchretien, Paris, 1987).
41
Both orders and decrees in that sense will be referred to as "jugements aufond" without other
specification. See LEXIQUE DES TERMES JURIDIQUES, supra note 36, at 220.
42
"Affaire matrimoniales" . See C. PR. Civ., arts. 1070-1 148, 1282-1303.
43
Respectively "garde des en/ants" and "pension alimentaire" . The latter also stands for "alimony".
44
"Administrates", "administratesjudiciaire". Receivers are nominated by order of the tribunal. See
LEXIQUE DES TERMES JURIDIQUES, supra note 36, at 1 8- 1 9.
8bankruptcy judgments 6
.
succession proceedings
47
, penal and tax judgments48 . The
second category, judgments other than on the substance, will comprise injunctions49
,
summary proceedings 3
,
and judgments awarded at the request of a single party, absent
any litigation on the substance. The latter category, called «jugements en matiere
gracieuse^
, is an interesting particularity of the French procedure that will include
personal status judgments3
, adoption
3
, divorce and separation with consent of both
Called "administratesjudiciaire", as for receiverships. See supra note 44.
1
"Liquidation judiciaire" for companies, "faillite personnels for individuals in relation to business
activities. See LEXIQUE DES TERMES JURJDIQUES, supra note 36, at 282, 213.
47
"Successions'. See C. PR. Civ., arts. 1304-1327.
Respectively : "jugement en matiere pena/e" and "jugement en matierefiscale".
49
"Ordonnances"\ The word "injonction", which is the literal translation of injunction, refers in French law
to an order to pay a sum of money ("injonction de payer"), to the order for specific performance or
prohibition to act made by a judge to an administrative branch {"Administration"), enforceable indirectly
only by means of fines for non-execution, to the order for specific performance in limited cases (limited in
valorem and in specie )("injonction defaire"), C. PR. ClV., art. 1425-1 and to the order by a judge in a civil
suit made to compel a party to disclose documents or evidence. LEXIQUE DES TERMES JURJDIQUES, supra
note 36, at 253-254. All other forms of injunctions are covered by the word "ordonnance'\ See C. PR. CIV.,
arts. 482-499, 808-813, 848-852, 872-876, 956-959.
The French procedure mostly distinguishes two types of injunctions ("ordonnances"): interlocutory
injunctions ("refere"), comprising interlocutory injunctions for specific performance ("re/ere injonction'),
and injunctions limited to cases defined by statute, requested by one of the parties {"ordonnances sur
requete"). Such injunctions may be ex-parte, C. PR. Civ., art. 812. It is important to note that none of the
above-mentioned injunctions are declarative of the rights of the parties and are not part of the substance of
the adjudication. They are justified by the circumstances. C. PR. Civ., arts. 809, 812. See, e.g., TGI Paris
May 20, 1974, 1974 G.P. 538 (for interlocutory injunctions).
50
"Re/ere ", see supra note 49, and "jugements avant dire droit ", referring to discovery measures (mesures
d'instruction) and interlocutory measures (mesures provisoires). See BARBIERI, supra note 38, at 99.
51
See LEXIQUE DES TERMES JURIDIQUES, supra note 36, at 149.
52
C. PR. Civ., art. 25. Article 25 states that the judge will award a judgment of that type when the court has
jurisdiction upon the subject-matter, at the request of a party, absent litigation by another of the facts
requested to be declared. See Dominique Le Ninivin, La Jurjdiction Gracieuse dans le Nouveau
Code DE Procedure Civile (Litec, Paris, n.d.). This type ofjudgments is not recognized any res judicata
authority, see C. PR. Civ., art. 480. See also Cass. Civ. 25 Oct. 1905, D.P. 1906, I, 337, note Planiol.
53
"Statut personnel", for instance declaration of nationality. See Le NINIVIN, supra note 52, at 76.
54
"Adoption ". See LE NlNIVlN, supra note 52, at 76-84.
9parties", request for re-composition of official acts that were destroyed"
,
and all other
declarative judgments5 .
The differences in definition in each system involved are the product of individual
legal developments and illustrate the differences in procedure among the two systems.
Those difference will indeed be reflected in the general practice of recognition and
enforcement of non-money awards in each nation.
55
Divorce ou separation par consentement mutuel. Consent of the parties suppresses the element of
litigation and dispute and thereby qualifies this type of proceedings to be included in this category. See LE
NINIVIN, supra note 52, at 76-84.
56 "
Reconstitution d'actes detruits ". See LE NINIVIN, supra note 52, at 76-84.
57
"Jugement declaratif. Such judgments recognize and declare the rights of the parties as they stood at the
opening of the proceedings. LEXIQUE DES TERMES JURIDIQUES, supra note 36, at 269. See also LE NINIVIN,
supra note 52, at 76-84.
CHAPTER II : PREREQUISITES AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES
DETERMINING THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS OTHER THAN FOR A SUM OF MONEY
Before undergoing a study of the general principles governing the recognition and
the enforcement of foreign judgments rendered other than for a defined sum of money,
the meanings attached to the very words "recognition' and "enforcement" should be
examined, for they are to be distinguished. Such distinction will undermine the general
understanding of the concepts at stake in this study.
SECTION I : RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT DISTINGUISHED
The difference of meanings between the term "recognition ofjudgments" and the
term "enforcement ofjudgments" is seldom emphasized in the legal literature and in the
CO
judgments rendered in connection with the matter . However, such a distinction is of
importance, particularly with regard to the execution of foreign non-money judgments.
A foreign judgment is recognized "when a court concludes that a certain matter
has been decided in the [foreign] judgment and therefore will not be litigated further [in
the second forum]" . In recognizing a foreign judgment, the court will give effects to that
8
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 38. ("Although the two terms are sometimes used
interchangeably by courts, they have distinct meanings"). Jonathan H. Pittman, The Public Policy
Exception to the Recognition ofForeign Judgments, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 969 (1989), n.2 and
accompanying text (publication page reference not available for this document) ("Courts and litigants often
use the terms 'recognition' and 'enforcement' interchangeably, but there is an important distinction
between the two"). See e.g., 30 AM. JUR 2d. Executions 524-63 1 ( 1 994) (treating under the heading
"Executions etc." of problems relating to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and using the
word "enforcement" in a subsection referring to "Bases for Recognition", 30 AM. JUR. 2d Executions 524-
525 (1994)). However, note of this distinction appears in the Restatement (third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States : Restatement (third) of the Foreign Relations Laws of the United
States §481 (1987).
59
Robert B. von Mehren, Enforcement ofForeign Judgments in the United States, 17 Va. J. INT'L L. 400,
400 (1977) [hereinafter Enforcement in the United States].
10
II
judgment, but will not necessarily provide the relief granted by the foreign court60 . The
latter will be operated by the procedure of '"enforcement". In other words, enforcement is
the actual grant by the local court (second forum) of the relief to which the foreign court
(first forum) entitled the party61 .
In the United States, recognition is considered as a prerequisite to enforcement62
,
which does not guarantee that enforcement will be granted . However, since the
enactement by the majority of the states of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act , recognition and enforcement are often consisting of a single procedure,
namely the filing of the foreign judgment with the court of the state in which recognition
is sought . It should also be noted that the federal statute regulating the recognition and
the enforcement of sister-state judgments pursuant to the Constitution does not
distinguish either between the two terms .
In France, no prerequisite character is conferred to recognition. However the
distinction between recognition and execution is of importance because some categories
of foreign judgments will be granted some effects similar to those of recognition
60
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 38.
61 Von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 38. See also von Mehren, Enforcement in the United States,
supra note 59, at 400.
62
Zanueldo v. Zanueldo, 360 N.E. 2d 386, 390 (Ill.App. 1977). See R. Doak Bishop & Susan Burnette,
United States Practice Concerning the Recognition ofForeign Judgments, 1 6 INT'L Law 425, 427-428
(1982) ("recognition is only the first step in the process of enforcement". Id., at 28).
63
164 East Seventy-Second Street Corporation v. Ismay, 151 P. 2d 29 (Cal. App. 1944). Bishop &
Burnette, supra note 62, at 28.
64
13 U.L.A. 149 (1986) [hereinafter cited as the Enforcement Act]. The Act has been enacted by 43 states.
See Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement ofForeign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of
Uniformity and Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 329 (1991) for an account of the adoption of
the Act by the various states.
65
See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 6-9-230 to 6-9-238 (Supp. 1990), GA CODE ANN. §§ 9-12-130 to 9-12-138
(Supp. 1990), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10, §§ 12-601 to 12-617 (Smith-Hurd 1884), MISS. CODE ANN. §§
1 1-7-301 to 1 1-7-309 (Supp. 1990). Before the enactment of the Enforcement Act by the states,
recognition and enforcement were often considered to separate steps. The foreign judgment was first
recognized by way of a judgment of the U.S. court of the state in which recognition was sought, and only
then enforced on the face of the U.S. judgment, see e.g. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 38.
66
U.S. CONST., ART. 4, § 1 (full faith and credit clause of the Constitution) and its implementing
legislation, 28 U.S.C.A. 1738 (last amended 1980).
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independently from the procedure of enforcement (" exequatur")67 that otherwise governs
the whole process of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the French
system . Also the Convention providing for recognition and enforcement of European
sister-state judgments expressly distinguishes the recognition and the enforcement of
such judgments , with important consequences arising from the distinction71 .
In each system, the distinction between recognition and enforcement is
particularly important with regard to non-money judgments. Often, because of the
72
peculiar circumstances surrounding the execution of foreign non-money judgments
,
such execution will comprise recognition but will not be furthered so as to include actual
enforcement of the foreign judgment at stake. Given the difficulties encountered in the
various legal systems regarding the actual enforcement of local non-money judgments
,
the limited enforcement offoreign non-money judgments is all the more understandable
and further emphasizes the importance of the distinction between the concepts of
recognition and enforcement in connection to the matter. In many cases, the request of a
party will be limited to recognition of the foreign judgment, not its enforcement . A
defendant may wish to seek, recognition of the res judicata effect of the prior foreign
judgment to dismiss a plaintiffs claim in the second forum *, and a plaintiff will ask the
second forum to recognize the prior foreign judgment in his favor as "offensive collateral
67
See infra, note 229 and accompanying text.
68
Id. See generally WON LOUSSOUARN & PIERRE BOUREL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 519-539
(Dalloz, Paris, 4th ed. 1993).
69
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27,
1968, 8 Int'l LEG. Mat'LS 229 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Brussels Convention] See infra, note 88.
70
Brussels Convention, supra note 69, at art 26. See infra, notes 128-146 and accompanying text.
71
See LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 537-539.
11
See infra, notes 205-210 and accompanying text.
73
See generally TRENDS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF NON-MONEY JUDGMENTS, supra note 32.
74
Pittman, supra note 58, at nn.6-8 and accompanying text.
75
Id. See infra notes 299, 300-304 and accompanying text for a definition ofresjudicata effects".
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estoppel against the defendant"
,
without in any case asking for actual enforcement of
the foreign judgment involved.
SECTION II : SOURCES GOVERNING RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS OTHER THAN FOR A SUM OF MONEY
In the U.S. system, the sources governing the recognition and the enforcement of
'"sister-state" judgments are to be distinguished from the sources governing recognition
78
and enforcement of foreign-country judgments . Such a distinction must also be made as
far as the recognition and the enforcement judgments in France of other European
Member State are concerned. The integration of states into federal (United States) or
supra-national (France with the European Union) entities bring similarities of law and
procedure in the state of origin and the state addressed for recognition and/or
enforcement as well as a common interest in reciprocal recognition and enforcement of
81
the acts and proceedings of the administration and the courts of one another . Such
similarities and interest, of various degrees depending on the nature and the goal of the
state integration , call for specific rules. These circumstances exist and affect the
76
Pittman, supra note 58, at nn.6-8 and accompanying text. See infra, notes 299, 305 and accompanying
text for a definition of "collateral estoppel" in relation to recognition.
See infra, note 84 and accompanying text.
78
Even though both sister-state judgments and foreign-country judgments are included in the general
category of "foreign" judgments for the purpose of this work.
79
The European Union was first created by the Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic
Community, March 25, 1957 [EEC Treaty], to be found under Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
Treaty on European Union, O.J. 1992 C 191 (29 July 1992). The current EU member states are: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
80
Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement ofSister-State Judgments: Reflection on the
General Theory and Current Practice in the European Economic Community and in the United States, 8
1
COLUM. L. REV. 1044, 1044-45 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as Sister-State Judgment Recognition]. See
also Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Judgments, General Theory and the
Role ofJurisdictional Requirements, 167 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
[R.C.A.D.I.] 9, 92-93 (1980) [hereinafter Recognition, General Theory].
81 Robert C. Casad, Civil Judgment Recognition and the Integration of Multiple State
Associations : Central America, The United States of America and the European Economic
Community 21 (Lawrence, The Regents Press of Kansas 1981).
82
Id.
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recognition and the enforcement of non-money judgments in both United States and
France. They must accordingly be analyzed separately from foreign-country judgment
recognition sources .
A. The Recognition and the Enforcement of Sister State and other member
state Non-Money Judgments
In both the U.S. and the French legal systems, particular dispositions regulate the
recognition and the enforcement of so-called "sister-state judgments"84 in the United
States and "other Member State judgments" in France. In the case of the United States,
the degree of integration of the states into a federal union is such that the rules provide for
a very extensive policy of recognition and enforcement of sister-state judgments,
including non-money judgments . France being integrated in a looser regional
association, the European Union
, the rules for recognition and enforcement of other
Member State non-money judgments, which are to be found in an international treaty
specifically drafted for that purpose , will also prove looser.
3
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 1, at 1607 ("international recognition practice should be treated
separately from federal-system practice").
. These are the judgments issued by the courts of one of the legal entities linked together and integrated
in "some sort of a multiple-state association" (von Mehren, Sister State Judgment Recognition, supra note
80, at 1045), "where there are significant nonnational elements in the administration ofjustice in the
several states that comprise the system in question" (id, at 1044). "For convenience of exposition,
judgments with such mixed characteristics can be called "sister state judgments'" (id, at 1045).
85
Hans Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 UCLA L. REV. 44,
45-46 (1962) [hereinafter International Res Judicata] (referring to the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a
"nationally unifying force").
86
Casad, supra note 81, at 22.
87
See supra note 79.
88
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27,
1968 [hereinafter cited as the Brussels Convention]. The Convention was revised in 1978, (done at
Luxembourg on Oct. 9, 1978), 18 I.L.M. 28 (1979), 29 I.L.M. 1417 (1990) (consolidated version including
amendments of accession treaties) following the accession of Denmark, Ireland and Great Britain to the
Community, and again in 1992 for the accession of Spain and Portugal (done at San Sebastian and signed
by France on February 1st, 1992). Safe few differences on the substance, a text similar to that of the
Brussels Convention was adopted among the European sister-states and those states of the EFTA
(European Free Trade Association), comprising at the time the Convention was signed Austria, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, and today reduced to Switzerland, Norway,
Iceland and Liechtenstein due to the integration of the others into the European Union in 1996. The
Convention, known as the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters [hereinafter cited as the Lugano Convention], was signed on Sept. 16, 1988, 1989 O.J.
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1. The extensive recognition and enforcement rules ofthe United States
The U.S. Constitution requires that each state give "full faith and credit" to the
public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State89 . The legislation
implementing the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution90 further states that the
decisions of the courts of any state are entitled to the same
9
' full faith and credit in every
court within the United States as in the "courts of such State ... from which they are
taken"
.
The standard for recognition and enforcement is therefore federal93
,
and not
state law.
Relatively few exceptions arise to the policy of complete recognition of sister-
state judgments regardless of their nature . Accordingly, sister-state non-money
judgments will be generally recognized. Public policy is not a valid defense95
, and the
principle of recognition extends to tax and some penal
97 judgments. The general rule,
which does not distinguish between money and non-money judgments, is that a judgment
is entitled to full faith and credit when the second court's inquiry discloses that there has
been full and fair litigation in the court rendering the original judgment, and that such
(L. 285) 1 . See e.g. Georges Peyrard, Recueil de Textes: Droit International Prive et Droit du
Commerce International 137(L'Hermes, 1992).
89
U.S. Const, art. 4, § 1.
The Act of May 26, 1 790, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 1 22 implemented the clause. It is nowadays codified under 28
U.S.C. 1738, last amended in 1980. See von Mehren, Sister State Judgment Recognition, supra note 80, at
1051.
Emphasis added.
92
28 U.S.C. § 1738.
Linda Silberman, Enforcement and Recognition ofForeign Country Judgments: American Law, C475
ALI-ABA 525, 527.
94
CASAD, supra note 81, at 29-30. von Mehren, Sister-State Judgment Recognition, supra note 80, at 1051-
53.
95
Fautleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
96
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
" Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892). Judgments that are penal "in the international sense" will
generally not be recognized. A judgment is penal "in the international sense" when its "purpose is to
punish an offense against the public justice of the state", as opposed to a penal judgment affording "a
private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act", 146 U.S. 657, 673-74 (1892). The former will not
be recognized under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution [The Antelope case, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 66 (1825)] while the latter will [Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892)]. See e.g., Mark W.
Janis, The Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Law: The Antelope 's Penal Law Exception, 20 INT'L
LAW. 303(1986).
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98judgment is final
. It follows therefrom that ex-parte and default judgments may be
vulnerable to full faith and credit", as well as interlocutory orders
100
. However,
modifiable decrees, for alimony, child support or custody will generally be recognized
101
,
and specific legislation will sometimes provide expressly for such recognition 102 . In
principle, recognition of sister-state non-money judgments, includes many equity
decrees . albeit the Supreme Court has ruled that full faith and credit did not require the
enforcement of decrees purporting to convey or otherwise affect land lying outside of the
territory of the rendering court
The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution 3 does not distinguish between
recognition and enforcement . However, actual enforcement of sister-state judgments
may require some further steps to be taken due to the states' individual sets of rules for
procedure. For instance, a sister-state may require that a local judgment be obtained in its
courts based on the original judgment the recognition of which is sought, and then
enforce this original judgment indirectly, such enforcement arising from the local
(second) judgment rather than from the original judgment . Whereas money-judgments
may be easily enforced without further formalities, the above-mentioned procedure may
more often be required from non-money judgments, particularly equity decrees.
I OR
enforceable only by procedures available locally , and in the absence of "undue burden"
no
Casad, supra note 8 1 , at 29.
99
von Mehren, Sister State Judgment Recognition, supra note 80, at 1053. Exclusively the issues that the
absent party did not have the opportunity to litigate in the first forum will be affected.
100
CASAD. supra note 8 1 , at 29.
101
Id. Richman & Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws, § 98 (1984).
102
See. e.g. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act [URESA], 9A U.L.A. 643 (1979) (1968
Revised Act), Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act [UCCJA], 9 U.L.A. 91 1 (1979). See infra, notes
48 1 -97 and accompanying text.
103 ROGER C. CRAMTON ET al., CONFLICT OF Laws 454 (5th ed. 1 993).
104
Fall v. Estin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909). The exception concerns direct effects upon foreign land. Indirect
effects are entitled to full faith and credit. Casad, supra note 8 1 , at 30.
105
U.S. CONST, art 4 § 1 . See supra, note 66 and accompanying text.
106
Supra, note 66 and accompanying text.
107
Casad, supra note 8 1 , at 26.
108
As procedure may vary from state to state : procedural law is state law. See von Mehren, Sister State
Judgment Recognition, supra note 80, at 1044-1045.
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upon the enforcing court . However, in those states that have adopted the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
, some of the procedural difficulties may be
avoided
. The Enforcement Act does not limit itself to money-judgments and its
dispositions will apply to non-money judgments issued by courts of sister-states 112 . The
Enforcement Act provides for enforcement of sister-state judgments in a manner similar
to that of local judgments. Upon filing of the foreign judgment in the local court 113
,
notice is issued to the debtor of the obligation and after a specified period, local
enforcement procedures will be made available to the plaintiff
Whereas sister-state judgments may not be assimilated to local judgments * and
indeed do bear the name of "foreign judgments" , the sources providing for their
execution are to be found in the federal Constitution and that particular category of
"foreign" non-money judgments is granted a degree of recognition far superior to that to
be found in the system governing the recognition and the enforcement of other Member
State non-money judgments in France.
2. Limited rules for recognition and enforcement of other Member State non-money
judgments in France
Rules providing for recognition and enforcement in France of European Member
State judgments 117 are embodied in the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and
109
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 1, at 1608 (citing the 1967 draft of the proposed § 102 of the
Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws).
110
13 U.L.A. 149 (1986). See supra, note 64.
See supra, note 64.
112
By its terms, the Enforcement Act applies to sister state judgments. In States having adopted both the
Recognition and the Enforcement Act, the latter is incorporated into the former by the terms of the former
but will nevertheless refer to non-money judgments while the Recognition Act will be limited to money-
judgments. Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement ofForeign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of
Uniformity and Acceptance, 67 NOTRE Dame L. Rev. 253, 278 (1991).
113
The filing procedure is a simplification operated by the 1964 version of the Enforcement Act. The
earlier version, from 1948, provided for a "registration" procedure. See supra, note 64.
1 14 Enforcement Act, supra note 64.
115
von Mehren, Sister State Judgments Recognition, supra note 80, at 1045.
1 16
See supra, note 84 and accompanying text.
117
See supra, note 79 for a list of those Member-States.
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Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 118 , elaborated to further the
"common market" goals of the founding fathers of the European Community in the
field described by article 220 of the founding Treaty 120 as "simplification of formalities
governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of [other Member State
judgments]"
. The source for recognition and enforcement of other Member State
judgments in France is therefore a Treaty, which is independant from the founding Acts.
French law provides in its Constitution for the supremacy of Conventions and Treaties
over any other source of national law . Whenever applicable, the Brussels Convention
will therefore preempt any other national source in the field.
The Brussels Convention undertakes to harmonize jurisdiction, and recognition
and enforcement rules among the Member States of the European Union. The states of
123
the European Union have significant differences in their legal systems . Accordingly,
"it would have been impossible for the Member States to reach agreement on pertinent
rules for all possible subjects of litigation" . Article 1 of the Convention sets a list of
matters expressly excluded from the scope of the Convention. The Convention applies to
Civil and Commercial matters exclusively " and does not cover personal status, legal
capacity, matrimonial property, wills, successions and bankruptcies , that are areas
where local policy is very likely to be very strong " and where judgments granted will be
so other than for a defined sum of money. As a result, many types of non-money
judgments from other Member States's courts will not be granted privileged treatment
Supra note 88.
" 9EEC Treaty, supra note 79, art. 2. Article 2 of the EEC Treaty sets the establishment of a "common
market" as one of the goals of the -then- newly formed association.
120 EEC Treaty, supra note 79, art. 220.
';' Id.
122 Const (Fr.). art 55.
12
' von Mehren, Sister-State Judgment Recognition, supra note 80, at 1048-50.
124
Peter Herzog, The Common Market Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments: An
Interim update, 17 Va. J. INT'L L. 417, 420 (1977).
125
Brussels Convention, supra note 88, art. 1
.
126
Id. See also Herzog, supra note 124, at 420, and Casad, supra note 81, at 36.
127
Herzog, supra note 1 24, at 420. Casad, supra note 8 1 , at 36.
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and will be submitted to the rules governing the recognition and the execution of foreign-
country judgments.
For those non-money judgments covered by the scope of the Convention, for
instance specific performance in commercial matters, injunctions in civil or commercial
matters unaffected by the specific exceptions listed above or judgments for title in civil or
commercial matters, the scope of the effects given in France to one of them will depend
on whether recognition or enforcement is sought.
Unlike the provisions dealing with the matter in the U.S. sister-states system, the
Brussels Convention treats in separate articles -albeit within the same section- of
128
recognition and enforcement . Article 26 of the Convention provides that any judgment
covered by the scope of the Convention shall be recognized without the necessity of any
formal procedure . Such "automatic"-or de piano- recognition includes res judicata
effects and can accordingly be qualified of "complete" . Article 26 applies to non-
money judgments unaffected by the exceptions of article 1. Article 27 however sets some
exceptions to the de piano recognition of article 26. Such exceptions will comprise the
local public policy
133
, lack of notice to the defendant
134
,
judgment inconsistent with a
prior judgment between the same parties " and incorrect choice of law if the suit
incidentally involves matters excluded from the scope of the Convention . The scope of
128
Brussels Convention, supra note 88, arts. 26, 32.
129
Brussels Convention, supra note 88, art. 26. Casad, supra note 79, at 37.
"Reconnaissance de plein droit".
131 LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 538. Casad, supra note 81, at 37.
132
Unlike the French domestic recognition of some effects de piano to foreign judgments, which may or
may not include resjudicata effects depending on the category ofjudgment considered. See infra, notes
233-240 and accompanying text.
133
Brussels Convention, supra note 88, art. 27 (1). Public policy as understood in the Brussels Convention
does not include rules for jurisdiction and has a much more limited scope than public policy as understood
before United States jurisdictions. Herzog, supra note 124, at 425. Georges A. L. Droz, Regards sur le
Droit International Prive Compare, 229 R.C.A.D.I 9, 105 (1991). CASAD, supra note 81, at 39.
134
Brussels Convention, supra note 88, art. 27 (2). See CASAD, supra note 8 1 , at 39.
135
Brussels Convention, supra note 88, art. 27 (3). See Casad, supra note 81, at 39.
136
Brussels Convention, supra note 88, art. 27 (4). Herzog, supra note 124, at 425. See also CASAD, supra
note 81, at 39.
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recognition in France of other European Union Member State judgments is. following the
above exceptions, less extensive than that in the United State for sister-state judgments 137
,
where notably public policy is excluded from the thin list of grounds for non-recognition
of sister-states judgments
. Particularly with regard to non-money judgments,
recognition is less extensive in France because unlike the full faith and credit clause of
the U.S. Constitution, the Brussels Convention excludes some entire areas from
automatic recognition.
Enforcement is to be found under a different article of the Brussels Convention 139 .
Unlike recognition, it is not provided for automatically. Article 34 of the Brussels
Convention requires an ex-parte application for enforcement 140 . The granting of the
request may not be refused on grounds other than those of article 27 listed above,
provided that the judgment is enforceable in the state of origin . However, enforcement
of non-money judgments may prove more difficult. Because of the differences in the
legal systems of the European Member States, much greater than the differences among
the sister-states composing the United States , some remedies available in the country
of the original judgment may not be available in the country in which recognition is
asked. It could therefore hardly be expected that the latter country provide such relief
Also the question arises that the public policy exception may be invoked if the remedy
seeked is available in the country of recognition but not provided for domestically in the
particular type of suit involved
von Mehren, Sister-State Judgment Recognition, supra note 80, at 1055.
138
Fautleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). See supra, notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
139
LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 538.
140
Brussels Convention, supra note 88. See Casad, supra note 81, at 37-38, and LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL,
supra note 68, at 536.
141
Herzog, supra note 124, at 425.
I4:
von Mehren, Sister-State Judgment Recognition, supra note 80, at 1048-50.
143
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 1, at 1609. For instance, the concept of "equitable remedies" as
used in England and its methods of enforcement are unknown to the French system. See generally TRENDS
in Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments, supra note 32.
144
Id. For instance, if the First judgment is rendered for specific performance in labor law, when specific
performance exists as a remedy in the state where enforcement is sought, but not in relation to labor law.
21
Therefore, because of the exclusion of specific matters from the scope of the
Brussels Convention as well as because of some differences in the degree of similarity
between Member-State judgments
, the recognition and the enforcement of Member
State non-money judgments in France will be far more limited that for U.S. sister-state
judgments. Whereas the Convention applies to some types of non-money judgments,
many are excluded from the Convention and will follow the rules for recognition and
enforcement of foreign-country" judgments. No such exclusions take place in the U.S.
146
system
B. Sources Governing the Recognition and the Enforcement of Foreign-
Country Non-Money Judgments
There are no special rules set for the recognition or the non-recognition of non-
1 *17
money judgments in either the United States or France . Therefore the general
procedure set for recognition is to be followed in each country. The actual enforcement of
non-money judgments will prove more delicate in both systems
/. Rules governing the recognition of foreign-country non-money judgments the
United States
Even if some courts have sometimes based recognition of foreign-country
judgments upon it 149 , the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution
5
does not apply
to judgments of foreign nations 1 ^ 1 . However, the application of the clause among sister
145
von Mehren. Recognition General Theory; supra note 80. at 90.
146
See supra, notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
147
Buzard. supra note 34, at 93 ("A foreign [non-money judgment] is susceptible to the same general
conditions and/or affirmative defenses as monetary judgments").
148
Infra, notes 203-210, 269-76 and accompanying text.
"'
See, eg. Jonhson v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 124 (NY. 1926), Scott v.
Scon. 33 1 P.2d 64 1 . 653 (Cal. 1 958). Bishop & Bumette, supra note 62, at 426.
150
U.S. Const, art. 4, § 1.
151
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912). Reese, The Status in this Country of
Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 783. 786 n. 19 (1950), Hans Smit, International Res
Judicata, supra note 85, at 44-45 (establishing a list of references on that topic), Bishop & Burnette, supra
-)-)
states has influenced the general recognition practice , based upon the concept of
153 •
comity "
,
into being particularly extensive compared to that of other nations 154
The recognition of foreign-country judgments is not based on federal law as the
recognition of sister-state judgments is . No federal legislation nor any treaty is
preempting the field 3
,
even though there is little doubt that by ratification of a treaty or
enactment of a statute the Federal Government could adopt laws governing recognition
and enforcement of foreign-country judgments ? . The treatment accorded to foreign-
country judgments is considered a matter of state law
,
even though as of today, the
Supreme Court has not yet issued any ruling on that particular question 1 . Following the
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins decision as to the application of state law in diversity cases, it
has been consistently held that state law also governs issues of recognition and
enforcement of foreign nation judgments
note 62, at 425-426. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF Laws § 98, comment b ( 1 97 1 ). See also
Silberman, supra note 95, at 527.
Bishop & Bumette, supra note 62, at 426-427.
' See infra, note 166 and accompanying text.
154
See, e.g., von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 81 . RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
Law OF the United States, chapter 8, introductory note ( 1 987).
155
By virtue of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST, art. 4, § \. See supra,
notes 89-93, and accompanying text.
156
Brand, supra note 64, at 258. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 38-39.
157
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 38-39. The Foreign Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8 would presumably entitle Congress to such power and the Executive's
powers to negotiate in the area of foreign affairs, U.S. CONST, art II, § 2, entitles the President to act.
Brand, supra note 64, at 257.
158
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 38-39 ("the recognition of foreign-judgments usually is
governed, under current law, by the various state laws").
r59
Id., at 39.
160 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In diversity cases, the federal court must apply the law of the state in which it sits,
304 U.S. at 78. The result is that federal judges are compelled to determine what the relevant state courts
would decide if faced with the same issue. Brand, supra note 64, at 263. Choice of law rules are also those
of the state in which the federal court sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
161
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405
U.S. 1017 (1972), Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), Ltd., 492 F.Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980), Banque
Libanaise pour le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1990). See also Brand, supra note 64, at
262-263. Smit, International Res Judicata, supra note 85, at 48 ("the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and
subsequent cases pronounces state law to be controlling")-
23
In the United States, recognition of foreign-country judgments is generally a
matter of common law
. Some statutory sources may be found, but their scope of
application will however be limited to money-judgments. The Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act 163 is today the cornerstone of such sources 164 . As far as non-
money judgments are concerned, the main sources will therefore be the common law of
each state. The Restatement (third) of the Foreign Relations Laws of the United States 165
also includes some dispositions regarding non-money judgments.
Common law bases recognition of foreign-country judgments upon the notion of
"comity"
.
Not distinguished under the doctrine of comity, judgments other than for a
sum of money will therefore follow this general basis for their recognition. Comity
provides for "acceptance of foreign judgments as conclusive for res judicata and
collateral estoppel effects" unless one of the following grounds justifies the refusal of
such recognition : lack of impartiality of the foreign tribunal or lack of due process 168
,
~ von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 40-41
.
>3
1 3 U.L.A. 263 ( 1 986) [hereinafter cited as the Recognition Act].
22 states have adopted the Recognition Act with some additional requirements of reciprocity in 5 States.
See Brand, supra note 64, at 286.
65 Restatement (third) of the Foreign Relations Laws of the United States ( 1 987).
Abundant case law and literature exist upon the notion of Comity. The leading precedent on the concept
of Comity is Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 1 13 (1895). In a very frequently cited paragraph, the Supreme
Court identified "Comity" as
Neither a matter of absolute obligation, on one hand, nor of mere courtesy or good will, upon the
other. But it is the recognition that one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection
of its laws.
159 U.S. 113, 163-54(1895). See a/so Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,
440 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert, denied. 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). Among the literature upon the concept of Comity,
see, e.g., Bishop & Burnette, supra note 62, at 426, von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6. at 43-46, von
Mehren, Enforcement in the United States, supra note 59, at 401-402, Robert B. von Mehren,
Transnational Litigation in American Courts : An overview ofthe Problems and Issues, 3 DICK.. J. INT'L L.
43, 58 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Transnational Litigation Overview], Joseph J. Simeone, The Recognition
and Enforceability ofForeign Country Judgments, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 341, .nn.5-58 and accompanying
text ( 1 993) (publication page references not available for this document), Smit, International Res Judicata,
supra note 84, at 54, 30 AM. JUR. 2D, Executions, 528.
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 44.
168
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 1 13, 166-67 (1895) ("upon regualr proceedings and due notice..."), and see,
e.g., Panama Processes v. Cities Service Co., 796 P.2d 276, 285 (Okla. 1990), Parsons v. Bank Leumi Le-
Israel, B.M., 565 So.2d 20, 24 (Ala. 1990). See also Recognition Act, supra note 163, at § 4 (a)(1), 13
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lack of jurisdiction over the defendant 169 or the subject matter 170 , absence of sufficient
notice to the defendant
,
judgment obtained by fraud 172 , the cause of action or the
judgment are repugnant to the public policy of the second forum 173 , the judgment
conflicts with another final judgment entitled to recognition 174
, or the proceeding was
contrary to a choice of forum agreement between the parties
17
"\ In most jurisdictions, a
finding of reciprocity is no longer a requisite to recognition
176
. However some states
maintain some higher requirement for foreign-judgments recognition 177 . Based upon the
notion of "Comity of Nations", foreign-country non-money judgments will be recognized
in the United States provided they are free of the above-mentioned defects. Some argue
U.L.A. at 268, and Restatement (third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 482
0)(a)(1987).
Hilton v. Guyot. 1 59 U.S. 1 1 3, 202 ( 1 895) (requiring "an opportunity for a trial abroad...before a court
of competent jurisdiction"). See Brand, supra note 64, at 271. See also Recognition Act, supra note 163, at
§ (a), and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 482 ( 1 )(b)
(1987).
170
Hunt v. BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd.. 492 F.Supp. 885, 898 (N.D. Tex. 1980), Recognition Act,
supra note 1 63, at § 4 (a)(3). Restatement (third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 482 (2)(a) (1987).
171
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166-67 (1895). Tahan v. Hogdson, 662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(notice held to be sufficient even though it was in Hebrew, a language not understood by the defendant),
Boivin v. Talcott. 102 F.Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 195 l)(insufficient notice), Hager v. Hager, 274 N.E.2d 157,
161 (III. App. 1971) (insufficient notice). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
Law of the United States § 482 (2)(b) ( 1 987).
172
Hilton v. Guyot, 1 59 U.S. 1 1 3, 206 ( 1 895) (dicta), Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.,
453 F.2d435, 442 (3d Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). See also Laufer v. Westminster
Brothers, Ltd., 532 A.2d 130 (DC. App. 1987), United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 (1878)
(only fraud extrinsic to the judgment will invalidate such judgment). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 482 (2)(c) ( 1 987).
173
Hilton v. Guyot, 1 59 U.S. 1 1 3. 204-05 ( 1 895), Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.,
453 F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 1971), cert denied, 405 U.S. 1017, (1972). See also Adamsen v. Adamsen, 195
A.2d 4 1 8 (Conn. 1 963). Yoder v. Yoder, 263 N.E.2d 9 1 3 (Ohio App. 1 970). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 482 (2)(d) ( 1 987).
174
Ackerman v. Ackerman. 517 F.Supp. 614. 623, 6226 (S.D.N. Y. 1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 898 (2d Cir.
1 982). See also Brand, supra note 64, at 2 1 6, and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS Law
OF THE UNITED STATES § 482 (2)(e).
175
Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. I (1972) (supporting choice of forum clauses). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 482 (2)(f) (1 987).
176
Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152N.E. 121, 123 (N.Y. 1926). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 48 1 , reporter's note 1
,
at598-99(1987).
177
For instance Georgia requires reciprocity and makes all of the above-mentioned exceptions mandatory
grounds for non recognition. GA CODE ANN. § 9-12-1 14 (10)(1982), Brand, supra note 64, at 286.
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that non-money judgments will however be subject to closer scrutiny than money-
judgments will
,
which may be supported by recent case law 179 in certain areas.
The Restatement (third) of the Foreign Relations Laws of the United States (1987)
expressly includes as recognizable in the United States some types of non-money
judgments in its statement of the law upon recognition of foreign-country judgments,
1 Of) 1 O 1 I Q-J
such as divorce
,
custody and support orders . The Restatement (third) also lists tax
and penal foreign-country judgments as generally not recognizable nor enforceable in the
United States
,
which is different from the rule governing sister-state judgments upon
the matter . Save that exception, non-money judgments not specifically listed by the
Restatement will follow the general rule according to which final foreign-country
judgments establishing or confirming the status of a person or determining interests in
property are entitled to recognition in the United States if they are not affected by one
of the above-mentioned grounds for non-recognition. A comment to the Restatement also
indicates that other types of foreign-country non-money judgments such as judgments
granting injunctions or judgments arising from attachment of property may be entitled to
Buzard, supra note 34, at 92 (1990) (referring to foreign equitable remedies).
179
Pilkinton Brothers, Ltd. v. AFG Industries Inc., 581 F.Supp. 1039 (D.C. Del. 1984) (denying
recognition of a British interim injunction pending arbitration proceedings upon the subject matter in
England). See infra, notes 521-525 and accompanying text.
180
See, e.g., Gould v Gould, 138 N.E. 490 (N.Y. 1923), Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y.
1 965) (denying recognition as a blatant example of forum shopping). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 484 ( 1 987).
181
See. e.g., In Re Marriage of Ben-Yehoshua, 91 Cal.App.3d 259 (Cal. App. 1979), Taylor v. Taylor, 420
A.2d 570 (Pa. Super. 1980), cert, denied, 102S.Q. 1020 (1982), Miller v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 22 Cal.3d 923 (Cal. 1978). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 485 ( 1 987).
182
Herczog v. Herczog, 186 Cal.2d 318 (Cal. App. 1960), Gutillo v. Gutillo, 30 A.D.2d 484 (N.Y.App.Ct.
1968). But see e.g., Nardi v. Segal, 234 N.E.2d 805 (111. App. 1967). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 486 ( 1 987).
183
See supra, note 97 for penal judgments. See also, for tax, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the
Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979). See Restatement (THIRD) OF
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 483 (1987) ("courts in the United States are not
required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines or penalties rendered by the
courts of other states").
184
See supra, notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
185
Supra notes 180-183 and accompanying text for a list of those specifically listed.
186
Supra, notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
26
1 87
recognition under the Restatement rules , as well as judgments recognizing succession
1 88
to the property of a decedent and claims recognized or denied by foreign bankruptcy
. 189
courts .
In its section 98, the Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) states a
general policy in favor of recognition of foreign-country judgments . It appears that
non-money judgments are not included in that declaration of principle, as the Restatement
indicates that "[e]xisting authority does not warrant the making of any definite
statement" as far as those judgments are concerned. However, the Restatement further
indicates in its comments that foreign equity decrees will usually be recognizable " and
may be enforceable if they will "not impose an undue burden upon the American
courts"
1 3
and if the decree is "consistent with principles of justice and good morals" .
The rules for enforcement of foreign non-money judgments are far more restrictive than
the rules governing their recognition.
187
See Buzard, supra note 34, at n.2. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
Law of the United States § 48 1 (1 987).
188
Warts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 265 N.E.2d 739 (N.Y. 1970). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 481, Reporter's note 2, at 599(1987).
189
Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Restatement (third) OF THE
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 481, Reporter's note 2, at 599 (1987).
190
Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws § 98 (1971). Courtland H. Peterson, Foreign Country
Judgments and the Second Restatement ofConflict ofLaws, 72 COLUMB. L. REV. 220, 223 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Foreign Judgments and Restatement Second].
191
Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws § 102 (1971). Peterson, Foreign Judgments and
Restatement Second, supra note 190, at 223. See also Buzard, supra note 34, at 91-92.
192
See Roblin v. Long, 60 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 200 (1880) ("This court possesses full power to enforce the
judgment and decree of the Chancery court of Canada", id., at 205). See also Abadou v. Trad, 624 P.2d
287 (Alaska 1981) (enforcing equity decree related to land). Peterson, Foreign Judgments and Restatement
(second), supra note 190, at 223, von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 74-75, Brand, supra note 64, at
96-97.
193
Roblin v. Long, 60 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 200 (N.Y. 1880). See also Abadou v. Trad, 624 P.2d 287 (Alaska
1981). Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws 3 1 0, § 1 02, comment g ( 1 97 1 ). See Brand, supra
note 64, at 108.
194
Id.
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2. Rules governing the enforcement offoreign non-money judgments in the United
States
A foreign-country judgment, even recognized, is generally not directly
enforceable in the United States : it must first be reduced to a judgment of the enforcing
court and then may be enforced by any means available under local law 195 . It is to be
noted that in the United States, as in any other common law system, the enforcement
proceedings is treated as a fresh separate proceeding
196
the initiative of which is in the
hands of the successful party : unlike in civil law countries
1
, the court has neither
duty nor initiative to enforce a previous judgment or order and must leave this decision to
the successful party. Each state has its own detailed rules governing enforcement
proceedings , and uniformity has been reached among some states only as far as money-
* 200judgments are concerned, by the combined application of the Recognition Act ,
201
applicable to foreign-country money-judgments, and the Enforcement Act , applicable
only to sister-state judgments originally but extended to foreign-country judgments by
incorporation into the terms of the Recognition Act in those states that have adopted
both
202
. Non-money judgments may not be recognized by this simplified proceeding and
will therefore follow the local procedure.
U.S. courts will indeed grant actual enforcement of some types of foreign non-
money judgments , provided the form of relief is available under local law , and that
von Mehren, Enforcement in the United States, supra note 59. at 402.
1 Trends in the enforcement of foreign non-money judgments, supra note 32, at 18.
Id.
1
See infra, note 276 and accompanying text.
von Mehren, Enforcement in the United States, supra note 59, at 404.
Supra note 163.
195
196
197
198
199
200
Supra note 64.
202
Brand, supra note 64, at 278-79. The Recognition Act provides that a judgment entitled to recognition is
enforceable "in the same manner as the judgment of a sister-state which is entitled to full faith and credit",
Recognition Act, supra note 64, at § 3.
203
See e.g., Roblin v. Long, 60 How.Pr. 200 (N.Y. 1880) (enforcement of specific performance decree).
See supra, note 192. See also infra, notes 510-520 and accompanying text.
204
Boissevain v. Boissevain, 169 N.E. 130 (N.Y. 1929). See von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 74-
75. See supra, note 195.
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the enforcing court will not suffer an "undue burden"20 "". However this will be indirect
enforcement, since the judgment enforced will really be the U.S. judgment rendered
following recognition of the foreign judgment , or a judgment assimilated to a local
judgment for enforcement according to the terms of the Enforcement Act itoday n force
in most states . Given the differences in the remedies available in each of the two legal
systems considered, many of the species of non-money judgments awarded in France will
not be available in the same form under U.S. rules and therefore may be entitled to
recognition, but not enforcement in the United States. The problem is however avoided in
208
a number of cases where the judgment is qualified of "self-enforcing"
,
that is capable
of producing effects by virtue of its own existence, such as a declaration as to legal rights
or a decree of legitimization . Also, in some cases, the obligation may be convertible
210
into a money "compensation" by the enforcing court due to the impossible
enforcement of the decree granting specific relief.
In the United States, the enforcement of non-money judgments, as that of any
2 1 I
other type of judicial decision, rests upon "contempt of court"" and the power of the
court to impose therefrom various sanctions of a fairly serious order, including fines and
imprisonments, upon the party who is not complying with the non-money decree212
205
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 74-75. See supra note 192 (Roblin case). See also
Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws § 102, comment g, at 3 10. (All the other conditions will
have been examined at the earlier stage of recognition).
" von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 74-75.
207
Recognition Act, supra note 64. See supra, note 665 (Following the adoption of the Enforcement Act,
procedures concerning the recocgnition and the enforcement of foreign-country judgments are consisting
of a single step : the filing of the foreign judgment with the courts of the state in which recognition and
enforcement are sought).
208
Trends in the enforcement of foreign non-money judgments, supra note 32, at 1 6.
209 , , . .-
Id., at 17.
210
Even though the principle underlying the granting of non-money awards is that there is no such money
equivalent to it, see supra, note 1 1
.
211
The action of contempt of court is defined as "any act which is calculated to embarrass, hinder or
obstruct the administration ofjustice, or which is calculated to lessen its authority or its dignity", BLACK'S
Law Dictionary (WESTLAW). Failure to comply with the order of a court amounts to contempt of court,
id
212
For the use of the term decree instead ofjudgment in relation to equitable remedies, see supra, note 1 1
.
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issued previously by the court" J . However, contempt of court is limited to in personam
decrees"
,
and other means of enforcement are made available to the successful party for
other types of decrees. For instance, an order to convey land may be carried out by the
court, operating the transfer of property herself
21
". Such a method will be qualified of
"indirect enforcement"
, as opposed to direct enforcement, that is enforcement realized
by the parties themselves . Indirect enforcement may also be used in in personam cases,
for instance by appointment of a receiver or other officer of court to carry out the act
218 2 1
Q
commanded , the costs of the substitution being charged to the non-complying party
It is to be noted that once receivership as been chosen over contempt of court for
220
enforcement, the latter is not available any more to the party seeking enforcement .
However the most frequently used instrument of enforcement of non-money decrees is
perhaps the imposition of fines to require the direct enforcement of the decree or the
order by the defendant . Enforcement of non-money judgments in the United States
223
may accordingly be effectuated by various measures" . The problem of actual
enforcement arises as far as the enforcement of local non-money judgments are
concerned, and will be emphasized greatly when the relief sought originates abroad, even
though it is reduced to a local judgment by the time it reaches the stage of enforcement
213
See supra, note 211. See also DOBBS, supra note 7, at 93.
214
DOBBS, supra note 7, at 93. ("it is a power that exists only to enforce personal orders").
2,5
Id., at 91.
216 Trends in the enforcement of foreign non-money judgments, supra note 32, at 16-1 7.
217
Trends in the enforcement of foreign non-money judgments, supra note 32, at 1 7.
218
DOBBS, supra note 7, at 92. Ohio v. Kovacs, 21 S.Ct 705 (1985) (following the issuance of a clean-up
order in an environmental protection case, a receiver was appointed to carry out the order upon non-
compliance of the defaulting party).
2,9
Ohio v. Kovacs, 21 S. Ct 705 (1985).
220
Id.
221
The resort to coercive and compensatory fines is common indeed. On the other hand, punitive fines are
rarely, if ever, used in civil contempt proceedings. TRENDS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN NON-MONEY
JUDGMENTS, supra note 32, at 8 1
.
222
Id. See e.g., Mobile County Jail Inmates v. Purvis, 600 F. Supp. 788 (S.D. Ala. 1 985), c.c. 55 1 F. Supp.
92(S.D. Ala. 1982), affd 703 F. 2d 580 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (compliance with order requiring change in the
management of a county jail carried out by imposition of a coercive fine upon county officials), and CBS
v. Pennsylvania Record Outlet, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 1549 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (imposing compensatory fines for
various violations of a consent decree).
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77.1
before a U.S. court." Quite different are the procedures used in the French system for
recognition and enforcement of non-money judgments. They are not as extensive as the
solutions offered generally by the U.S. system.
3. Rules governing the recognition and the enforcement offoreign-country judgments
in France
Recognition of foreign judgments in France is one of the few areas of the law
which has been extensively developed by case law223 . The Code of Civil Procedure,
which deals with the enforcement and execution procedures for local judgments226 simply
provides that foreign-country judgments will be enforceable in France in statutory-
defined cases
.
The statutory provisions referred to are set forth in the Civil Code228 and
merely provide that enforceability of foreign-country judgments is granted by a special
proceeding, bearing the name of exequatur, before French civil courts
229
. Such
proceeding is an adversary hearing
,
and requires proper standing from the part of the
parties to the action . In many cases, the proceeding of exequatur is required for
recognition of some resjudicata effects to foreign-country judgments. Therefore, in those
7^7
cases, "recognition", meaning the production of res judicata effects, " and
"enforceability" of foreign-country judgments will arise from the same proceeding.
However, foreign-country judgments may be recognized some effects independently from
the exequatur proceeding. First, all foreign judgments will be recognized as elements of
Trends in the enforcement of foreign non-money judgments, supra note 32, at 82.
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
225
LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 5 1 9.
226
C. PR.CIV. arts. 501-26. See generally VINCENT & GUINCHARD, supra note 38, at 552-82.
227
C. PR. Civ. art 509.
228
C. Civ. art 2123.
230
"Procedure contradictoire\ LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 53 1
.
231
Id. See Cour d'Appel de Paris, Feb. 19, 1960, REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL Prive [Rev.
cr. dr. int. pr] 1960.599, note Y.L.
232
See infra, notes 299-304. The extent of the resjudicata and estoppel effects ofjudgments rendered in
France are more limited than those in the United States. See infra, note 290.
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proof of the situation created or recorded by the judgment, or of the quality of the parties
* *u 233
to the case .
More fundamental is the recognition awarded per se to foreign-country judgments
establishing the status of a person^ or dealing with personal capacity of the parties. Case
law has consistently held that such judgments will be recognized res judicata effects in
France independently from the proceeding of exequatur23*, provided however that the
"international regularity" of the judgment be established237 . Exequatur will only be
required for those judgments if some measures of execution upon persons and/or property
238
are requested . Since judgments ruling upon status and capacity will be forms of non-
239
money decrees
,
the recognition of those categories of non-money judgments, being
automatic, will prove less burdensome in France than the recognition of the same in the
United States. Safe this exception all other types of non-money judgments will not be
recognized res judicata effects without fulfilling the requirements of the exequatur
proceeding. Since the French procedure does not expressly distinguish between money
and non-money judgments , the exequatur proceeding applies to the latter as it applies
to the former. However the distinction will prove significant, even before actual
enforcement is required.
" LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 533. Daniele Alexandre, Les effets desjugements etrangers
independants de I exequatur, in TRAV. COM. FR. DR. INT. PR., 1975-77, 51, 54-59 (Paris, C.N.R.S. ed.,
1979).
2j>4
Supra note 53. See infra, notes 45 1 -454.
55
LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 534-36. Alexandre, supra note 233, at 59-61. Cass., Feb. 28,
1 860, D.P. 60. 1 .57, S. Jur. I. 60. 1 .2 1 [commonly and hereinafter referred to as the Buckley case] (ruling
that producing title of foreign divorce justified dissolution of the previous marriage in the eyes of French
registrar). This principle of automatic recognition was justified by the incompatibility between the creation
of a status and a possible geographic relativity of such status, LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra.
236
"Regularite internationale". Alexandre, supra note 233, at 60.
237
Id.
238
LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 534-36. Cour d'Appel de Colmar, Dec. 16, 1953, Clunet,
1954.1 10 (Court of Appeals refused to grant an alimony based on foreign divorce not submitted to
exequatur).
Supra, notes 53, 57.
240
Supra, notes 38-39, and accompanying text.
32
The conditions to be met by a foreign-country judgment in order to be recognized
and enforceable in France have been issued by case law. If they are met, exequatur will
be granted to the judgment, thereby rendering it recognizable and enforceable on the
French territory without further action
241
. France does not have a general policy of
recognition
.
Rather, the control of the judge will focus on four conditions, and unless
all four conditions are met
,
the foreign judgment244 will not be recognized any res
judicata effects in France, and will not be enforceable243
.
These four conditions are the following : the foreign tribunal had jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject-matter" and did not infringe upon a rule granting exclusive
jurisdiction to the French tribunals under French law247
,
the foreign tribunal applied the
law that French conflict of law rules would have designated248 or a law producing the
same effect
, the foreign judgment respects public policy250 as understood in private
241
LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 522.
" Supra, notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
243
Cass.Civ., l
ere
,
Jan. 7, 1964, J.C.P., 1964.11.13590, note Ancel, Rev.cr.dr.int.pr., 1964.344, note Batiffol,
Clunet, 1964.302, note Goldman [commonly and hereinafter cited as the Munzer case]. Cass. Oct. 4, 1967,
Rev.cr.dr.int.pr., 1968.98, note P. Lagarde, D. 1968.95, note Mezger, J.C.P., 1968 11.15634, note Sialelli,
Clunet, 1969.102, note Goldman [commonly and hereinafter cited as the Bachir case].
Safe the exception concerning judgments upon status and capacity, supra notes 234-237 and
accompanying text.
Prior to Munzer, French tribunals practiced the highest degree of control prior to granting exequatur to a
foreign judgment. The procedure included review of the merits ( "revision aufond"). LOUSSOUARN &
BOUREL, supra note 68, at 523. See also G. Holleaux, Remarques sur revolution de lajurisprudence en
matiere de reconnaissance des decisions etrangeres d'etat et de capacite, TRAV. COM. FR. DR. INT. PR.,
1948-1952, 179, Bredin, supra note 5, at 19-20 (commenting upon the disappearance of the review of the
merits).
According to the local rules governing jurisdiction and to the French rules governing jurisdiction.
LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 528. Bredin, supra note 5, at 25.
247
LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 524-526. Bredin, supra note 5, at 27-30 (arguing that such
condition is a remnant of "legal nationalism" and should accordingly be discarded). See, e.g., Cass. May. 5,
1962, D. 1962. 718, note Holleaux, Rev. crit. dr. int. pr., 1963.99 (the decision stated the principle that
exclusive jurisdiction of the French tribunals under French law is an obstacle to the recognition of the
foreign judgment infringing such rule), Cass. Feb. 6, 1985, Clunet 1985.460, obs. A. Huet,
Rev.cr.dr.int.pr., 1985.369, D. 1 985. 1. R.498, obs. Huet [hereinafter cited as the Simitch case] (accepting
jurisdiction if the litigation had some sufficient connection to the foreign forum).
Munzer, supra note 243, and Bachir, supra note 243.
249
Munzer, supra note 243. See also Cass. civ. Oct. 2, 1986, Rev.cr.dr.int.pr., 1986.91, note Jobard-
Bachellier. The "same effect" principle is called theory of equivalence ("theorie de Vequivalence"}.
250
"ordre public". Public policy may be defined as "community common sense and common conscience,
extended and applied throughout the state to matters of public morals, health, safety, welfare and the like".
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international law 3 and the judgment is rendered free of fraud2 '" 2
. There is no requirement
of reciprocity under French law for recognition of foreign-country judgments233 .
Once the above-mentioned conditions have been fulfilled, exequatur will be granted by
the competent tribunal"
3
and the foreign judgment will be recognized the same res
judicata effects and the same enforceability character as would a decision of a French
tribunal
.
It is to be noted that none of the effects which arose prior to the issuance of
the exequatur will be recognized thereafter
236
.
Whereas in principle there is no exception regarding the recognition of foreign
non-money judgments as opposed to money-judgments257 under exequatur proceedings,
the conditions to be met as stated above will affect non-money judgments much more
than they will affect money-judgments. First, some categories of non-money judgments
will not pass the muster of "public policy", such as judgments for taxes and penal
258judgments" . Public policy will also limit the recognition of the judgment awarding a
remedy that is not available under French rules of law and procedure. Also, non-money
judgments, decrees and orders are issued in areas in which each country has developed
Black's Law Dictionary (WESTLAW). See, e.g. Cass. Civ., May 29, 1948 (Lautour case), J.C.P. 1948.11.
4532 (note Vasseur), D. 1948.357 (note P.L.-P.). S. 1949. 1.21 (note Niboyet) (definition of public policy in
French law with regard to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments), Cass. Civ. June 21, 1950
{Messageries Maritimes case), D. 1 95 1 .749 (note Hamel), S. 1 952. 1 . 1 (note Niboyet) (stating that only
public policy in the international sense of correcting the decisions of foreign sovereigns as opposed to
correcting private acts is to be considered in the definition affecting recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments). See also Munzer, supra note 443, and Cass. Civ. Nov. 3, 1984 (Rohbi case), Clunet 1984.329
(note Ph. Kahn).
251
Messageries Maritimes, supra note 250, Munzer, supra note 243. The satisfaction of the public policy
requirement comprises the insurance that due process has been respected, Bachir, supra note 243, and the
verification that the judgment does not offend public order on its merits, LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra
note 68, at 530, Bredin, supra note 5, at 2 1
.
" Munzer, supra note 243. Bredin, supra note 5, at 21-22.
253
LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 53 1
.
254
The competent tribunal is the Court of First Instance ("Tribunal de Grande Instance") of the place where
recognition and/or enforcement are sought, LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 531-32.
255
Id.
256
Id., at 532.
57
Supra, notes 38-39, 240 and accompanying text.
58
LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 520. However, penal judgments awarding punitive damages
may be recognized and enforced, Cass, civ., Dec. 7, 1936, S. 1937.1.63, Rev. cr. dr. int. pr., 1938.494.
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policies"" and particularisms in their approach as well as complex procedural
regulations . In such areas. French rules for jurisdiction or applicable law may call for
the designation of a tribunal or a law that may differ from the foreign rules upon the
matter much more frequently than rules awarding money-damages will, because the
matter has stronger ties to public policy . In connection to money-judgments, it has
been observed that French and foreign rules will generally meet or produce an equivalent
effect as requested for the granting of exequatur' ' . Such statement will not be found in
connection to non-money judgments, subject to more scrutiny with regard to the
fulfillment of the conditions necessary to the obtaining of an exequatur' . Indeed, it has
been commented upon the conditions for obtaining an exequatur that the distinction
between money-judgments and non-money judgments, not generally considered
domestically, will impose itself in private international law
To provide for uniformity with that regard, one branch of the French doctrine has
pleaded in favor of the extension of the principle of automatic recognition of judgments
upon status and capacity of the person
?
to all types of foreign judgments , but as of
today this plea has not produced any effects upon the jurisprudence and exequatur
proceeding is required in most cases to insure res judicata effects and enforceability to
foreign-country judgments.
" See infra, note 444.
260
Id.
Supra, note 249.
262
Bredin, supra note 5, at 31 ["there is a general equivalence of the laws regarding money-judgments (/'/y
a urxe equivalence des his en matiere patrimoniale)"].
m
ld.
264
Id. ("C 'est une distinction qui s imposera unjour ou I autre en matiere de droit international plus qu en
matiere de droit interne").
265
Supra, notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
266
Alexandre, supra note 233, at 61-80 (Ms Alexandre's communication is followed by the transcript of a
discussion among the members of the French International Law Committee upon the topic of the effects to
be given to foreign judgments independent from exequatur proceedings).
267
For an account of the justifications of such plea, and arguments against extension of the principle, see
Alexandre, supra note 233, at 61-80.
35
Unlike the system in force in the U.S.. the French proceeding treats recognition
and enforceability in one single step, namely the exequatur. Indeed, for money-
judgments, exequatur proceedings guarantee that public force will be imposed upon the
defendant to carry out the execution of the debt . It is not to be forgotten that unlike in
common law systems, the enforcement of the judgment in France and most civil law
countries is directly ordered by the judge, and not left to the initiative of the successful
party . However, the actual enforcement of foreign non-money judgments may raise
some difficulties that will be shared by local non-money award winners. If exequatur was
granted to the judgment which enforcement is seeked, it will be understood that the
270judgment is fit to be enforced in France by the local means of execution" . It other
words, remedies not properly available under French law and rules of procedure in the
circumstances were ruled out at a previous stage. Unlike in the U.S. system, the party
seeking enforcement of its non-money award will not be found in a position in which its
award was recognized but not actually for cause of "undue burden" to the enforcing court
27 1
or because the remedy was not available in such court" . The granting of exequatur
guarantees that no such "undue burden" will be found later. Actual enforcement of non-
money judgments however depends on the convincing force of the means available for
their enforcement. The concept of "'contempt of court"" " or an equivalent of that notion
are unknown to the French procedure" . Indeed, acts of coercion upon the very person of
the defendant are not permitted
274
. As opposed to the U.S. system with regard to the
268
269
LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 522.
See supra, note 197 and accompanying text.
270 LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 5 19 ['7es moyens d 'execution sont adaptes a une decision
etrangere" (the means of execution are adapted to the foreign award)].
271
Supra note 193 and accompanying text.
72
Supra note 2 1 1 and accompanying text.
73
Trends in the Enforcement of Non-Money Judgments, supra note 32, at 157.
274
ZWEIGER & KOTZ, supra note 40 at 509- 1 0. TRENDS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF NON-MONEY
Judgments, supra note 32, at 1 57-58, Edward Yorio, Contract Enforcement, Specific
Performance and Injunctions, 562 (Little, Brown & Co publishers, 1989), C. Civ., art. 1 142. See
supra, note 40.
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matter"
,
the French procedure knows little of direct enforcement and makes great use of
indirect enforcement for non-money judgments" . Direct enforcement is provided for the
delivery of specific goods or the conveyance of land" . It is not provided for specific
performance because of the general prohibition of coercion upon the persons mentioned
278 279
above , and even though some provisions of the Civil Code suggest a "possible
coercive subrogation of the debtor's performance, provisions regulating the realization of
280
such subrogation [were not implemented]" . Neither does French law provide for
281
subrogated performance by a third party . The most generalized coercive measures
2S2
aimed at obtaining compliance with non-money awards are astreintes' '. Astreintes are
orders for the payment of a certain amount of money for each unit of time,
usually a day, during which the defendant delays in complying with a judgment
283
or order for [specific performance]
An astreinte may be either provisional, that is set as a penalty and subject to
revision or suppression
284
, or definitive and payable to the plaintiff with no possibility of
revision
285
. Astreintes are independent from damages" . An order setting an astreinte is
currently regarded as the most effective means of securing enforcement of non-money
judgments in France287 . However, the limit of this indirect coercion is reached by the
75
See supra, notes 212-213 and accompanying text.
276
Trfnds in the Enforcement of Non-Money Judgments, supra note 32, at 1 57.
277
ld
8
Supra note 274.
279
C. Civ. art 1 143 (providing for possible coercive destruction of material contravening to contact
280
281
282
provisions).
"n
TRENDS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF NON-MONEY JUDGMENTS, supra note 32, at 1 59.
C. Civ. art. 1237, Trends in the Enforcement of Non-Money Judgments, supra note 32, at 157.
Trends in the Enforcement of Non-Money Judgments, supra note 32, at 161 . L. 72-526 of July
3rd. 1972, arts. 5-8.
83
Trends in the Enforcement of Non-Money Judgments, supra note 32, at 1 6 1
.
284
YORIO, supra note 274, at 563. L. 72-526 of July 3rd, 1972, art. 6.
285
Id.
286
Trends in the Enforcement of Non-Money Judgments, supra note 32, at 162. L. 72-626 of July
3rd. 1972, art. 6.
287
YORIO, supra note 274, at 563.
insolvency of the debtor and therefore can not be said to replace direct coercion as
practiced in the United States289
288
" Trends in the Enforcement of Non-Money Judgments, supra note 32, at 1 99.
Supra note 21 1 and accompanying text.
CHAPTER III: SCOPE AND EXTENT OF THE EFFECTS TO BE GIVEN TO
FOREIGN NON-MONEY JUDGMENTS FOLLOWING THEIR RECOGNITION:
MODIFYING THE BOUNDARIES OF DOMESTIC RES JUDICATA
Once a foreign judgment has been recognized following the conditions and
procedures described in the previous chapter for each of the two systems considered, the
question of the extent to be given to such foreign judgment arises. Indeed, each system
defines the scope of the conclusive effects that one of its judgments is to be given with
regard to the parties to the action as well as regarding third parties. Such scope will vary
from system to system, and generally it can be said that American courts recognize
greater conclusive effects to their judgments than French courts to theirs . Given those
differences, there is a two-fold inquiry as to the effects to be granted to foreign awards
:will the court be willing to give to a foreign judgment it has just recognized some
conclusive effects comparable to those it grants to its own judgments, or will the court
refer to the foreign law and rules of procedure to determine the effects to be granted to the
foreign judgment291 ? These questions have been one focus of the American legal
literature upon recognition of foreign judgments" for more than thirty years
290
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 65 ("under U.S. law the effect of res judicata and collateral
estoppel is broader than it is under the laws of most countries [...]"), John D. Brummett, Jr., The Preclusive
Effect ofForeign Country Judgments in the United States and Federal Choice ofLaw: The Role ofthe Erie
Doctrine Reassessed, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 83, 95 (1988) ("the nations outside of the Anglo-American
common law tradition have extremely limited preclusion law").
291
Reference to foreign law with regard to this matter is described as "equivalence of effects", von Mehren
& Trautman, supra note 1, at 1681-82.
292
Inclusive of sister-state judgments. See supra note 78.
293 Among the landmarks of such literature, are notably : Willis M. Reese, The Status in this Country of
Judgments Rendered Abroad, supra note 151, Hans Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral
estoppel in the United States, supra note 85, Courtland Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign Country
Judgments, 24 OHIO St. L.J. 291 (1963)[hereinafter cited as Res Judicata], Arthur T. von Mehren and
Donald T. Trautman, Recognition ofForeign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, supra
note 1, Robert B. von Mehren & Michael E. Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign-Country
38
39
However, the literature has concentrated its analysis on general considerations and on
money-judgments"
,
partly because the issue of recognition and enforcement of foreign
non-money awards is a somewhat recent development in areas other than personal status
matters
.
However, the matter is crucial for non-money awards in two respects. First,
non-money awards are rendered in connection to situations where relativity of status,
depending on the geographical position of individuals in a world of international
exchanges is particularly unbearable for the parties . Indeed, we have seen that the
incompatibility between the creation of a status that requires permanence and the system-
based relativity of this status has justified automatic recognition of effects to such foreign
judgments by French courts . The fact that specific provisions may be found in each of
the two systems considered to provide for or to define the effects to be given to particular
categories of non-money awards is the other justification of a study specifically oriented
towards non-money judgments in the broader field of the scope to be given to foreign
awards generally. This study will uncover some of the policies behind recognition that do
not constitute the actual sources studied in the previous chapter. In turn, those policies,
Judgments in the United States, supra note 6, Courtland Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the
Second Restatement ofConflict ofLaws, supra note 189, Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign
Country Judgments: Whose Law 9
,
70 IOWA L. REV. 53 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Issue Preclusion]. See
also Paul D. Carrington, Collateral Estoppel and Foreign Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 381 (1963), John D.
Brummett Jr., The Preclusive Effect ofForeign Country Judgments in the United States and Federal
Choice ofLaw: The Role ofthe Erie Doctrine Reassessed, supra note 286, Linda Silberman, Enforcement
and Recognition ofForeign Country Judgments: American Law, supra note 93.
294
See e.g., Casad, Issue Preclusion, supra note 293, at 70 ("The present study focuses on judgments
granting or denying a money-award") (explaining that judgments granting non-money awards "pose
somewhat different problems").
5 Trends in the Enforcement of Non-Money Judgments, supra note 32, at 7 (viewing non-money
judgments as the "juridical response to the profound and extensive changes taking place in our increasingly
complex, industrialized and plural society").
296
Notably concerning the relativity of personal status, for instance regarding divorce, child custody,
nationality decrees. LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 534-536. Cass Feb. 28, 1860, D.P., 60.1.57,
S. 60. 1 .2 1 (Buckley case). Smit, International Res Judicata, supra note 85, at 64-65
In matter of personal status, certainty and stability are considerations of great
moment [...] relitigation in such matters will ordinarily reach the point of harassment
much more quickly than in cases in which certainty and stability are not considerations
of overriding importance".
Smit, supra, at 64-65.
297
Buckley case, supra. See also supra, note 235 and accompanying text.
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because they will often highlight the specific characteristics of some types of non-money
judgments, may lead the way toward advocacing more extensive recognition and greater
scope of effects of foreign non-money awards altogether.
SECTION I: THE SCOPE OF THE EFFECTS TO BE GIVEN TO FOREIGN NON-
MONEY AWARDS
In the United States, a specific terminology is attached to the concept of the
effects given to judgments generally. Because the literature upon the topic uses different
298
terms to define those effects, confusion may arise. It is therefore useful
acknowledgment to bear in mind the definition of those key concepts before analyzing
them.
The terms most commonly associated with this area of the law are res judicata
and the related concept of collateral estoppel. These two doctrines, referred to as
"fundamental precept of common law adjudication" , are defining that "a right, question
or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction
... cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties and their
privies..." . Resjudicata , strictly speaking, is the rule that
a judgment, once rendered, is the full measure of the relief to be accorded to the
same parties on the same 'claim' or 'cause of action'. Under these rules. ..the
effect of a judgment extends to the litigation of all issues relevant to the same
claim between the same parties, whether or not raised at trial.
See, e.g., the works cited supra, note 293.
298
299
Southern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 1 68 U.S. 1,48(1 897).
300
Id, at 48-49. See also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153(1979).
301
Literally : a "matter adjudged", Black's Law Dictionary 905 (abr. 6th ed., 1991).
302
Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g. and Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535-36 (5th Cir. 1978)
(emphasis added).
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Accordingly, under the doctrine of res judicata, "a judgment on the merits in a
prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties and their privies303 based on the
same cause of action"
. Collateral estoppel occurs when a suit involves issues litigated
in a prior action among same parties or their privies but is based upon a different cause of
action. Collateral estoppel then bars the "relitigation of issues actually adjudicated and
essential to the judgment in [the] prior litigation .
This distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel may be defined as
'"traditional" . Some alternative terminologies have used the term res judicata as a very
general concept, comprising the meaning of both res judicata and collateral estoppel as
307
defined above . Under that broad definition, res judicata would be divided between
'"claim preclusion" and "issue "preclusion" , issue preclusion covering direct estoppel
as well as collateral estoppel. This terminology was adopted by the Restatement (second)
of Judgments ( 1 982) . The terms "merger" and "bar" ' may also found to express
' A privy is a non-party who "had sufficient interest in the prior action or sufficient control over it" for
the judgment to be asserted against him, von Mehren & Trautman, supra note I, at 1682-83. The privies
include "those who controlled the earlier action, those whose interests were represented by a party to that
action, and successors in interest to prior parties and their privies", id.
304
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 (1979). See also, e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Serv.
Corp., 75 S.Ct. 865(1955), Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 68 S.Ct. 715 (1948), Cromwell
v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
305
Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g and Mach., Inc. 575 F2d 530, 535-536 (5th Cir. 1978). See also
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 ("[collateral estoppel] precludes the relitigation of issues
actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action"). Collateral estoppel is "a bar or
impediment which precludes allegations or denial of a certain fact or state of facts, in consequence of
previous ... final adjudication of the matter in a court of law", Black's Law Dictionary 383 (abr. 6th ed.,
1991).
306
See, e.g.. Southern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48 (1897), Kaspar Wire Works, Co. v.
Leco Emg'g and Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), Migra v. Warren city School District of Educ,
465 U.S. 75, 77 (1984) (acknowledging the traditional character of this terminology as opposed to other
recent terminologies in connection with resjudicata principles).
307
Migra v. Warren city School District of Educ, 465 U.S. 75, 77 ( 1 984). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
Judgments, ch.3, 131 (1982).
308
Black's Law Dictionary (WESTLAW) (to be found under the entry RES).
309
"Direct estoppel" occurs when the second suit is upon the same claim cause of action as far as disputed
issues are concerned, CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 103, at 403-405.
310 CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 103, at 403-404.
311
Expressing that the claim is extinguished if the judgment in the first action was in favor of the plaintiff,
Black's Law Dictionary (WESTLAW). See also Restatement (second) of Judgments, § 45,
comment a.
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that a claim is extinguished3
lj
. Whenever possible, the terminology used in the following
developments will follow the traditional distinction314 between res judicata and collateral
estoppel
,
because most developments upon the subject occurred at a time no alternative
terminology was commonly used.
A. Scope of the effects to be given to foreign non-money awards in France
Foreign non-money awards will not be recognized in France the effects they were
able to produce in their original forum . Once the recognition process has been satisfied,
foreign judgments in general will be recognized some res judicata effects based upon the
French rules of Civil Procedure. It is first in the Civil Code, article 1351
317
, that the
boundaries of French res judicata . Under article 1351, res judicata is limited to some
parts of the judgment, namely the "dispositive" part, as opposed to the "motive" part319 .
Article 1351 also limits the res judicata effects ofjudgments to the parties involved in
the judgment, to the cause of action and to the subject-matter, or object, " of the action
taken together. Should one of these three components vary, no res judicata is
322
recognized . Also, this definition limits the "negative" effects of judgments to direct
estoppel : no collateral estoppel is to be found under the French rule due to the above-
" Expressing that the claim is extinguished if the judgment in the first action was in favor of the
defendant. Black's Law dictionary (WESTLAW).
Supra, notes 311-312.
Supra note 306 and accompanying text.
These terms have been used with such meaning in the previous chapter. See supra, note 232.
316
LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 5 1 8.
317 C Civ., art. 1351.
1
Id. The term used in the code is "autorite de la chosejugee". Literally, "autorite de la chosejugee " is to
be translated by "authority conferred to a matter adjudicated", and therefore bears the general meaning
given to the words 'resjudicata" by the terminology of the Restatement (second) of Conflicts of Laws
rather than the traditional definition followed by the Supreme Court in the United States, supra notes 304-
305. Autorite de la chosejugee thereby conveys the meaning of both res judicata and collateral estoppel
under the traditional terminology adopted herein.
319
C. Civ., art 135 1 . Casad, Issue Preclusion, supra note 293, at 63-64. VINCENT & GuiNCHARD, supra
note 38, at 91-92. C. PROC. Civ., art. 480.
320
C. Civ., art 1351.
321
322
"Objef. C. Civ., art 1 35 1 . See also VINCENT & GuiNCHARD, supra note 38, at 90-98.
Vincent & Guinchard, supra note 38, at 96.
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mentioned combined requirement of identity"5^. As in the United States, judgments do
not create any rights nor obligations towards non-parties to the action
324
.
Only final judgments may be recognized as having res judicata effects323 .
Accordingly, some categories of injunctions and all judgments said to be "other than
on the substance"
,
including interlocutory orders
,
will not be recognized as res
judicata nor as having direct estoppel effects . If foreign non-money awards of such
kind were to be recognized in France, their effects would be accordingly greatly limited.
B. The scope of the effects to be given to foreign non-money awards by
American courts
American courts generally recognize broad preclusive effects to domestic
judgments. These effects may vary in detail from state to state, but "the major features of
this largely judge-created law are very similar throughout the United States"330 . Such
effects will include res judicata and collateral estoppel among the parties and their
• • 331
privies
Traditionally, resjudicata forbids the relitigation upon the same cause of action of
matters actually decided and of matters that could have been decided but were not
actually raised in the prior action . Collateral estoppel "gives preclusive effect to
~~ Casad, Issue Preclusion, supra note 293, at 64.
See supra, notes 300-302 for references to the law in the United States with that regard. In the French
terminology, the absence of rights and obligation towards those who are not party to the judgment is
referred to as '7a relativite de la chosejugee". VINCENT & GuiNCHARD, supra note 38, at 96-97.
325 C PR. Civ., arts. 480, 482, 488.
Supra, note 49.
Supra, notes 49-57.
328
Supra, note 49.
329
VINCENT & Guinchard, supra note 38, at 91
.
330 CRAMTON & AL., supra note 103, at 403.
Supra, note 303.
332 CRAMTON & AL., supra note 103, at 404. See Southern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48
(1897), Montana v. United States. 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979), Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g. and
Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535-36 (5th Cir. 1978), Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649
(1979). See also, e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 75 S.Ct. 865 (1955), Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 68 S.Ct. 715 (1948), Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876). Smit,
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essential findings necessarily determined in an earlier litigation on another cause of action
between the same parties" J
. As far as collateral estoppel is concerned, non-parties may
be permitted in some jurisdictions to assert a prior judgment against a party to the
previous action
. It used to be that party identity or privity in collateral estoppel was a
uniform requirement
,
"preventing use of a fact or issue determination by a person who
would not be bound by [it] in the other litigation had it been decided the other way"336 .
As far as some specific types of non-money awards are concerned, slightly different rules
may apply. Domestic status judgments "conclusively determine status with respect to all
337
persons" but will bind individuals only if proper in personam jurisdiction was acquired
338
upon them
. Domestic in rem judgments are conclusive upon all persons concerning the
determination of the interest at stake , while quasi in rem judgments are conclusive of
the interest but only in between the parties to the proceedings .
The preclusive effects of domestic American judgments are far greater than those
accorded to domestic judgments by French courts. While French law limits res judicata
to an identity of parties, cause of action and object, as well as to a strictly defined part of
the judgment, American law extends the effects of its judgment beyond a same cause of
action and to some extent beyond the parties to the first action. Necessarily, such
extensive scope of effects will affect the scope of the effects given to foreign
International Res Judicata, supra note 85, at 57. The original claim is said to be barred if the judgment was
in favor of the defendant, and merged if it was in favor of the plaintiff, CRAMTON et al., supra, at 404. See
also supra, notes 312-313.
3 CRAMTON & AL., supra note 103. at 404. See Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g and Mach., Inc,
575 F2d 530, 535-536 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649
("[collateral estoppel] precludes the relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of
the first action").
334
Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l. Trust & Sav. Ass'n., 122 P.2d 892 ( Cal. 1942). See also von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 1, at 1683, CRAMTON & AL., supra note 103, at 405.
35
Called "mutuality of estoppel", or "mutuality doctrine". CRAMTON ETAL., supra note 101, at 405. von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 1, at 1683.
336 CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 1 03, at 405.
Smit, International Res Judicata, supra note 85, at 57.
338
Id
339
Id.
uo
/d.
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judgments" . American courts may be faced with a problem quite opposite from that
encountered by French courts while determining the scope of effects to be given to
foreign judgments. While French courts applying as a matter of policy its domestic law of
preclusion may be faced with judgments afforded greater preclusive effects in their
jurisdiction of origin -for instance if the foreign judgment is American-, United States
courts will almost always be faced with the dilemma that applying their local law may
confer greater or different effects to a judgment than those created in the jurisdiction of
origin of that judgment.
The American practice distinguishes the debate upon the scope of the effects of
sister-state judgments and that upon the scope of the effects of foreign-country
judgments. The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution and its implementing
legislation require that the judgment of a sister-state be given in the recognizing state
the same effects it would have in the state of origin 5 . All non-money awards entitled to
recognition will follow such rule and be accorded the scope of effects they were meant
to produce in their original environment . However, the term "same" as it appears in the
implementing legislation has been occasionally interpreted as requiring "at least as
great effects", leaving the door opened to the possibility of granting sister-state judgments
See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 1, at 1682.
" Supra, note 316 and accompanying text.
343
U.S. CONST., art. 4, § 1.
344
28 U.S.C. 1738.
345
28 U.S.C. 1738 states that the courts of any state are entitled to the same full faith and credit in any
courts of any state as they are in the courts of such state from which they are taken, von Mehren &
Patterson, supra note 6, at 65.
46
Supra, notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
347
See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting, 225 U.S. 1 1 1, 135 (1912), Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (federal courts are required to give preclusive effects to state-court
judgments). For the possibility of the jurisdiction of origin to determine the extraterritorial effects of its
domestic awards, see Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943) (state not permitted to award
supplementary compensation for worker's injury after the plaintiff had obtained recovery from another
state's worker's injury compensation board), Industrial Comm'n of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622
(1947) (holding that only unmistakable language from state legislature precluding further compensation
would warrant such preclusion), Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co, 448 U.S. 261 (1980)
(controversially overruling Magnolia Petroleum Co. in favor of McCartin).
348
28 U.S.C. 1738.
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greater effects than they would have in that sister-state courts^49 . Such view is dismissed
by the Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws330
, but no definitive statement exists in
favor of one position or the other and the Supreme Court has not ruled upon the topic. It
is also worth noting that a recognizing state may apply its own statute of limitations on
judgments to bar a suit upon a sister-state judgment not barred in that sister-state331 .
However, it appears that the solution reached in the U.S. federal system in dealing with
the scope of the effects to be given to sister-state judgments reaches a result much
different from that of the Brussels Convention dealing with the same issue 3 . While the
Brussels convention provides for automatic recognition of res judicata effects in any
court of any other sister-state, the scope of these effects is to be found in the law of the
recognizing state, whereas the United States system provides for determination according
to the law of the rendering state, save the exception of "greater effects ".
Rules governing the scope of the effects to be given to foreign-country judgments
create more controversy. It appears that "a majority of U.S. courts apply their local
[preclusion] rules ... to foreign judgments most often without considering the issue of
what law should apply"
?4
. Other courts have positively taken position in favor of the
application of domestic rules , or rules governing the effects of sister-state
349
Jackson, J., Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause ofthe Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30
(1945). Wright, Federal Courts § 100A (5th ed. 1994) ("it would not offend the [Full Faith and Credit]
policy to give the judgment greater effect than it would have in the rendering state"). Hart v. American
Airlines Inc., Misc.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (application of broader New York preclusion rules to Texas
judgment).
350
Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws 277 ( 1 97 1 ).
351 Mc Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 326-27 (1839), Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188 (1966)
(allowed Georgia to apply its statute of limitations requiring suits on foreign judgments to be brought
within five years).
352
Brussels Convention, supra note 88, art. 26. See supra, notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
Supra, note 349.
354
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 65. See e.g., Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322
F.Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970), modified, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
355
See, e.g., Cannistraro v. Cannistraro, 223 N.E. 2d 692, 693 (N.Y.I 967).
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judgments"" . Since U.S. law affords broader preclusion rules' than that of most
KO
countries, including France, as seen above "
, resorting to local rules to determine the
scope of the effects of a foreign judgment amounts to confer greater effects to that
judgment than it would enjoy in its forum of origin ~ 9 . Accordingly, some writers
suggested that foreign law should really govern the scope of the effects to be accorded to
the foreign award . Indeed, some courts have ruled that the law of the rendering country
determines the preclusive effect of the foreign judgment in a United States court '.Asa
result, it appears that United States practice offers a diversity of solutions as to the
determination of the law governing the scope of the effects to be given to foreign-country
judgments which creates a debate that French law knows only as far as legal theory is
concerned, since all judgments recognized whether de piano or following the grant of an
exequatur are ruled by French domestic law as far as the scope of their effects are
,363
concerned
In a landmark article written more than 30 years ago, Professor H. Smit
proposed an analysis by category of judgments of the scope of the res judicata and
56
See, e.g., Compagnie du Port de Rio de Janeiro v. Mead Morrison Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 163, 165-66 (D.
Me. 1927). See Carrington, supra note 293, at 389, 391 (advocating in favor of determination by the law of
the forum).
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 65.
Supra, text following note 340.
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 6, at 65.
360
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 1 , at 1 677-8 1 , Restatement (SECOND) OF Conflict OF Laws §
98, comment/ 371-72 (proposed official draft 1967) (stating that" normally an American court would
apply the foreign rules as to [splitting a cause of action or collateral estoppel] if these rules are substantially
the same as the rules of American courts"). Statement to this effect was to be found in the Revised
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 491, comment c (Tent. Draft N°4, 1983) but
later disappeared from the Restatement (third) of the law of the Foreign Relations of the United States
(1986), Restatement (first) of Conflict of Laws § 450 (2) (1934) (stating that the scope of the effects of a
foreign-country judgment is determined by the law of the state where the judgment was rendered).
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See, e.g., Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d 493 (1960), cert, denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961) (applying the law of
Switzerland to determine the scope of the preclusive effects to be given to a judgment of that country and
subsequently ruling that it had no binding effect due to the absence of recognition of collateral estoppel
effects in the law of Switzerland).
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See Silberman, supra note 93, at 735-37, Casad, Issue Preclusion, supra note 293, at 53-58, von Mehren
& Trautmann, supra note 1 , at 1 677- 1 68 1
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Smit, International Res Judicata, supra note 85.
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collateral estoppel effects which should be granted to foreign judgments by U.S.
_
365
courts .
According to Professor Smif s study, some categories of non-money awards were
to receive the most extended scope of effects, stating that with regard notably to personal
status and child custody decrees, uniformity was a high priority366 . Professor Smit argues
that judgments relating to personal status are normally recognized domestically as res
judicata in the United States. Also these judgments should be entitled to collateral
estoppel effects, but only as far as the determination of status is argued in a different
cause of action . Subsequent proceedings concerning different subject matter should not
be given collateral estoppel effects . The second category of non-money awards
considered by Professor Smit comprises in rem and quasi in rem judgments. Professor
Smit advocates the recognition of res judicata effects to judgments determining "an
interest in, or the fate of, specific property" due to the resulting harassment, in some
respect similar to that which would affect judgments regarding personal status, if the
matter was to be litigated again . However, collateral estoppel effects would not be
recognized, "except insofar as the determination of the specific interest in the property is
concerned"
,
because there would be no justification for an extension of effects beyond
those granted before the foreign court . The third category indicated by Professor Smit
is that of judgments in personam, for which "certainty does not have the same eminent
importance it has in connection with judgments relating to status ... and judgments
365
Id., at 64-74.
366
Id., at 64 ("the interests of the litigants to have their relationship determined once and for all is
especially great when the decision rendered will affect important other relationships").
367
Id., at 65.
368
Id
369
Id. The author draws a parallel with the effects of domestic personal status judgments.
370
Id., at 66.
371
Id.
372
Id., at 70.
373
Id.
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adjudicating interests in specific property' 4 . Accordingly, Smit advocates an attenuated
application of the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and introduces a
distinction as to effects upon domiciliaries of the foreign forum and non domiciliaries
7
".
Res judicata and collateral estoppel effects should be found in relation to the former, but
not to the latter .
Smit's proposed approach is of particular interest concerning the scope of the
effects to be granted to some categories of non-money awards.
It has been argued consistently in the legal literature on recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments that a careful analysis of the policies behind the concept of recognition
may uncover that the real basis for recognition is not that advanced by the courts in
support of recognition, but is rather to be found in the policies underlying the scope of the
378
effects to be given to foreign-judgments, such as resjudicata
SECTION II: RETHINKING RECOGNITION OF NON-MONEY AWARDS IN LIGHT
OF RES JUDICATA PRINCIPLES
In the United States, commentators in recent times have questioned the notion of
"comity"3 on which the courts base their rationale for granting recognition to foreign-
country judgments. . Professor Reese, in his first important post-war article written on
TO
j
the recognition of foreign-country judgments , was prompt to qualify the concept as "a
word of loose and uncertain meaning at best, [with] little significance ... other than as a
374
Id., at 67.
375
Id., at 67-68, 71.
376 /*
77
See supra note 293 for a list of selected landmarks regarding this very topic.
378
Reese, supra note 151, at 784 ("we must therefore look beyond the usual reasoning of the courts to
discover the real basis for their decisions").
See supra, note 166.
380
Reese, supra note 1 5 1 , at 784. CASAD, Issue Preclusion, supra note 293, at 58. See generally, Peterson,
Res Judicata, supra note 293, Smit, International Res Judicata, supra note 95.
Reese, supra note 151.
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TO")
statement of the conflict of law rules of the forum" ". Later, other commentators have
concluded that comity is merely a "general mode of expression... at the most [expressing]
383
an attitude or a disposition"
,
"leav[ing] hidden in obscure abstractions the reasons for
which recognition may be given"
According to these scholars, reasons behind recognition are to be found in other
relevant policies. Professors von Mehren and Trautman believed that at least five basic
38S
policies were important with regard to judgment recognition . Those policies are : (1)
the "desire to avoid duplication of effort and consequent waste involved in reconsidering
a matter that has already been litigated" , (2) protection of the successful litigant from
3X7
subsequent harassment on the part of the previously unsuccessful party
, (3) "a policy
against making the availability of local enforcement the decisive element ... in the
388
plaintiffs choice of forum"
, (4) "an interest in fostering stability and unity in an
international order" , and finally (5) "a belief that the rendering jurisdiction is [overall]
a more appropriate forum than the recognizing jurisdiction" . According to the writers,
each of these basic policies will receive a different weight in each jurisdiction considered,
391
depending in part upon the attitude of that jurisdiction on related questions . One or a
combination of these policies would be the broad basis underlying recognition practice.
Following conclusions previously developed , at least policies number (2), (3) and (4)
would argue in favor of an heightened recognition of non-money awards related to status
and capacity of the person. Policy number (5) would highlight principally the reasons
382
Id, at 784.
383
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 1, at 1603. See also Casad, Issue Preclusion, supra note 293, at
58. See generally the works mentioned supra, note 293.
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behind a strong national policy oriented approach such as that of the French test for
. 393
exequatur.
However, most authors have searched for a more immediate basis of recognition
than those proposed by von Mehren and Trautman, and have concentrated their analysis
of the policies underlying recognition principally on the notion of "resjudicata".
Earlier, another concept, that of "vested rights", had been a substitute for
"comity" as a basis for recognition of foreign judgments. The notion of "vested rights" is
an early concept in modern legal literature and sets as a principle that the recognition
of a right "cannot be called into question anywhere"
. Like any obligation, that arising
from a suit should "follo[w] the [debtor of the obligation], and may be enforced wherever
the person may be found" . The doctrine of "vested rights", while calling for an
extensive recognition practice which would encompass the recognition of all categories
of created obligations, and thereby of all categories of in personam non-money
awards, gave rise to some criticisms that are similar to those regarding comity. The theory
of vested rights is virtually absent from United States post-second world war recognition
practice and commentaries
Starting with Professor Reese's article in 1950 , modern scholars have mainly
analyzed "res judicata" 1 as the true rationale for recognition of foreign judicial awards .
9j
See supra, notes 246-253 and accompanying text. See also the Messageries Maritimes case, Cass. Civ.
June 21,1 950, D. 1 95 1 .749 (note Hamel), S. 1 952. 1 . 1 (note Niboyet) supra note 25 1
.
394
In relation to conflict of laws problems generally, the "vested rights" theory blossomed in the U.S. in
the early years of the Twentieth century, mainly due to the influence of Professor Joseph Beale, who first
urged to replace the principle of "comity" by that of "vested rights". CRAMTON & AL., supra note 103, at 5,
1 2. See generally JOSEPH BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF Laws (1916). See Slater v. Mexican Nat' 1
R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) for a case law endorsement of the vested rights theory.
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Beale, supra note 394, at 105.
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Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
" In the vested rights theory, the right created by the judgment is attached to the person and follows her
wherever she may go. In rem judgments being attached to the rem, not the person, are per se excluded.
Casad, Issue Preclusion, supra note 293, at 58.
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Professor H. Smit also analyzed the concept of "legal obligation" as a basis for recognition of foreign
judgments. According to this doctrine, "a foreign judgment creates an obligation that the local courts will
52
For Reese, the real basis for recognition of foreign judgments, "it seems clear, is no other
than the doctrine of res judicata that '[pjublic policy dictates that there be an end of
litigation'"
,
such public policy applying to all judgments, "whether local or foreign"402 .
The meaning given by Reese to res judicata would appear to cover policies number (1)
and (2) of the study undertaken by Professors von Mehren and Trautman403
, relating to
avoiding duplication ofjudicial effort and reliability for the successful litigant404 .
Accordingly, such reasoning adopted as a basis for recognition of foreign-
judgments argues in favor of a heightened recognition of awards purporting to establish,
modify or confirm the status of a person or dealing with personal capacity as areas in
which the interest of the successful litigant in asserting a worldwide reliability is
crucial.
Professor Reese's reasoning has been subsequently followed406 and further
developed by other legal analysts . Notably, Professor Smit, in his article discussed
above, gives a similar definition of res judicata and agrees that "the principles
underlying the doctrine of res judicata provide the only logical and satisfactory
explanation for recognition of foreign judgments" . However, Smit dissents from
Reese's theory on one important point. Whereas Reese sees res judicata as applying to
both local and foreign judgments and does not distinguish any further between the two
enforce as any other obligation created under foreign law", Smit, International Res Judicata, supra note
85, at 54. While bearing some aspects in common with the "vested rights" theory, the doctrine of legal
obligation is qualified of "superficial", Smit, supra, at 54, and "unsound legal construction", id. at 55. The
doctrine of legal obligation originates in England and is used there as a basis for recognition of foreign
judgments.
Reese, supra note 1 5 1 , at 784.
Z ld-
Supra, notes 386-387 and accompanying text.
See Casad, Issue Preclusion, supra note 293, at 60-61.
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The Restatement (second) of Conflict OF Laws (1971), for which Reese was reporting, indicates
that the rationale for recognition of foreign nations judgments rests upon the "public interest" that "requires
that there be an end of litigation", RESTATEMENT, supra. Explanatory notes § 98, comment b, at 298.
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categories as far as the policy is concerned, Smit points out that foreign judgments
provide a ''somewhat different setting" for the application of the res judicata doctrine
from that of local judgments. Particularly, due to differences in substantive law and rules
of procedure among various systems, "a second local suit would definitely not be a mere
duplication of the prior foreign proceeding" . Based upon this assertion, Smit proceeded
to classify by category of judgments (in rem, judgments upon the status of the person,
quasi-in rem and in personam) the res judicata (and collateral estoppel) effects that
should be recognized to local and foreign judgments of each category. . As we have
seen, this analysis argued for the recognition of a greater scope of effects for in rem and
status-related foreign-judgments
It has been argued that the policy of res judicata as a litigation-ending policy was
the justification beyond the "automatic" recognition granted to foreign status and capacity
judgments in the French system , and generally res judicata, as "autorite de la chose
jugee" 3 is said to be the basis of the French recognition practice as a whole . However,
the presence of strong national policies in the test for exequatur, such as the public policy
exception, may weaken the scope of recognition granted by the French courts
The presence of those other strong policies aside res judicata in the recognition
process is one major issue discussed by Professor Peterson in a 1963 article on res
judicata and foreign country judgments , later qualified of "perceptive" , and again in
a 1972 article treating of recognition of foreign judgments in connection with the
4,0
Id
411
Id., at 62. See also Casad, Issue Preclusion, supra note 293, at 59 (analyzing the reasoning of Smit).
412
Supra, notes 369-374 and accompanying text.
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Supra, notes 374-377 and accompanying text.
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Supra, note 23 1 and accompanying text.
Supra, note 318.
416 A litigation ending policy seem to determine recognition in France. See supra, note 235.
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As found in the general conditions required prior to the grant of an exequatur, supra notes 242-248,
particularly with regard to the condition related to "public policy", supra, note 246.
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Peterson, Res Judicata, supra note 293.
419
Casad, Issue Preclusion, supra note 293, at 59.
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Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws
420
. In both articles. Peterson acknowledges that
American courts, "even when they offer comity as a rationale"421 are in fact "analyzing
foreign country judgments in terms of res judicata theory" . However, "the complexities
that intrude when judgments of foreign tribunals are at issue"4 3 bring different
implications than the policy of ending litigation has at a domestic level. On the
international level, res judicata would therefore involve more than a litigation ending
policy as described by concepts (1) and (2) of Professors von Mehren and Trautman
424
,
and the rationale for recognition in such a case would be "a bundle of complementary
policies", among which importance is given to "ordering relations between
countries", insisting upon the legal relationships of the litigants rather than upon the
relationships of the national entities as comity does " . Peterson further takes the example
of child custody decrees to illustrate how in some cases "the justification for giving
conclusive effects is even stronger in international cases than in comparable interstate
cases". due to the extent of the impact of the potential change of culture depending
from the outcome of the case. In those cases, resjudicata is re-examined in view of other
policies specific to an international environment, and principally that of ordering legal
relationships among countries with focus on the litigants. Such policies, absent of the
domestic scene, may direct the scope of recognition. Such scope, according to the author,
might be articulated around
420
Peterson, Foreign Judgments and Restatement Second, supra note 190.
421
Peterson, Foreign Judgments and Restatement Second, supra note 1 90, at 239.
422
Id.
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Id., at 240.
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See supra, notes 386-87 and accompanying text.
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Peterson, Res Judicata, supra note 289, at 304. See also Casad, Issue Preclusion, supra note 290, at 59.
Peterson, Res Judicata, supra note 290, at 305.
427
Id., at 305-306. According to the author, insistence upon relations between countries instead of relations
between private litigants is one inexactitude of the doctrine of comity, id., at 305, 308.
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a preference for predictability and stability in status relationships, and a goal of
securing the mobility of the persons by assuring that the acquisition or the loss
of a status in one place will be recognized elsewhere" ~ .
It would therefore appear that the existence of additional policies on the
international recognition scene would, in certain cases, favor the recognition of some
types of non-money awards, in a manner even more compelling than that governing
recognition within a system.
The res judicata rationale for recognition of foreign country judgments was re-
examined under yet another policy light by Professor A.T. von Mehren in a 1980 lecture
at the Hague Academy of International Law . Professor von Mehren took the view that
the recognition of foreign country judgments depends on the "proper accommodation [by
the court] of the conflicting principles of correctness and repose" . According to von
Mehren, the principle of correctness "expresses the concern that legal justice ... in both
substantive and procedural terms, be done" . The principle of repose, on the other hand,
accepts the inherent imperfection of human knowledge and institutions and the
need to put to rest quarrels and disputes that have arisen so that the energies of
individuals and the resources of society can be devoted to more constructive
tasks.
Recognizing that none of these two principles may be assigned an absolute value
for the result would be intolerable , von Mehren acknowledges that the balance between
the value assigned to each factor will determine the scope of recognition of foreign
country judgments in an international environment, and those values may be different
429
Id., at 244.
430
Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition, General Theory, supra note 80.
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von Mehren, Recognition, General Theory, supra note 80, at 21.
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Id., at 22.
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Id. ("Assigning an absolute value to correctness would create an enormous social and economic burden
[...] on the other hand, giving full scope to the principle of repose would require that full and absolute
finality be given to every determination made by an adjudicator of first instance").
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from those assigned to the same factors in a purely domestic setting
43
'". Particularly, the
principle of repose may be outweighed by the local idea of • ,correcmess ,\ The local -
recognizing- court may disagree with the foreign definition of correctness and proceed to
give to its own definition a higher value than that it would give to respecting prior
adjudication. Such analysis rationally explains that non-money judgments granted in
areas in which strong local policies are to be found may not be recognized in foreign
jurisdictions . However it does not provide a key to advocacy of a greater recognition of
non-money awards, except insofar as it may be insisted upon the value of the principle of
repose over that of correctness locally defined as a tool to expand recognition.
It results from the above analysis that judgments affecting status and capacity of
the person as well as in rem judgments appear to be granted a privileged treatment for
their recognition itself as well as for the scope of the effects to be given to them4 7 in
almost each of the rationale considered under the general term of res judicata. Similar
privilege is granted to the same, excluding in rem judgments, under French law, based
upon a rationale of compelling interest in ending litigation which relates to res judicata as
well
It may be argued that rethinking recognition in terms of res judicata may further
privilege the recognition of yet other categories of non-money awards. In modern legal
developments of industrialized nations, non-money judgments may be qualified of
"juridical response to the profound and extensive changes taking place in our increasingly
439
complex ... society" . They are usually granted in areas and circumstances in which no
money equivalent may compensate the victim. Indeed, this rule, known as the
435
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"irreparable injury" rule
,
is the condition governing the delivery of equitable remedies
in the United States system
441
. It may also be remembered that granting non-money
compensation is an exception to the general money-damages rule of the French
in
tribunals
.
Indeed, in each of these two systems, non-money damages are granted in
cases in which circumstances urge that it so be done because the harassment borne by the
victim will not be put to an end by damages443 .
See generally Douglas Laycock, The Death ofthe Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687
(1990).
Even though it appears that courts are now granting equitable remedies instead of money compensation
without existence of such "irreparable injury", thereby creating some flaws in the application of the general
principle. See generally Laycock, supra note 440.
" Supra, note 40 .
J
This principle is sometimes called, in civil law systems, "the greatest possible coincidence principle", in
which the remedy should be evaluated in its capacity to produce a result as near as possible to the ideal of
coincidence. TRENDS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF NON-MONEY JUDGMENTS, supra note 32, at 87.
CHAPTER IV: THE BOUNDARIES OF THE RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN NON-MONEY JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS OF
THE CURRENT PRACTICE IN SELECTED AREAS
The following are selected examples of the practice of recognition of particular
types of non-money awards in the United States and in France. They aim at highlighting
the particular difficulties arising in connection with recognition when the interests at
stake involve issues of sovereignty, public and legal national policies as well as the mere
obligation of the debtor. Most non-money awards generally include and highlight such
intricate policies .
Among the many categories of non-money awards practice is confronted with,
family law is the most common kind to arise, and the boundaries of the practice in that
field should be underlined as far as they provide for an enlightened example of the
application of the policies studied in the previous chapter. The second example is dictated
by modern developments of the law: when money does not adequately compensate the
plaintiffs alleged injury, the courts of some industrialized countries may grant injunctive
relief
44
^. In the past ten years, it has been observed that parties entitled to injunctive relief
have tried to secure their award wherever their interest was present, including on
AA4L
territories beyond the reach of the issuing jurisdiction . The answer of foreign
jurisdiction to such claims is at present extremely unclear and raises interesting questions
of sovereignty and practicability. As a third example, a model of international
cooperation may be found in the American practice regarding bankruptcies bearing
international ties. It will provide an interesting tool to acknowledge that thoughtful
444
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legislation may suppress harassment for the parties and the various courts involved in
international legal battles.
SECTION I: FAMILY LAW: DOMINANT EXAMPLE OF UNCLEAR BOUNDARIES
The subject of recognition of foreign family law awards is much too wide to be
reviewed here in its entirety. It should principally be underlined that both U.S. and French
practice have been receptive to the compelling need for recognition surrounding decisions
relating to the status of the person . While stretching their recognition practice to
accommodate the requirements of transnational occurrences in family relations, both
systems have left the boundaries of such recognition unclear and have emphasized the
role played by the res judicata doctrine in both systems, as argued by commentators and
448
scholars . Family law is also a field in which international conventions have developed,
thereby rendering possible the confrontation between the result of internationally
coordinated practice and the struggles of the unilateral accommodation of domestic rules
to suit the most compelling needs of a mobile society.
Foreign divorce awards form a main and long-standing branch of the family law
recognition practice. Extensive recognition is granted in both the U.S. and the French
system to foreign divorce decrees. Albeit in very different ways, both practices build up
evidence that the res judicata rationale as studied above is greatly present beyond
recognition of such decrees and therefore strengthens the approach of some scholars what
they view as the "true basis" behind recognition practice generally.
Under French law, foreign divorce decrees are among the judgments on status and
capacity of the persons that are recognized without need for exequatur proceedings unless
some material act of coercion upon individuals or their property is required in connection
447
448
See supra, notes 180-182.234-238 and accompanying text.
See supra, note 401 and accompanying text.
449
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to the award
?
.
The Com de Cassation case which initiated such type of recognition
without exequatur was indeed a foreign divorce case
3
". In the Buckley case
4?J
, the Com
stated that a foreign person should be able to rely without further proceedings on her
status of divorcee following a foreign divorce award in order to remarry in France. The
Com acknowledged that personal status should be uniform rather than dependant on
geography. The rationale behind such statement was that of res judicata, or the
acknowledgment that once adjudicated, the rights of a party to an action and the status of
such parties arising from that action were final and should not be questioned again. . If
coercion is required in connection with the decree, regular exequatur proceedings will be
applied, with their control over jurisdiction and choice of law rules . Family law in
general and divorce in particular is an area in which the "theory of equivalence" with
regard to choice of law ' has played a role to expand recognition. Without such
"equivalent effects" allowed, awards originating from countries such as the U.S. in which
choice of law designate the law of domicile would otherwise not qualify for recognition
following the exequatur proceeding because French rules of conflict in the matter do not
apply the law of domicile
?
.
In the United States, the recognition of foreign divorce decrees follows the
458
general rules arising out of the "comity" doctrine as set by the courts of each slate " . The
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Laws of the United States
5
indicates that
U.S. courts will recognize a foreign divorce decree rendered by a jurisdiction in which
451
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES ( 1 987).
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both parties to the action were domiciled . The Restatement (Third) further provides
that if the rendering court was located in the state of one of the parties' residence only, or
if only one party appeared but the other party received notice and had opportunity to be
heard, the U.S. court may recognize the foreign decree, but need not do so461 . Sister-states
are required by the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution
462
to give full faith and
credit to sister-state divorce decrees, including those for ex-parte divorces, provided that
the court of the sister state had in personam jurisdiction over the parties .The United
States foreign divorce recognition practice is therefore strongly tinged with
considerations ofjurisdiction. However, these considerations may be accommodated with
regard to particular circumstances. In Gould v. Goula , the New York Court of Appeals
recognized a French divorce decree despite the fact that neither party was domiciled in
France at the time of the decree. Since the parties were of American nationality and the
French court, following its conflict of laws rule in the matter, applied the law of New
York to the case, the New York court before which recognition of the French decree was
sought found that "under the circumstances of the case, [recognition], in conformity to
the principle of comity, would not offend our public policy"
5
.
Concerns for "the parties or the underlying factual situation" are therefore very
much present in the divorce recognition practice in the United States and may be factored
in to counter balance the differences in jurisdictional bases (i.e. domicile under U.S. law,
nationality domicile or discretionary power to assume jurisdiction under French law )
and applicable law (law of the domicile under U.S. rules, law of nationality if French
460
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citizen, or law of the domicile or discretionary application of French law under French
rules ) which would otherwise pose problem for recognition of foreign divorce decrees
in the U.S. . Indeed, the factual situation has had considerable weight in the recognition
470
practice of the so-called migratory divorces
, recognized in some states such as New
York but not in other states, such as New Jersey . The differences in practice and the
impact of factual elements underline that unclear boundaries of recognition with regard to
the matter.
A convention on foreign divorce recognition has been negotiated by the Hague
474
Conference on Private International Law . Neither France nor the United States have
signed it, but the unclear boundaries set up by the practice highlights the need for
international coordination of the rules for jurisdiction primarily, and of the choice of law
rules secondarily.
Other areas of family law, such as child custody and support decrees bear similar
problems of jurisdiction and choice of law in their international recognition. Unlike
divorce decrees, such orders must pass the muster of exequatur under French law prior to
their recognition, and considerations of jurisdiction and choice of law therefore arise in
connection to the matter .
Those orders first pose the specific problem of finality as far as they generally
take the form of modifiable decrees. Under both French and American practice, finality is
468
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a prerequisite to recognition
476
. However, in the United States, the Restatement (third)
477
extends to the international practice the interstate rule according to which modifiable
orders are enforceable for past payments and may subsequently be modified by the
recognizing jurisdiction if it has jurisdiction over both parties . Identically, French
courts will recognize such orders if they are otherwise valid from the exequatur
standpoint in spite of their modifiable character . Out of similar concern for the
situation of the parties, custody orders have been recognized on broader jurisdictional
basis. The traditional notion of the competence of the child's domicile to judge custody
cases has first been modified in the U.S. interstate practice by the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act in force in all of the States . The Act applies to international
practice . In Klont v. Klont
4
, the Michigan Court of Appeals applied the UCCJA to
recognize a German custody decree, stating that "even if the foreign jurisdiction has not
adopted the Act, so long as the foreign court's exercice ofjurisdiction conforms with the
criteria enumerated in the Act" the decree should be enforced. Prior to the enactment of
the Act, it was possible to acknowledge that international recognition bore to some degree
more consideration than interstate recognition. Some states were entitled by a Supreme
•IRS
Court decision to require that a rendering court had jurisdiction over both parents
AO£L
before granting interstate recognition of a custody decree . Urgent circumstances
surrounding transnational custody cases again justified the acceptance of looser
476
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jurisdictional requirements such as the "child's habitual residence"487 criterion later
adopted by the UCCJA, when public policy was not offended. This is indeed the very
example taken by Professor Peterson in his article treating of the "bundle of
lOQ JOG
complementary policies' he saw as the rationale behind recognition in general. The
UCCJA was indeed drafted to prevent the states from setting severe and inconsistent
jurisdictional requirements in the field . A good example is provided by AIL Ali49 ' , a
New Jersey Superior Court case. In this case, the court, based on public policy, refused to
recognize an ex-parte divorce decree awarded by the Sharia Court of Gaza to the
defendant, a Palestinian national. The Palestinian decree awarded custody of the child
born from the marriage to the defendant/father. The New Jersey court took jurisdiction
pursuant to the UCCJA over the custody issue as the child's home state for two years
prior to his leaving the country with his father, stating that "physical presence [of the
child], while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine custody" . The
UCCJA was ruled applicable to the case: "the UCCJA apparently appies to international
493
decisions as long as they are made by legal institutions similar in nature" . The court
justified its refusal to enforce the foreign custody decree by stating that the Gaza decree
did not consider "the best interest of the child", whereas it is the New Jersey standard for
custody determinations . It further concluded that "although the logistics were dauting,
this court cannot refuse to exercice its proper jurisdiction under the UCCJA as the "home
state of the child"
495
.
486
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An international convention in the field496 , to which France is a party497 , attempts
to fulfill the same goals as the UCCJA at a strictly international level and adopts rules of
jurisdiction similar to that in force in the current U.S. system. It therefore appears that the
recognition of foreign child custody orders is assured by an identity or an equivalence of
rules of jurisdiction in the field among the various nations, and that such position would
be strengthened by an extended application of the convention in the field.
Family law is therefore an area of law in which the negative effects of differences
in jurisdiction and choice of law rules have been compensated by a greater concern for
international stability of the situation of the parties. It is a field in which premises of
international conventions are in development, but do not so far as to erase the unclear
boundaries of the recognition practice. Family law which adds credence to the res
judicata rationale considered by most scholars as the true basis for recognition. The
following section illustrates how this rationale is weakened with regard to the recognition
practice of foreign injunctive relief.
SECTION II: INJUNCTIONS AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: THE TEMPTATION
OF UNILATERALISM
The various legal systems of the industrialized world may have different answers
to similar legal problems. When the remedy involved is the mere payment of a sum of
money, the only issue at stake when two legal systems are involved at one stage or the
other of the same dispute is the determination of whether the winner of the claim in the
first forum is entitled to relief in the second system. There is no question about the nature
of such relief, and the central inquiry is whether the laws and policies of the second
forum warrant the relief.
496
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When dealing with the recognition and/or the enforcement of foreign injunctive
relief, the question of the availability of the remedy with consideration for its very nature
arises. Also, some types of injunctive relief may involve some additional considerations
of disregard for the recognizing jurisdiction's sovereignty, as it is the case with anti-suit
injunctions. A brief overview of the problems arising in the field with regard for the
French practice and the United States practice proves to be an illustration of the
difficulties faced by tribunals and litigants in an area that practice -unilateral and
coordinated- did not shape the same way nor accord the same degree of importance as it
did with family-law judgments. The demonstration is highlighted by the great differences
in the two legal systems considered regarding the matter.
A. THE PROBLEM OF THE LACK OF AVAILABILITY OF THE INJUNCTIVE REMEDY IN THE
RECOGNIZING SYSTEM AND THE RECOGNIZING PRACTICE
"In today's societies, attention towards [enforcement] of non-money obligations is
spurred by the inadequacy of mere awards of damages to restore the rights injured ... " .
Injunctive relief is often considered as the modern expression of prevention of further
damaging behavior as well as compensation of past injuries . Such expression is to be
newly found in connection with rights inherent to the person's sphere -enhanced by the
capital role of the media in modern societies-, with the right to work -job security and
equality of opportunity-, and with the so-called new rights in environmental control and
. .- 500
consumer s protection .
The French legal system gives a limited importance to injunctive relief. For
instance, specific performance is generally prohibited when the action involved is
performance of an act
501
,
albeit it is available for conveyance of a res" . A few
498
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exceptions arise in the modern development of some areas of the law, such as Labor
Law3
,
but mainly the remedy available instead of specific performance under French
Law is damages . Because of their historic development of equitable remedies
,
American courts have much more leeway, in appropriate circumstances
, to issue orders
for specific relief. A major exception arises with specific performance of contracts for
personal services, which may not be enforceable through injunctive relief safe few
exceptions . The issuance of negative injunctions, preventing the debtor of the personal
service to provide such service to any party other than the plaintiff, may however be
508 509
granted . It is notably the practice in the entertainment industries .
The lack of adequacy in the availability of injunctive remedy to an identical cause
of action in the legal systems involved in a transnational action does certainly bar the
enforcement in the second forum of the remedy granted in the first forum, as seen
above," because
a system that does not provide for specific performance or some other particular
form of relief could hardly be expected to provide such relief for a foreign
judgment.
For instance in Boissevain v. Boissevain ', the Court of Appeals ofNew York refused to
grant the relief demanded in the complaint after it had declared the foreign judgment
503
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"entitled to recognition in this state'
013
on the ground that "the complaint seeks
enforcement of the foreign judgment by a form of equitable relief that is inappropriate to
the facts as pleaded' . The court held that the foreign judgment was of a type "for
which no provision is made for enforcement in the same manner as a judgment [of the
same nature] rendered by the courts of this state' 5 . The court further interpreted the
local statute controlling the remedies for local judgments of the type of the foreign
judgment submitted for recognition and held that "those remedies are applicable only to
such judgments as have been obtained in one of the states of this Union [but] does not
include judgments which are truly foreign" .
Some however argue that in cases specific performance is utilized domestically
albeit not in connection with a particular type of cause of action arising from a foreign
decree the enforcement of which is seeked, the second forum could nevertheless consider
5 1
7
appropriate to enforce the remedy.
The issue of recognition remains at stake, because one of the parties may request
the second forum to take into account as res judicata the injunctive relief granted by the
first forum, to bar further action from the other party in the second forum. The party
granted injunctive relief in the first forum may also ask the court to recognize the
injunctive relief and enforce it by its own "usual" means. This hypothesis materialized on
a few occasions in the American practice. In Roblin v. Long , the first case of
recognition of foreign specific performance decree in the United States even before the
doctrine of comity firmly established itself in the United States law of recognition , the
New York Supreme Court agreed to recognize and enforce a Canadian decree dealing
513
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with property located in Canada, based upon the acquisition of personal jurisdiction over
the debtor of the obligation as well as upon comity 3" . In the modern practice, Pilkington
Bros. v. AFG Indus? is the case commonly referred to by commentators to illustrate the
state of the law regarding recognition of foreign country injunctive relief . A British
injunction barred a Delaware corporation from diffusing information relating to
technology licensed by the plaintiff, a British corporation. Fearing that the British courts
would not be able to secure the enforcement of the injunction in the United States, the
plaintiffs seeked to have a duplication of this injunction by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Delaware. The court held that "comity [did] not require, and in fact militate[d]
against, the issuance of a duplicative order ... '
,
expressing that "duplication" was
indeed independent from "recognition". However, the commentators have read the
Pilkington case as requesting that parties come to the second forum after the violation of
the foreign injunctive remedy has occurred, that is once "irreparable injury" has already
arisen" . Pilkington thereby illustrates the flaws of the recognizing practice with regard
to the safeguard of the injured party's interests in cases compelling injunctive relief for
the protection of those interests. Commentators have further argued that Pilkington "on
its face militates against recognition of a foreign ... injunction ... " .
In the French system, the limited availability of injunctive relief is also an
obstacle to recognition because the single proceeding of exequatur determine both the res
judicata effects and the potential for enforcement of the foreign remedy
3
.
A remedy not
enforceable because of its absence of availability in the French system would therefore
prevent the granting of res judicata effects. It should be remembered that foreign
Roblin v. Long. 60 How. Pr. 200, 205 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1880).
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judgments produce some effects independent from exequatur in France 2*27 , and a foreign
injunctive relief will always have value offact ("fait") ' .
B. Specific considerations regarding interlocutory and anti-suit injunctions
The recognition of interlocutory injunctions" may pose a problem with regard to
their finality, since
,
again, both the French and the U.S. system require that a judgment
be final before it be subject to recognition3 . Among the two countries, the Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters" ' is in
force and is supposed to provide for cooperation with regard to discovery injunctions .
However, the mechanism is weakened from both ends. With regard to French discovery
injunctions , the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the Aerospatiale case held that the
Hague Convention did not provide exclusive and mandatory procedure for obtaining
documents and information located within foreign territory. Accordingly, courts in the
Unted States may order parties before them to produce evidence physically located
abroad pursuant to the federal rules of civil procedure" . With regard to American
discovery orders, the Convention has permitted a reservationas to discovery, which
France has made. Rules which are the foundation of the American discovery system .
Supra, notes 233-239 and accompanying text.
28
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are thereby excluded from the scope of application of the Convention as applicable in
between France and the United States. Should orders for discovery be otherwise
submitted for recognition under the general rules for exequatur, there is little doubt that
French public policy and considerations of sovereignty would dictate the rejection of U.S.
powerful discovery injunctions3 6 :
The French objection is not merely that American discovery violates French
procedural law. Rather, the French believe that American discovery disregards
important. French policies embodied in their notions of judicial sovereignty and
what they perceive as the permissible limits of litigation within their country's
borders.
Moreover, should be remembered that the French rules of procedure do not grant
any res judicata effects to interlocutory injunctions
,
which would in any case limit the
benefit of the potential recognition of a foreign order of such type.
The American practice with regard to the recognition of foreign so-called "anti-
suit injunctions" is an illustration of compromises to be made between the interests of the
litigants with consideration for 'comity" and "res judicata" and the principles of
sovereignty of nations.
An international anti-suit injunction "prohibits a party from proceeding with his
suit in a foreign forum that had concurrent jurisdiction over the case"" . These
Diana L. Muse, Discovery in France and the Hague Convention: In Searchfor a French Connection, 64
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1073(1989).
For protestation against the use of U.S. discovery rules as contrary to French law, see, e.g., COFACE v.
Philips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), BriefofAmicus Curiae The Republic ofFrance
in Support ofPetitioners, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482
U.S. 522 ( 1 987) (N°85- 1 695). See also French Law N° 80-538, 1 980 J.O. 1 799, 1 980 D.S.L. 285 (enacted
in response to broad U.S. antitrust discovery requests). See Muse, supra note 535, at 1073-77.
Muse, supra note 535, at 1090.
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Teresa D. Baer, Injunctions Against the Prosecution ofLitigation Abroad: Towards a Transnational
Approach, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 155, 156-57 (1984).
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injunctions may be "offensive" or "defensive" in nature, depending on their purpose 5 .
Injunctions drawn to protect the court's jurisdiction by preventing interdictory
proceedings in a foreign court and orders restraining a party from enforcing a foreign
antisuit injunction are of a defensive nature5 . On the contrary, injunctions "broadly
drawn to seize exclusive jurisdiction. ..by preventing parallel proceedings abroad"' " are
said to be offensive. In an international environment, the issuance of injunctions of the
latter type especially may "escalate disputes of a political character beyond judicial
resolution"
5
and "take on a political character" , especially since they often involve
545
extraterritorial applicability of the first forum's laws" and subsequent opposed policies
of the second forum. The famous Laker litigation between the courts of England and the
courts of the United States proved to be a highlighted illustration of those
considerations
5
. U.S. courts have a traditional "liberal" approach to injunctions" , and
the power of a court of equity to enjoin a person within its jurisdiction from litigating
548
abroad has been recognized early." . Courts will indeed sometimes enjoin a person
within their jurisdiction from litigating abroad, when the foreign litigation would
540
Richard W. Raushenbush, Antisuit Injunctions and International Comity, 71 Va. L. REV. 1039, 1040
(1985). Michael D. Schimek. Anti-Suit and Anti-Anti-Suit Injunctions: A Proposed Texas Approach, 45
Baylor L. Rev. 499, 500-501
.
541
Rausenbush, supra note 540, at 1040.
4
" Id. See also Schimek, supra note 540, at 500-501
.
4j
Schimek, supra note 540, at 505.
544
Id
545
Id.
546
The Laker litigation was an antitrust suit brought in the United States on behalf of Laker Airways, a
British corporation. The defendants in the case brought concurrent action in England and requested anti-
suit injunctions against the U.S. proceedings. In return, the U.S. court issued its own anti-suit injunction,
the British court replied by a second injunction. The confrontation of the two nations' sovereignties finally
settled due to the intervention of both governments, but the Laker case remains the ultimate example of
"fundamentally opposed national policies", Laker Airways v. Sabena World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 945
(DC. Cir. 1984), regarding the reach of antitrust legislation and its consequence when both nations
disregard the judicial activity of one another. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1984] 1 Q.B. 169
(C.A. 1983), Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgain World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984), Laker
Airways v. Pan American World Airways, 596 F. Supp. 202 (D.D.C. 1984), Laker Airways v. Pan
American World Airways, 604 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1984). See Raushenbush, supra note 540, at 1043-46.
547
Id. at 1049.
548
Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890).
73
•549
"frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction, be vexatious or oppressive"" or
would result in prejudice to other equitable consideration" . In Princess Lida ofThurn &
Taxis v. Thompson J
,
the Supreme Court has however ruled that parallel proceedings in
"strictly in personam [cases] " in courts of concurrent jurisdiction were acceptable "at
least until judgment is obtained [in one of the courts] which may be set up as res judicata
in the other]"" . There remains the question of the effects a U.S. court will generally give
to a foreign anti-suit injunction. The Laker litigation and its high policy note saw the
refusal of the Delaware District Court to recognize British anti-suit injunctions3 " in the
case. However, some courts have recognized such injunctions 55 , when no important
"regulatory policies" were at stake. In Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co. 5 , the
558
Court of Appeals for the fifth Circuit recognized "as a matter of comity" a Florida state
court injunction on the ground that Florida had a "valid state court interest" . The Court
of Appeals held that it "[did] not feel that federal courts should be a party to the ignoring
of a state court injunction if the grounds assert[ed] a valid state court interest and [were]
not clearly insufficient"
560
. The Court further observed that an added factor was that the
appelant was already litigating before the state court issuing the injunction
5
.
The divided practice of anti-suit injunctions highlights the temptation for
unilateralism to be found with regard to injunctive generally. While the differences in the
549
Raushenbush, supra note 540. at 1050. See In Re Unterweser Rederei, GMBH, 428 F2d 888, 890 (5th
Cir. 1 970), affd on rehearing en banc, 446 F2d 907 ( 1 97 1 ), rev 'd on other grounds sub.nom.
550
Raushenbush. supra note 540, at 1050.
551 305 U.S. 456(1939).
552
Id, at 466.
™ld.
Supra, note 546.
555
See. e.g.. Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 294 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1961). See Raushenbush, supra
note 540, at 1054.
556
Raushenbush, supra note 540, at 1054.
557
294 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1961).
558
Id. at 840.
559
Id.
560
Id
561
Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 294 F.2d 834, 841 (5th Cir. 1961).
74
use of injunctive relief among the various systems threaten their recognition and often bar
their enforcement, anti-suit injunctions come as a reminder of the multiple policies and
sovereignty issues underlying the recognition of injunctive relief, and the emphasize the
need for uniformity and coordinated practice in the field of recognition of foreign
equitable relief.
SECTION III: INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS: THE
AMERICAN MODEL OF COOPERATION
"A bankruptcy proceeding [becomes] an international bankruptcy when the assets
and creditors of [an] insolvent debtor are located in more than one country" . Two
theories coexist in the industrialized world regarding the scope to be given to such
international bankruptcy. One theory, adopted by most systems, including the French
one
,
is that the effect of a determination for bankruptcy is limited to the rendering
jurisdiction . Such an approach is characterized as "territoriaT^ , and allows local
creditors to pursue an independent action before the forum at which they are located
,
under protection of local law. The United States also has a territorial approach, since
bankruptcy jurisdiction under United States federal law extends to "persons who have
property in the United States" regardless of their nationality, domicile, residence or place
of business" .
562
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Another approach is the "universality" theory" . According to this theory, "one
bankruptcy adjudication over all the debtor's assets is held in the jurisdiction of the
debtor's domicile to settle all claims [regarding the debtor's estate]'
069
. Such approach is
seldom found in the practice 5 .
Some difficulties may easily be foreseen when an international bankruptcy
proceeding arises with property and/or creditors in two countries using a territorial
approach to the matter, such as France and the United States3 ' . The international practice
has failed to address the matter through international agreements
5
. In France, absent any
specific provision regarding the matter, foreign bankruptcy judgments and bankruptcy
proceedings may be recognized following regular exequatur proceedings.The United
States have taken unilateral action to encourage international cooperation and consistency
of solution in the field. The enactment of Section 304 and 305 of the federal Bankruptcy
Code 5 introduced some elements of universality for international bankruptcies. Section
304" gives a court discretion to allow, on a case by case basis, the administration by a
foreign bankruptcy proceeding of assets located in the United States . It thereby
proceeds to recognize a specific category of foreign non-money award otherwise ignored.
Five forms of relief are available to foreign representatives under the federal Bankruptcy
Code . First, section 304 offers the possibility for a foreign representative to commence
568
See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 908.
Barbara K. Unger, United States Recognition ofForeign Bankruptcies, 19 INT'L Law. 1 153, 1 154
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an action under chapter 7 or chapter 1 1 (involuntary proceeding) as an ancillary case to
the foreign proceeding
5
. The court may also enjoin the commencement or the
continuation of any action against the debtor
3
or his property
5
, enjoin the enforcement
of "any judgment against the debtor with respect to such property"" or any judgment
*S8
1
proceeding to "create or enforce a lien" upon such property . A third remedy available
is the request for order by the court to turn the property of the debtor over to the foreign
582
representative . The last remedy provided by section 304 is the request for an order of
583
"appropriate relief" ' from the court, which allow a flexibility in perfect accordance with
the principle of "adequacy of remedy" which governs the grant of non-money awards3 .
The last remedy available to a foreign representative is provided by section 305, which
states that the court "may dismiss a case [...] or may suspend all proceedings in a case" if
the interests of both creditors and debtors "be better served by such dismissal or
suspension"
5 \ or if there is pending a foreign proceeding" . Also, the foreign
587
representative is allowed to request such dismissal or suspension
cog
. .
To decide whether to grant relief , the courts are requested to consider a list of
c on
six factors set by section 304(c)" . Such factors include just treatment of all creditors to
577
1 1 U.S.C.A. 304(a)( 1 992). See Unger, supra note 569, at 1 1 70. Under the former act, local U.S.
creditors had to petition on behalf of foreign representatives in order for the position of the latter to be
considered, 2 Collier Bank. §304.01 at 304-4 (L. King ed., 15th ed. 1985). The foreign proceeding
could also be recognized under the comity doctrine, see supra note 163, see also Unger, supra note 569, at
n.69 and accompanying text.
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Id.
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11 U.S.C.A. 304(b)(2)( 1992).
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See supra, note 439-44 1 and accompanying text.
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the estate
3
,
protection of U.S. creditors against inconvenient foreign proceedings
391
or
comity .
Case-law in the field has shown a general will from the part of the U.S. courts to
grant recognition to foreign bankruptcy proceedings following section 304. For instance
in Cunard Steamship Company Ltd v. Salen Reefer Services AB* , the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of comity as "appropriate
relief under section 304 3 to a Swedish bankruptcy proceeding and subsequently
vacated the attachment by an English corporation of the debtor's assets located in the
United States. Courts have interpreted section 304 in different manners. For instance, in
Kilbarr Corporation v. Business Systems Incorporated, B. K 3 \ the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit recognized a Dutch bankruptcy proceeding subject to the Dutch court's
willingness to recognize in its proceedings an American judgment for damages awarded
to an American creditor in the case. The latter example points that uniformity of solution
will however not be attained under §§ 304-305.
Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen is an example of a case arising prior to the enactment
of §§ 304-305 of the federal Bankruptcy code. In Clarkson, the Court of Appeals for the
second Circuit recognized a Newfoundland bankruptcy court order requesting the
turnover of documents located in New York. The Court of Appeals held that "as long as
the foreign court had jurisdiction over the bankrupt and the foreign proceeding ha[d] not
resulted in injustice to New York citizens, prejudice to creditors' New York statutory
remedies, or violation of the laws or public policy of the state"' , it would recognize the
foreign court order under the doctrine of comity.
590
1 1 U.S.C.A. 304(c)( 1 ) ( 1 992). See also 1 1 U.S.C.A. 304(c)(3) & (4) ( 1 992).
591
11 U.S.C.A. 304(c)(2) (1992).
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773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. !985).
594
Id., at 544.
595 990 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1993).
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Id, at 629.
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It should therefore be noted that the universality encouraged by sections 304 and
598305" of the federal Bankruptcy code is in accordance with the broad recognition of
foreign judgments by the United States courts 5 . However, such consideration should not
lessen the importance of §§ 304-305 as an example of unilateral goodwill towards
international cooperation and recognition. Indeed, the enactment of section 304 has
activated a debate upon the reform of the present system of international insolvency.
Because attempts to negotiate a multilateral convention in the field fell short due to the
presence of so many issues and policies
,
the international legal community, through a
special committee of the International Bar Association (IBA), proposed a draft for a
model act which could be implemented a domestic legislation by the various countries
interested . The Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act (MIICA) would
follow the spirit of section 304, except so far as it would include some reciprocity and
Supra, note 569 and accompanying text.
5,9
However some commentators have expressed the regret that section 304 be not accompanied by a
reciprocity requirement, see Panuska, supra note 562, at nn. 149- 179 and accompanying text (publication
page reference not available for this document).
600
Panuska, supra note 562, at n. 191 and accompanying text (publication page reference not available for
this document).
Id., at n. 1 85 and accompanying text.
602
The MIICA draft is reprinted in John A. Barret and Timothy E. Powers, Proposalfor Consultative Draft
ofModel International Insolvency Cooperation Actfor Adoption by Domestic Legislation with or without
Modification, 17 Int'l Bus.Law. 323, 327 (1989).
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choice of law considerations
J
. Both France and the United States are among the
countries interested in the MIICA project
Section 304 therefore illustrate a model of international cooperation unilaterally
implemented but eventually resulting in a much broader debate than its original scope of
application. It perfectly illustrates that the solutions towards some much needed
uniformity and furthering of the law of recognition worldwide may take various forms
and definitely may be achieved in areas dealing with non-money awards.
603
Panuska, supra note 562, at nn.203-208 and accompanying text (publication page reference not
available for this document).
604
Id., at nn.215-218 and accompanying text.
CHAPTER V : OF UNIFORMITY AND ACCEPTANCE : PROPOSED
ALTERNATIVES
SECTION I : THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY RESTATED IN LIGHT OF SPECIFIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-MONEY JUDGMENTS
The developments studied in the previous three chapters underline that, in the
U.S. legal system, and also to some extent in the French legal system, the question of the
force and the effects to be given to foreign country judgments is answered in a manner
more uncertain and confusing than in almost any other area of law . It has been
established both by scholars and by some courts that while recognition of foreign-country
judgments is needed for satisfactory dispute resolution in all cases, it is of a particularly
crucial importance when the status of individuals and property (though in rem actions) is
at stake. While awarding money-damages is the rule in each of the two systems
considered in this paper
,
it may not adequately deal with supplying the appropriate
remedy for the claimant. For an injured party for whom money damages are no adequate
compensation in a transnational setting, obtaining a specific relief limited by sovereign
boundaries when the debtor of the injury is not within those boundaries is often
equivalent to an absence of relief. Unlike a money-award situation, the presence within
the jurisdiction of the court issuing the award of some assets of the defendant will not
provide the expected relief if the defendant is absent. The hardship to the plaintiff entitled
to a just remedy may thereby be greater than in situations in which the grant of money
awards is the just compensation . Accordingly, "in a world in which business
605
And, however to some lesser extent, the question of what effects to be given to sister-state judgments.
606
Brand, supra note 64, at 255.
607
Supra, notes 8, 40 and accompanying text.
608
See supra, note 296 and accompanying text.
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transactions and people are constantly crossing sovereign barriers" , certainty and
uniformity of solutions in the field of recognition of non-money awards granting specific
relief, confirming or establishing the status of a person or of property appear to be factors
of highlighted importance .
Yet, uniformity of solutions may have several meanings. First, uniformity may be
understood as uniformity of result among the various recognizing courts of a legal
system. Such uniformity is reached by French law, in which a single test is used to
determine whether to recognize a foreign judgment . As a matter of course, it may
indeed appear that some elements of the test itself, such as the public policy exception
,
bring some element of uncertainty. However, this would result in lack of predictability
rather than lack of uniformity, and uniformity is indeed attained under due control of the
decisions of lower courts by the Cour de Cassation \ Also some precise rules are set by
way of the European Community convention on the recognition of sister-state
• a * 614judgments
Much different is the problem in Unites States where state law governs . We
have seen that a few different approaches to recognition of foreign country judgments are
taken by the various courts . Since the practice of recognition is very wide, with the
exception of a few jurisdictions which have maintained a requirement of reciprocity
,
the problem of uniformity is not as present at the recognition stage than it is when the
actual scope of effects to be given to foreign country judgments arise . At that latter
Brand, supra note 108, at 323.
Supra, note 296 and accompanying text.
Supra, text following note 239.
'" Supra, note 250 and accompanying text.
'"' Supra, note 225 and accompanying text.
14
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, supra, note 88.
Supra, note 1 58 and accompanying text.
61
Supra, notes 177, 354-55 and accompanying text.
Supra, note 1 77 and accompanying text.
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Supra, notes 366-67 and accompanying text.
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stage, the diversity of solutions reached by the different courts
619
may make the various
attempts of pattern analysis difficult. The practice on recognition of judgments in the
United States therefore calls for attempts to reach greater uniformity of practice so as to
provide international litigants with more certainty as to the outcome of their case.
Yet uniformity of result is only one aspect of the quest for uniformity in
connection with recognition of foreign-country judgments. A second aspect relates to
uniformity of substantive laws or rules of procedure among various sovereign nations. As
seen in the previous chapter, certain areas in which non-money judgments are sought
coincide with those in which generally strong local policies arise 620 . Such policies may
result in the enactment of exorbitant or exclusive rules of jurisdiction621
, in a greater
extraterritorial application of local laws
,
or simply in laws or rules of procedure
marked by such strong policy that their application to a case for which recognition of the
resulting judgment will bar recognition of that judgment in another forum on the basis of
a policy of the recognizing forum . The resulting disparity of rules among sovereign
nations in those policy-sensitive areas undoubtedly leads to a degree of recognition
619
Id.
Supra, notes 259-60, 444 and accompanying text.
For instance, France has developed very extensive rules of exorbitant jurisdiction which go far beyond
specific areas of law. According to article 14 and article 15 of the Civil Code, a plaintiff or a defendant of
French nationality may claim exclusive jurisdiction of French tribunals to hear the dispute. The failure of a
foreign forum to respect an expressed claim for exclusive jurisdiction will result in denial of effects to the
foreign judgments within the French territory, LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 527. Other
exclusive rules ofjurisdiction in French law will include disputes affecting land located in France and other
in rem matters, nationality (when the dispute affects French nationality of a party), patents (French
register), personal status («e/a/ civil») of French nationals, contracts of employment (to be executed in
France). LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 527. Exclusive rules ofjurisdiction in the U.S. legal
system will notably include those relating to decrees affecting land [Fall v. Estin, 215 U.S. 1 ( 1 903)].
See, e.g., the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws in antitrust cases [Alcoa v. Aluminium Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)], that of U.S. defamation laws [See, e.g., DeRoburt v. Garnett, 83
F.R.D. 574 (D. Hawai, 1979), Desai v. Hersh, 719 F.Supp. 670 (N.D. Ill, 1989). See also Jeff Sanders.
Extraterritorial Application ofthe First Amendment to Defamation Claims Against American Media, 19
N.C.J. INT'L. & COM. REG. 515(1 994)], or of securities and RICO laws (see Brand, supra note 64, at 327).
See, e.g, the opposition of France (or England) to grant enforcement of interlocutory orders for
discovery granted under extensive U.S. rules, supra, notes 536, 546 and accompanying text, and the refusal
to grant enforcement to U.S. antitrust decrees, British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical
Industries, Ltd., 2 All E.R. 780 (C.A. 1952).
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inferior to that of cases in which a de facto equivalence of result is reached among those
same nations, as it is in many instances involving money judgments in civil and
commercial matters .
One way to enhance the practice of recognition is those areas in which disparities of
substance, procedure or policy may be found is to unify those rules by means of
international conventions and agreements specifically dealing with the issues at stake.
Some of these international conventions will also specifically provide for some rules of
recognition and enforcement of the matters at stake, and thereby encompass both
approaches towards uniformity : (1) uniformity of the rules for recognition itself, and (2)
uniformity of substantive rules of law so as to lessen the disparities among different
systems of law. The Brussels and Lugano Conventions 5 are examples of such approach,
for both Conventions, said to be "multilateral and double" in regard of their dual
purpose, deal with rules for asserting jurisdiction among domiciliaries of the member
states , fulfilling approach (2), as well as with substantive provisions for recognition
and enforcement of member-state judgments , fulfilling approach (1). By unifying the
rules of in rem, personal and subject-matter jurisdiction among member states " and
specifically ruling out exorbitant rules of jurisdiction as non-applicable among the
Supra, note 258 and accompanying text. See also Frank Vischer, General Course on Private
International Law, 232 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 241
Especially in the field of status, family relationships and hereditary matters ...
[divergencies in the national conflict systems, especially the dichotomy between States
adhering to the nationality and the domicile principles ... would in many cases block
recognition.
Id
Supra, note 88.
626
"Convention multilateral double". See LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 5 10. See also
Georges A.L. Droz, Cours General de Droit International Prive, 229 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 100-102 (1991).
Conventions bearing a single purpose are said to be "simple'", i.e. single.
627
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, supra note 88, arts. 2-4 (general rules for personal jurisdiction),
arts. 5-6 (specific rules for personal jurisdiction with regard to the subject-matter of the controversy), arts 7-
12 (subject matter jurisdiction with regard to insurance matters), arts. 13-15 (subject matter jurisdiction
with regard to matters involving consumers law), and art 16 (exclusive rules ofjurisdiction).
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, supra note 88, arts 25-49.
See supra, note 125.
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domiciliaries of the member states
,
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions proceed to
create uniformity in a domain in which disparity of rules could definitely have impaired
the recognition mechanisms among the member states6 . The presence of rules directly
regulating recognition and enforcement of member-state judgments provides for direct
uniformity of the recognition practice among the member states in an area in which,
again, such practice was greatly varying from one country to another. However, the goal
of unification of the two Conventions is not furthered completely, since the Conventions
do not apply to some topics specifically listed ~ in which it was felt that no agreement
could be reached due to strong disparities in the laws of the member states in areas
recognized as policy-sensitive . Since these areas, principally dealing with the status of
the person, wills, estates and bankruptcy proceedings are associated with the issuance of
non-money awards, in some respects the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, in spite of
unique efforts of unification, fail to further the badly needed recognition of some major
categories of non-money awards. The double method employed by the Brussels
Convention to reach unification, coupled with the fact that the interpretation of its
provisions is in the hands of a single entity rather than being left to the individual
countries
6 4
would be the most effective means of unifying and furthering the recognition
process for non-money judgments. It remains to be seen that attempts of unification may
be unilateral as well as bilateral or multiple, all of these methods presenting advantages as
well as disadvantages.
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, supra note 88, art. 3.
631
See Brand, supra note 64, at 289-290.
'' Brussels and Lugano Conventions, supra note 88, art. 1
.
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Supra, notes 124, 126-27 and accompanying text.
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The interpretation of the provisions of the Brussels Convention, supra note 88, is left to the Court of
Justice of the European Community by Protocol of June 3, 1971, signed by the states party to the Brussels
Convention. See G. Peyrard, Recueil de Textes : Droit International Prive et Droit du
Commerce International, 1 12-1 14 (L'Hermes, 1992).
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SECTION II : UNIFORMITY THROUGH UNILATERAL SOLUTIONS
France has a single unified legal system and thus French rules for recognition of
foreign-country judgments are unified among the various lower courts under the authority
of the "Cour de Cassation" . Nevertheless, unilateral improvement of current practice
of French courts could be achieved by means of enactment of comprehensive statutory
law in the field. At present, the rules for recognition and enforcement of foreign-nation
judgments in France are one of the few areas of judge-made law . Enactment of
comprehensive legislation would be an opportunity to further extend recognition of
foreign awards, currently limited by the multiple requirements of the test determining the
£ JO
grant or the denial of exequatur .It would potentially be the opportunity to introduce a
formal distinction between money and non-money awards in the French system, as this
distinction has been acknowledged by commentators in the field of private international
law but is not part of the general classification of judgments in the French system .
Such legislation could potentially secure the recognition of categories of non-money
judgments currently unrecognizable under the test determine by case-law. However there
is no intent on the part of the French legislature to implement such a legislation in the
near future.
The debate on the unification of the domestic rules for recognition and
enforcement of foreign-country by unilateral action is relevant to the United States.
Reaching uniformity among the rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign-country
judgments is an issue which has been widely debated by scholars in the United States
Notably, it has been thought that a "truly national approach to the recognition and
The French "Supreme Court".
6
Supra, note 225 and accompanying text.
637
Const, art 34.
See supra, notes 243-255 and accompanying text.
39
See supra, note 264 and accompanying text.
Supra, note 36 and accompanying text.
Brand, supra note 64, at 255.
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enforcement of foreign-money judgments*' was a very conceivable means of
unilaterally providing uniformity and international certainty in the field. The goals of
unilateral unification within the United States may be stated as follows : (1) uniformity
among the various states
, (2) uniformity between state and federal court systems,
and (3) to some extent increased recognition of United States judgments abroad " by
enactment of a comprehensive legislation which would facilitate the identification of
sources and solutions for those countries requiring reciprocity before enforcing a foreign
judgment.
Given particular constitutional surroundings , the field of recognition and
enforcement of foreign-nation judgments in the United States may be approached through
several legal alternatives.
1. Uniform State Laws
The first of the suggested alternatives would be regulation by means of enactment
Ail 7
of uniform state laws so as to further uniformity of rules among the various states and
also between state and federal courts, because in diversity cases, the latter have so far
held that state law governs the matter . Currently, such regulation exists partially
through the uneven implementation of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act
649
and the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 3 . However,
such implementation is quite limited as far as the Recognition Act is concerned " since
M
Jld.
' Brand, supra note 64, at 285.
644
Id.
M5
/d.
646
Due to the potential relevance of the Commerce with Foreign-Nations Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8. See infra, note 663 and accompanying text.
647
Brand, supra note 64, at 257, 285.
648
Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981), Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum
Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). See also Brand, supra note 64, at
287.
Supra, note 163.
Supra, note 64.
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See Brand, supra note 64, at 329 for a list of the States in which the Act is implemented..
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that less than half the States have integrated it into their legislation within thirty years of
availability of the Act
,
some with changes which damage uniformity rather than further
it
3
. Further, the Recognition Act is limited to the recognition of money-judgments ? .
The implementation of the Enforcement Act has proven more successful since most states
have adopted it with little variations . The Enforcement Act is not limited to money-
judgments. However, its scope of application will apply to foreign-country judgments
only to the extent the adopting state has also adopted the Recognition Act. By its terms,
the Enforcement Act applies to sister-state judgments 3 . In states having adopted both
the Recognition and the Enforcement Act, the latter is incorporated into the former. The
terms of the Recognition Act will accordingly apply to the Enforcement Act. Since the
Recognition Act applies to foreign-country judgments, the Enforcement Act, when
implemented through the Recognition Act, will also cover foreign-country judgments as
well as sister-state judgments ? . Whereas proving successful in areas such as commercial
law. company law or else probate law, the enactment of uniform legislation by the
Z. CO
various states does not seem to generate similar "national" consequences " in the area of
Ul 659
recognition
2. Comprehensive Federal Legislation
Another means of unilaterally furthering uniformity of rules -among states and in
between state and federal courts- for the recognition and enforcement of foreign-country
judgments in the United States is the suggestion that Congress may enact comprehensive
6
" Id.
5j
See, for instance, the reciprocity requirement added by some of the states to the original wording of the
uniform act. See Brand, supra, note 64, at 329 (the author lists those states which have added requirements
to the Act's original version).
Supra, note 112.
. Brand, supra note 64, at 329
See supra, note 1 12.
657
Id.
58
In spite of the Recognition Act's similarities to existing common law, see Brand, supra note 64, at 287.
59
See Brand, supra note 64, at 286-288 for an account of the advantages and disadvantages of the uniform
act approach in the field.
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federal legislation in the field, thereby preempting any existing state law . Federal law
has indeed preempted state rules in some areas affecting recognition and enforcement of
some categories of non-money judgments, such as child custody or international
bankruptcy (the latter being part of a wider federal question). The type of legislation
considered here would affect the field of recognition and enforcement as a whole.
Scholars agree that such power would be consistent with the Commerce Clause of the
U.S. Constitution , at least when "the process threatens to impinge on foreign
relations'' in a domain otherwise reserved to state power. Arguably, "federal legislation
may be the most direct path to true unification of United States law on the matter" .
Uniformity would thereby be reached in a more secure way than through uniform state
legislation, since the states would be deprived of the opportunity to individually deviate
from the terms of the act as some did with the terms of the Recognition Act
As a single source, federal legislation would provide a much needed certainty in
the field
667
and could possibly clarify the state of the law as far as the various categories
of non-money judgments are concerned. For non-money awards, the implementation of a
comprehensive federal legislation may achieve some of the purposes of furthering
recognition and providing for certainty and predictability. However, the unilateral
character of the approach would make it unfit for purpose of debating the international
unification of substantive rules in areas in which such unification would further
recognition of categories of judgments, often granting non-money relief, that are
currently in a uncertain state as to their potential for recognition, due to wide differences
660
U.S. Const, art. VI, ("supremacy clause of the Constitution").
661
Supra, notes 481-90 and accompanying text.
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Supra, note 573 and following text.
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in substantive rules among legal systems . Neither would enactment of federal
legislation truly advance the recognition of United States judgments abroad, least of all in
matters involving non-money awards . With regard to foreign courts dealing with an
issue of recognition of a judgment of a United States court, federal legislation could
clarify the identification of the law applied by the United States courts670 . The enactment
of federal legislation is generally considered as "the most likely alternative"
671
for
unifying unilaterally United States law in the field. In spite of wide scholarly support,
there has not been -so far- any significant effort by Congress to provide for such
legislation .
3. Federal Common Law
Another issue seldom addressed by scholars and commentators as a possible
unilateral source of unified law in the field of recognition of foreign-nation judgments is
federal common law .
Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Erie Railroad v. Thompkins
,
recognition issues could arise as federal common law . The landmark case of Hilton v.
Guyot , decided by the Supreme Court before Erie and its progeny and cited by most
state courts dealing with recognition of foreign-country judgments is an example of a
unifying case in a field otherwise dominated by state law.
See supra, e.g.. note 469 and accompanying text.
&9
Except in areas dealing with status of the person, in which recognition is always more favorably
considered in industrialized countries due to the particular necessity of international certainty surrounding
such awards. Supra, notes 186-88, 238 and accompanying text.
Supra, note 645 and accompanying text.
Brand, supra note 64, at 258.
672
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Erie Railroad v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) stated that "Except in matters governed by the federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. [T]here is no
general federal common law.", id., at 78.
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159 U.S. 113(1895).
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Some argue that there would be room for such federal common law in the field
of recognition after Erie, since the Supreme Court determined that there were areas "in
which federal courts appropriately may mold special common law" and preempt state
rules in that field. Federal common law after Erie may be found when the area involves a
"uniquely federal interest" and when there is "a significant conflict" between such
identifiable "federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law" . Recent cases
lead scholars to consider the possibility of the development of federal common law in
areas relating to transnational commercial relations . These scholars " have put forward
the idea that the recognition of foreign-nation judgments could be governed by federal
common law . Such a rule would provide uniformity among state laws as well as
uniformity in between state and federal courts through preemption. Just as federal
legislation, federal common law could bring certainty, uniformity and predictability in the
recognition of foreign non-money awards. However, this theory shares the incapacity of
other unilateral rules to provide for greater recognition of U.S. judgments abroad
generally and their impossibility to provide for the unification of substantive rules among
See Scoles. Interstate and International Distinction in Conflict ofLaws in the United States, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 1599, 1605-07 (1966), Note, Recognition ofForeign-Country Judgments-A casefor
Federalization, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 331(1 987;. The Foreign Affairs Power and the Dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause, 16 Va. J. lnt'l L. 635 (1976), Comment, Judgments Rendered Abroad: State Law or
Federal Law
,
1 2 Vill. L. Rev. 6 1 8 ( 1 967). Henkin. The Federal Affaird Power ofthe Federal Courts:
Sabbatino, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 805, 820 (1964).
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(federal common law applies to dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine), Island Territory of
Curacao v. Solitron Devices Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974) (federal
law applies to actions seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitral award). See also Brand, supra note 64, at
305-306, 309.
" Supra, note 692.
683
See, e.g., Brand, supra note 64, at 306, stating that:
A rule on foreign judgments would simply extend [the act of state doctrine] to provide deferences
to the acts of the judicial branches of foreign governments in appropriate circumstances").
Id
91
nations as a major tool to further the recognition of non-money awards. Such unification
may therefore only be carried by means of coordinated transnational practice.
SECTION III: UNIFORMITY THROUGH COORDINATED TRANSNATIONAL
PRACTICE
Coordinated transnational practice appears as the most efficient method of
furthering recognition and enforcement of foreign-country judgments generally, and of
non-money awards specifically. The negotiation, the signature and the ratification of
international treaties which may provide for unification of substantive rules of law among
nations party to the agreement as well as for direct provisions regarding recognition and
enforcement will indeed further all of the goals mentioned in the precedent section .
Treaties provide the means to further uniformity among the states of a federal or
supranational system, they increase the recognition of foreign country judgments in
signing nations whose rules are otherwise not favorable to extensive recognition, and they
generally provide for uniformity and predictability for the recognition of the types of
judgments included in their scope of application.
Negotiating treaties is a delicate exercise in the practice of international relations
between nations. Treaties presuppose that each party will abandon some of its domestic
rules for a common solution which is the product of a legal, political and economic
balance among the various positions of the participants to the negotiations . Often, the
agreement necessitates some common features among the different systems
represented , so that the compromised solution integrates as smoothly as possible in the
zoo
domestic law of each nations . With regard to the rights and obligations of individuals
4
Treaties providing for both bear the name of "double" conventions, or "conventions doubles", see
supra, note 626.
685
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and private parties under a treaty . the above-mentioned difficulties are particularly
acute . Also, states are only indirectly interested by the provisions of a treaty binding
individuals and other private interests, which may manifest in slow process of negotiation
and ratification
,
particularly in policy-stricken areas such as recognition and
enforcement. Indeed, some examples of these difficulties were encountered in the practice
with regard to proposed international agreements in the field of recognition and
enforcement .
In France as in the United States, the authority to negotiate international
agreements is vested in the President and the ratification process later lies within
parliamentary powers in the United States . There is no doubt in either country about
the possibility to enter into international agreements regulating rights and obligations of
individuals and private entities . However, the practice vary greatly between France and
the United States as far as the actual negotiation, signature and ratification of
international agreements regulating the recognition and enforcement of foreign-nation
judgments. Whereas France appears to be party to numerous bilateral and multilateral
As opposed to treaties dealing with rights and obligations of the state itself. Treaties dealing with
individuals and private parties will be part of "Private International Law", treaties dealing with states
themselves will be part of "Public International Law". See, e.g., LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at
19.
690
LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 19.
69l
/rf.,at 19-20.
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See
.
e.g., the failure of the Hague Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, infra notes 786-89, 849 and accompanying text.
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CONST., art 52 for France, and for the United States: U.S. Const., art II, § 2 ("[The President] shall
have power, by and with the advice and consent of senate, to make Treaties, provided that two thirds of the
Senators present concur..."). United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 57 S. Ct. 216 (1936) (defining
the presidential powers in respect of foreign affairs).
694
U.S. CONST., art II, § 2 (supra note 678). It France, only certain categories of Treaties, notably affecting
the status of the person or modifying matters regulated by law or by the Constitution must be approved by
the Parliament, CONST., arts. 53 & 54. More than half the treaties signed by France are ratified by the
president without need to Parliamentary approval.
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Brand, supra note 64, at 288 (pointing that any doubts are reduced to the state of a "historic footnote in
a world in which the distinctions between public and private international law are increasingly less
visible.").
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conventions in the field, the United States has entered very few such agreements, non of
which are bilateral .
A. Bilateral solutions
When two nations maintain regular economic and business relations, it is only
natural for them to further such relations by mutually allowing their courts to recognize
and enforce each other's decisions . Such result will often be made possible by the
presence of specific ties binding the two countries, whether relating to common features
in their legal systems or simply to strong common interests in furthering relations. A
common solution suitable to the interests of each party bound by an international
AGO
agreement is certainly facilitated by the bilateral character of such agreement, because
the interests to accommodate are not so numerous and may be enhanced by those specific
699
ties linking the two nations concerned . For this reason, bilateral treaties dealing with
recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments may be more likely to address
specific issues relating to non-money awards. Indeed, this is the experience of the French
practice in the field. Whether through "single" or "double" conventions , France has
reached agreements for mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments with various
foreign nations. Before the implementation of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions
,
France individually negotiated and ratified recognition conventions with each nation of
,6
For an account of some of the reasons behind the difficulties of ratification of conventions in private
international law matters by the United States, see Willis M. Reese, The Hague Conference on Private
International Law Some Observations, 19 Int'L Law. 881, 885-86 (1985). It is not the purpose of the
following development to review such reasons.
Droz, supra note 626, at 100.
See supra note 686 and accompanying text.
699
See LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 24, 537.
00
Supra note 626. "Single" conventions are dominant in the field, LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note
66, at 537.
Supra, note 88.
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the current European Union
. Also, bilateral conventions have been signed with some
Asian partners and with all French-speaking African nations (former colonies)
Some flaws of the early practice are illustrated by the provisions of some of the
older convention signed with African countries . These conventions allowed the
exorbitant rules of jurisdiction of the French Civil Code, art. 14 and art. 15 70\ to be used
with respect to French nationals residing in the African country concerned by
providing that the jurisdictional rules to be taken into account were those of the
recognizing country . This practice illustrates how "single" conventions may be easier
to negotiate but will not prove as efficient as "double" conventions which lock the
recognition practice by providing for direct unification of substantive rules of law.
To alleviate the possibility of the above-mentioned flaw, many "single"
708
conventions in the field of recognition include some indirect rules of jurisdiction
Instead of establishing substantive rules as a "double" convention would, the "single"
convention may list the various jurisdictional rules in use in the two nations party to the
709
agreement that are considered as being acceptable under the convention . Exorbitant
rules will generally not be listed as being acceptable . While not binding upon the judge
of the court of origin , this rule of indirect verification of competence provides for
v
~ Droz, supra note 626, at 100. These conventions were abolished individually when the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions were signed in place of bilateral conventions, LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note
68, at 24-25.
70j
For a detailed list of those conventions, see H. Muir Watt, Effets en France des decisions etrangeres,
JURISCLASS. DROIT INTERNATIONAL, fasc. 584-1.
704
Namely Ivory Coast, Benin, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, the Republic of Central Africa, Gabon,
Congo, Morocco, Algeria and Mali, see Droz, supra note 626, at n.162 and accompanying text.
705
C. Civ., art. 14 and art. 15. See supra note 62 1
.
6
Droz, supra note 626, at 101.
707
Id.
)8
Indirect rules ofjurisdiction are used by the recognizing forum, as opposed to direct rules found in
"double" conventions, which "limit the adjudicatory authority of the rendering forum" (forum of origin),
Peter Hay and Robert J. Walker, The Proposed U.S. -U.K. Recognition-of-Judgments Convention: Another
Perspective, 18 Va. J. INT'L L. 753, 759 (1978).
Droz, supra note 626, at 101.
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Id., at 101-102.
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predictability and certainty in a field in which it is much needed, particularly is the
convention applies to some types of non-money awards.
However allegedly easier to negotiate that multilateral conventions, bilateral
conventions have not yet entered the American practice, for the United States are not
party to any bilateral convention in the field of recognition and enforcement of foreign
country judgments.
The only serious attempt to negotiate such bilateral treaty arose with the United
Kingdom starting in 1976 . The proposed U.S.-U.K. Judgments Convention was set as a
"single" convention, and included a catalog of indirect rules for jurisdiction713 such as
that described above . As drafted, the Convention fulfilled its goal of unifying the
practice recognition of the judgments of the United Kingdom's courts in the United States
and reciprocally, providing for uniformity, certainty and predictability in the field
covered by the scope and the convention and within the limits of a "single"
convention . Also, the convention defined the scope of the effects to be reciprocally
given to the other party's judgments once recognized . These effects, according to the
718
convention , should have been the same as those given to a local judgment. That is to
say that those particular foreign judgments would have been entitled to collateral estoppel
" United Kingdom-United States Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil Matters, initialed October 26, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 71 (1977) (1976 draft), 8 N.J.C. Int'l&
COM. REG. 322 (1983) (Third Consultative paper, March 1979 draft) [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Judgments
Convention]. For a bibliography upon the convention, see Brand, supra note 64, n. 1 77.
713
U.S.-U.K. Judgments Convention, supra note 7 1 2. arts. 10-11. See also Hay & Walker, supra note 708,
at 759-760, and Mary Ann Alford, The Effect ofthe Proposed U.S. -U.K. Reciprocal Recognition and
Enforcement ofCivil Judgments Treaty on Current Recognition Practice in the United States, Comment,
18COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 119, 142-148(1979).
Supra, notes 708-1 1 and accompanying text.
715
See Hay & Walker, supra note 708, at 758. The unification however was not praised unanimously:
Professor Hans Smit, for instance, wondered if it "might appear desirable to let the law develop further in
the context of concrete cases before freezing it in more rigid treaty texts", Hans Smit, The Proposed United
States-United Kingdom Convention on Recognition and Enforcement ofJudgments: A Prototypefor the
Future, 1 7 Va. J. Int'L L. 443, 444 (1977) [hereinafter cited as US-UK Judgments Convention].
716
See supra, notes 6 1 2 and accompanying text. A "single" convention does not allow to further the goal
of unification of substantive rules for choice of law and jurisdiction, see supra, text following note 624.
U.S.-U.K. Judgments Convention, supra note 7 1 2, art. 13(1).
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effects in the United States, which might be contested by scholars . Such provision
illustrated successfully the unifying role of the convention on a point very much debated
in the U.S. domestic practice. However, the unifying role of the convention generally was
not carried to its maximum potential, since the scope of application of the Convention
was limited to certain categories of judgments and left aside entire areas for which
uniformity and certainty are key issues. Namely, the convention excluded subject areas
generally considered as raising "special problems*'
,
such as judgments in matters of
personal nature "
.
judgments on the status and power of legal persons
,
judgments for
disclosure of evidence " Judgments for punitive and multiple damages " . It appears that
the convention therefore applied principally to money judgments. However, non-money
judgments were not excluded expressly from the scope of the convention. Indeed, the
convention provided that
[t]o the extent that a judgment orders forms of relief other than the payment of
money, the [recognizing court] may refuse enforcement or may order any
measure of enforcement which the law of the [recognizing court] permits for
similar domestic judgments .
On the contrary, it therefore appears that the convention indeed extended to non-
money judgments as far as they are within the scope of application as defined by the
convention. Unfortunately, the scope of application of the convention did not include
those types of judgments resulting in the award of non-money relief in areas in which
Smit, U.S.-U.K. Judgments Convention, supra note 715, at 463.
720
Hay & Walker, supra note 708. at 758.
721
U.S.-U.K. Judgments Convention, supra note 712, art. 2 (3). See also Smit. U.S.-U.K. Judgments
Convention, supra note 715, at 451. This exception notably includes personal status, maintenance,
marriage, succession, bankruptcy and administration of estates.
U
U.S.-U.K. Judgments Convention, supra note 712, art. 2 (2)(g). See also Smit, U.S.-U.K. Judgments
Convention, supra note 715, at 450.
2j
U.S.-U.K. Judgments Convention, supra note 712, art. 2 (2)(d). See also Smit, U.S.-U.K. Judgments
Convention, supra note 7 1 5, at 449.
724
U.S.-U.K. Judgments Convention, supra note 712, art. 2 (2)(c). See also Smit, U.S.-U.K. Judgments
Convention, supra note 71 5, at 449.
U.S.-U.K. Judgments Convention, supra note 712, art 15(1).
97
certainty and uniformity of status is most needed " . Those awards being excluded from
the scope of the convention were those that prove troublesome to enforce under general
rules in the field. This is true especially as far as U.S. judgments in England are
concerned, since most U.K. judgments of such kind would be recognized in many U.S.
courts, albeit not under uniform rules and not in those jurisdictions requiring reciprocity
727
before granting enforcement . Most of the goals of uniformity, certainty and
predictability were therefore lost under the Convention as far as non-money awards were
concerned. Such statement is emphasized by the consideration that recognizing courts
were not obliged under the convention to grant the non-money remedy initially seeked,
728
even in areas within the scope of the convention .
729
The U.S.-U.K. Judgments convention was signed and initialed " , but was never
implemented. Since its negotiation could allegedly have represented the most likely
successful attempt for the United States in the field , due to the bilateral and "single"
character of the treaty and to close legal ties between the two systems involved, it
appears that "the possibility for [further] such agreements is [as of today] ... remote at
best"
732
.
It therefore appears that while the French system arguably illustrates a successful
bilateral coordinated practice in the field of recognition of foreign-nation judgments
generally, -albeit in a much more limited manner as far as non-money awards are
726
727
Supra, notes 292, 596 and accompanying text.
2
Because uniform rules, through the Recognition Act, supra note 163, limit their scope of application to
money judgments, Supra, text following note 1 1 1 and note 202 and accompanying text. For the reciprocity
requirement, see generally Paul Lagarde, La Reciprocity en Droit International, 154 RECUEIL DES COURS
d'Academie de Droit International [R.C.A.D.I.] 103 (1977), and see supra, note 175-76 and
accompanying text.
28
U.S.-U.K. Judgments Convention, supra note 697, art 15(1). Supra, note 738 and accompanying text.
Supra, note 712.
See e.g. Brand, supra note 64, at 298.
See supra, text accompanying note 713.
" Brand, supra note 64, at 298.
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concerned- the United States failed to implement uniformity, certainty and predictability
through bilateral transnational practice.
Such failure does not induce regrets with regard to the status of non-money
awards. The doomed U.S.-U.K. Judgments Convention points out that a "single" bilateral
convention is not ultimately effective in dealing with the specific problems encountered
with regard to non-money judgments. The convention, negotiated between two countries
with close legal systems, eliminated up front most categories of non-money awards and
offered derogatory enforcement provisions for those falling within the scope of the
• 734
convention .
While their major advantage is a better and easier assessment of the nations'
reciprocal interests
, so that they may be more likely to encompass the recognition of
non-money awards otherwise stricken by incompatible rules of law among the various
nations, bilateral conventions do not seem to further this possibility and offer only a
limited unification of the law when they are implemented.
In spite of greater difficulties of negotiation, multilateral treaties appear more
appropriate a means to fulfill the particular requirements of the recognition and
enforcement of non-money awards.
B. Multilateral solutions
In the field of recognition and enforcement of foreign nation judgments,
multilateral conventions appear to take two different forms. First, these conventions may
deal with recognition as a general concept, whether including substantive provisions
Supra, notes 730-735 and accompanying text.
Supra, note 725 and accompanying text.
' 5
"Bilateral negotiation and treaty-making in this field permit far greater accommodation of competing
interests and concerns than a multilateral convention would provide". Hay & Walker, supra note 708, at
767-68.
'6
LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 24 CfLJes traites bHateraux presentent un inconvenient tres
grave : la pluralite des regies juridiques").
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unifying rules for jurisdiction or other conflict of law rules 37 ("double" convention) or
simply settling the issue of recognition and enforcement of those foreign country
judgments falling within the scope of application of the convention ("single"
738
convention) . Other conventions are topical, or "substantive". Instead of dealing with
recognition and enforcement generally, these agreements settle the law of recognition on
one definite issue raising some rather specific and urgent problems, like divorce
,
international child support or child custody . General conventions have been the
focus of the attention of commentators and have caused lengthy negotiation proceedings.
They appear as the most efficient method of ensuring widespread uniformity and
certainty in the field, but so far substantive conventions have had a dominant role in
furthering the recognition of chosen categories of non-money awards.
1. General conventions
Among existing multilateral conventions in the field of recognition and
7*1?
enforcement of foreign nation judgments, the Brussels and Lugano Conventions signed
the members of the European Union and these of the EFTA greatly drew the attention
of commentators.
The circumstances surrounding the establishment of the conventions and their
general provisions have been discussed above , as well as their "double" character as
The French practice distinguishes between "conflict of laws" ("conflits de lois") and conflicts of
jurisdictional rules ("conflits dejuridiction"). "Conflits de lois" is limited to choice of law issues, and
"conflits dejuridiction", as its name indicates, deals with questions relating to personal, in rem (and quasi
in rem) and subject matter jurisdiction. "Conflict of laws" is herein employed in its larger American
definition, encompassing what modem French law describes as "Private international law" ("Droit
international prive") with the exclusion of the issue of "national law and aliens" ("condition des
etrangers"). See LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 68, at 3-10.
Supra, note 639.
See infra, notes 806-09 and accompanying text.
See infra, note 805.
41
See infra, note 802 and accompanying text.
" Supra, note 88.
743
Supra, note 79 for those states member of the European Union, and note 88 for those member of the
EFTA.
44
Supra, notes 119-141 and accompanying text.
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international agreements ^ and their impact upon unification of the law of recognition of
member-state judgments generally and with regard to non-money awards specifically 46 .
Another much discussed feature of the two conventions is set by article 59 of each
747
Treaty . Articles 59 provide that the member states may enter into a bilateral agreement
with non-member states and therein agree to extend to the domiciliaries of such non-
member state the jurisdictional rules set by the Brussels and Lugano Conventions for the
74Xjudgments of member-states to which the non-domiciliary is a party . Indirectly, the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions may therefore further the recognition of sister-state
awards falling outside of the scope of the convention. Such agreement was part of the
negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom towards mutual
recognition of their courts's judgments
, but such agreement remains not enforced
together with the other provisions of the doomed convention
However providing for substantive rules for jurisdiction as well as uniform rules
of recognition and offering to extend these rules outside of their initial scope, the Brussels
and Lugano Conventions fail in bringing any true answer to the specific problems of the
recognition of non-money judgments. These conventions nevertheless remain unique
examples of double conventions in the field of recognition and enforcement among
countries with very different legal background
5
.
Outside of the European Union, other general multilateral conventions relating to
recognition and enforcement of foreign-nation judgments have been negotiated, but the
United States have signed none
?
". The United States have been active participants to
international organizations purporting to unify and accommodate the rules of law in
745
Supra, notes 626, 63 1 and accompanying text.
Supra, text following note 633.
747
Brussels Convention, supra note 88. art. 59, Lugano Convention, supra note 88, art. 59.
748
Id. Arts. 2-18 of the Brussels & Lugano Conventions, supra note 88, set those rules for jurisdiction.
749
U.S.-U.K. Judgments Convention, supra note 712.
750
Supra, note 732 and accompanying text.
751
Supra, text accompanying note 634.
752
Brand, supra note 64. at 289.
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relation to "private legal transactions and relationships"
, such as the Hague Conference
on Private International Law 3 , the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law (UNIDROIT) 5 " and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) 3 . The Hague Conference has worked since 1963 on establishing a general
convention on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial
matters, and the United States have actively participated to the preparatory work and the
negotiations
3
. The Hague Recognition Convention, negotiated at the same time as the
Brussels Convention 5 , is of a "single" character and sets indirect rules for
jurisdiction instead of providing for direct rules as the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions do Under the 1971 Hague Recognition Convention, recognition and
enforcement may be denied on limited grounds only
,
which notably include fraud and
"incompatible policy of the State addressed" . The convention was understood as being
multilateral, but an additional requirement of individual agreements among states prior to
J
Peter H. Pfund, United States Participation in International unification ofPrivate Law, 19 INT'L Law.
505,507(1985).
754
Participation authorized by Congress H.R.J. Res. 778, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 77 Stat. 775 (1963),
amended 22 U.S.C. § 269g (1988). See Willis M. Reese, The Hague Conference on Private International
Law: Some Observations, 19 INT'L Law. 881 (1985) for an account of the composition, the methods of
operation and the accomplishments of the Conference.
" 22 U.S.C. 269g( 1988).
756
Established by G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI) of December 17, 1966. See generally Pfund, supra note 753 for
an account of the participation of the United States to the work of these organizations and an account of
such work.
Hague Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters [hereinafter HAGUE CONVENTION], February I, 1971, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 362 (1967), opened for
signature March 17, 1969. The American delegates voted in favor of such convention, Brand, supra note
108, at 298.
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Droz, supra note 626, at 101.
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Supra, note 626 .
10
The debate among the members of the Conference as whether to establish a "single" convention or a
"double" one is illustrated in Actes et Documents de la Session Extraordinaire de la Conference
de La Haye de Droit International Prive, "Execution des Jugements" (1966), Memoire, at 10-1
1
[hereinafter referred to as Actes et Documents de la Session Extraordinaire].
Supra, notes 709-71 1 and accompanying text. Droz, supra note 626, at 107.
" Supra, notes 122, 763 and accompanying text.
763 Hague Convention, supra note 757, art. 5.
1M
Id.
the entry into force of the convention was adopted
, and the convention is therefore
subject to "bilateralisation" before being enabled to produce its effects767 . The scope
of application of the Hague Recognition Convention was defined as applying to
"decisions rendered in civil and commercial matters by the jurisdictions of one of the
contracting states"
,
with the exception of decisions upon the status and the capacity of
person , family law , succession , maintenance obligations , bankruptcies and
analogous procedures . In a manner comparable to that of the Brussels (or Lugano)
774
Convention
,
the 1971 Hague Recognition Convention therefore excludes of most
categories of judgments issuing awards and decrees other than for a sum of money.
However, non-money judgments are not expressly excluded from the scope of the
convention and may appear within such scope in areas of civil and commercial
obligations
?
and accordingly may be dealt with, as with the Brussels Convention
,
under the provisions of the Hague Recognition Convention. The risk of possible
difficulties in connection with areas of the law in which choice of law rules -and
substantive provisions of the law- are incompatible among national legal systems was
highlighted in the memorandum ("memoire") accompanying the draft of the convention
in the Acts and Documents of the Hague Conference on the topic . The memorandum
765
Droz, supra note 626, at 101.
"Bilalerisation" is the process of rendering the instrument bilateral. See Droz, supra note 626, at 101
.
67
See ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DF LA SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE, supra note 760, Commission speciale,
Rapport, at 24-25 (explaining that recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments is a topic for
which the ratification of a "classical" general convention would show some reluctance from the part of the
nations).
Hague Convention, supra note 757, art. 1
.
7f»Q
Hague Convention, supra note 757, art. 1(1 ).
770
Id.
771
Hague Convention, supra note 757, art. 1(2).
72
Hague Convention, supra note 757, art. 1(3).
73 Hague Convention, supra note 757, art. 1(4).
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Supra, note 88, and text accompanying notes 12-28.
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Actes et Documents de la Session Extraordinaire, supra note 760, Memoire, at 13.
6
Supra, text following note 128.
77
Actes et Documents de la Session Extraordinaire, supra note 760, Memoire, at 13-14.
justifies the elimination of each category excluded from the scope of the Convention
on grounds of deep differences in the laws various nations relating to these particular
779
subjects . It is therefore interesting to note that the Convention, instead of furthering
uniformity in those categories calling for it most, discarded them from its scope of
application. However it is to be remembered that the Brussels Convention excluded the
780
same categories of judgments, mostly non-money awards , while it undertook to
provide for maximized recognition and enforcement in order to further the goals of the -
78
1
then- European Common Market . The 1971 Hague Recognition Convention certainly
did not have such heightened unification goals and the Conference on Private
782
International Law faced with the difficulties of multilateral negotiations , had many
interests to accommodate
It is worth noting that the position of the United States and common law nations,
"JO A
notably through the International Law Association was marked by their will to limit
78^
the scope of the convention to foreign money judgments . The United States ultimately
agreed to extend the scope of the proposed convention beyond money judgments.
786
The convention, opened for signature in 1969 , came into force on February 1,
787 788
1 97 1 with only three parties . The United States never ratified the convention, not are
they party to any other multilateral general convention upon recognition and enforcement
789
of foreign country judgments
778
See supra, notes 753-758 and accompanying text.
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It therefore appears that both major general multilateral agreements in the field of
recognition and enforcement have failed to bring uniformity and to further recognition of
non-money awards. Being by definition "general", those conventions face the difficulties
of accommodating very different and multiple interests. The Brussels Convention
succeeds in implementing uniformity of rules of jurisdiction because it sets direct rules
whereas the Hague Recognition Convention is limited to indirect rules of jurisdiction
792
binding the recognizing jurisdiction but not the issuing jurisdiction . In that light,
multilateral "double" conventions of general character appear to offer attractive features
for widespread uniformity in the field. However, it is within "substantive" conventions
that the recognition of some particular categories of non-money awards is currently best
served.
2. Substantive conventions
Many "single-subject-choice of law" conventions have arisen in private
793
international law since 1950. The Hague Conference on Private International Law
,
notably has played an important role in the development of conventions purporting to
unify the rules for jurisdiction and the choice of law solutions adopted by various nations
on a particular topic affecting the status and the relationships of individuals and legal
entities in international law . Some other conventions will undertake to unify the
substantive rules of law in a particular field , so that the question of choice of law
would be solved by the uniformity of the law in that field. Also, some of these
conventions will directly apply to recognition and enforcement of foreign country
judgments in particular areas.
Supra, text preceding note 123.
Supra, note 761 and accompanying text.
79")
" See supra, note 71 1 and accompanying text.
793
Supra, note 754.
See supra, note 737
795
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The importance of single subject-choice of law conventions unifying choice of
law rules and substantive rules of law among nations parties to the agreement should not
be understated with regard to recognition of foreign-nation judgments. Indeed, we have
observed that in those legal systems, such as the French system, that control the law
applicable to the case and require the choice of law to match their own or produce
equivalent results
,
unification of choice of law rules or of substantive rules of law in a
particular area of law will indeed allow recognition to take place in a field in which
differences would otherwise impeach such recognition .
Single subject-choice of law international conventions are numerous and will
indeed appear in areas in which non-money awards commonly arise. For instance, among
many others , France has signed and ratified the Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to Marital Property
,
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
80
1
International Child Abduction , the Hague Convention concerning the Law Applicable
802
to Child Support , or the Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or
OAT
Commercial Matters . The latter has also been signed and ratified by the United
States
Among substantive conventions specifically dealing with recognition and
execution of contracting-states judgments in the particular field concerned, the Hague
Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separation [hereinafter the
Supra, note 249 and accompanying text.
Supra, note 469 and accompanying text (for divorces).
See LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 66, at 20-24.
99
Are listed here a few conventions particularly significant due to their impact on recognition and
enforcement of related categories of non-money awards.
800
March 14, 1978. The Convention came into force in France on September 1, 1992.
801
October 25, 1980. The Convention came into force in France on December 1, 1983. 19 I.L.M. 1505
(1980).
°" Recueil des Conventions de La Haye 32 (1973).
803 Opened for signature March 18, 1970, codified in the United States 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781.
™ld.
805
Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, June 1, 1970 [hereinafter the
Divorce Convention]. Recueil des Conventions de La Haye 123 (1970).
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Divorce Convention] is said to have greatly contributed to further the recognition of
foreign divorce and/or separation procedures awarded by the courts of a contracting
state . The Divorce Convention sets some indirect rules for jurisdiction but unlike a
807
typical "single" convention, it also sets some additional requirements for asserting
jurisdiction. The convention otherwise forbids the denial of recognition based upon
choice of law or upon differences in the national laws in the field . Neither France nor
the United States are parties to this convention which however represents a good example
of a substantive multilateral convention purporting to further the recognition of a
particular category of non-money award.
The high number of single issue-choice of law conventions into force in the field
of unification of private international law illustrate their suitability to the matter,
particularly with regard to the recognition of non-money awards even though actual
recognition and enforcement may not be the primary purpose of some of those
conventions. For instance, the Child Abduction Convention , in force among 14
8 1
States , has for principal goal to ensure the restoration of children wrongfully removed
Q 1 1
from their custodian . In the course of fulfilling this general goal, the convention
provides for the means to ensure recognition of custody decrees and orders issues by the
courts of one the contracting states. The convention provides for substantive rules of law
8 1
2
as well of direct rules for jurisdiction " and thereby sets the uniform rules required for
recognition.
However, the practice and the uniformity of the rules may be impaired by the
individual interpretation made by the contracting states of the provisions or scope of
Droz, supra note 612, at 188.
807
Divorce Convention, supra note 791, arts. 2.n°2, 2.n°4, 2.n°5.
Id., art. 6. See Droz, supra note 612. at 189.
Supra, note 787.
See Peter M. North, Reform But Not Revolution: General Course on Private International Law, 220
RCA. D.I. 9, 141 (1990) for a list of those States.
811
812
" Id
ld.,a\. 141-142.
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application of the conventions. For instance, the functioning of the Child Abduction
813
Convention was impaired by the individual interpretations of the concept of
814 81^
'"wrongfulness" , and as seen in the previous chapter , the Hague Convention on the
o 1 z.
Taking of Evidence Abroad was greatly weakened by the ruling of the U.S. Supreme
Court that the convention "was not the exclusive method of discovery, nor even the
817
required method of first resort" , leaving the litigants free to use domestic rules of
8 1
8
discovery instead of the rules set by the convention . Aside from directly affecting the
functioning of the conventional instrument, such interpretations may very well affect the
recognition of foreign orders in the field concerned in those contracting states whose
interpretation of the convention in question would differ.
Because of tthey harmonize choice of law rules, rules for jurisdiction and in some
cases substantive law among the countries that sign them, ultilateral single subject-choice
of law conventions currently provide, whether directly or indirectly, for a heightened
recognition of judgments issued in the particular field of law object of the convention.
They indeed seem to suit the specific needs of those areas of strong differences in the
laws of the various nations. Since a multilateral substantive convention may provide for
indirect or direct rules of jurisdiction and substantive rules of law in the field as well as
provide for direct provisions regarding recognition and enforcement , and is specifically
drafted to suit the needs of the area concerned and thereby supervene the efficiency of a
"general" convention in fields in which specific categories of non-money awards are at
820
stake. However, a "general" convention such as the Brussels -or Lugano- convention
has proven to be the most efficient tool for recognition of foreign country judgments
J
Supra note 787.
See North, supra note 810, at 142.
815
Supra, notes 53 1 -38 and accompanying text.
Supra note 530.
817
Muse, supra note 535, at 1078 (1989).
818
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
As the Brussels (and Lugano) Convention does, see supra, note 123 and accompanying text.
Supra, note 88.
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among nations with very different legal backgrounds, especially if. as the Brussels
Convention provide, the interpretation of the provisions of the convention is left to a
01 1
single entity agreed upon by the contracting states ~ . Such a convention may play a
model role in developing similar agreements encompassing wider categories of non-
money judgments in their scope of application.
C. Proposals
822
In 1992 , the United States proposed that the Hague Conference on Private
823
International Law "resume work in the field of recognition and enforcement of
824judgments with a view to preparing a single convention [in that field]" . Not being a
party to any bilateral nor multilateral convention on recognition and enforcement of
foreign nation judgments, the United States occupy an "isolated position in the global
825
[recognition] scheme" . We have analyzed the existing methods for providing
uniformity in the field of recognition and enforcement of foreign-country judgments as
well as the methods for furthering such recognition. The United States proposal takes the
o~)f. 877 878
form of a "mixed convention" , as opposed to a "single" or a "double" convention
such as those analyzed above. The proposed convention first sets some direct rules for
Supra, note 634 and accompanying text.
22 May 5, 1992. Hague Conference on Private International Law Doc. N°L.c. ON N° 15 (1992).
Supra, note 754.
Hague Conference on Private International Law Doc. N°L.c. ON N° 15 (1992) (letter from Edwin D.
Williamson, legal advisor, U.S. Department of State, to Georges L. Droz, Secretary General, Hague
Conference on Private International Law).
Eric B. Fastiff, The Proposed Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement ofCivil and
Commercial Judgments: A Solution to Butch Reynolds 's Jurisdiction and Enforcement Problems, 28
Cornell Int'l L.J. 469, 476 (1995).
"Convention mixte". See Fastiff, supra note 825, at 480.
Supra, note 627.
828
Id
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829
jurisdiction as a "double" convention would do: this is the "white list" of the proposed
• 830
convention .
83
1
But unlike a double convention, the proposed draft also includes a "gray area"
of rules for jurisdiction under which foreign judgments are not entitled to recognition
under the convention, but the enforcing state may decide to recognize and enforce the
832judgment under its general law . It further includes a "black list" of impermissible rules
833
for jurisdiction , mainly composed by well-known examples of "exorbitant jurisdiction"
834
rules as found in the various legal systems . Indeed, the draft refers to provisions of
other conventions instead of specifically listing its own rules . The proposed draft, as a
'"double" convention would, then proceeds to state its rules for the actual recognition and
enforcement of contracting-nations judgments . The exceptions listed as valid basis for
837
refusal of recognition include public policy .
838
The proposed draft openly refers to the Brussels and Lugano Conventions in
each of its components apart from the "gray area" , which confirms these two
conventions in their role model for recognition and enforcement of foreign country
judgments. Like the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, the proposed draft would also
exclude from its scope of application "problem areas" such as family law, succession,
829
Fastiff, supra, note 825, at 480.
830
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
arts. 2, 5, 6, 6A. The "white list" includes domicile of the defendant (Draft Convention, supra, art. 2), the
"contracting State" for those dispute involving notably contracts, torts and agency relationships, (Draft
Convention, supra, art. 5), and special jurisdictional bases for complex contractual areas (Draft Convention,
supra, art. 6 & 6A).
831
Fastiff, supra note 825, at 482-83.
832
" Id., at 483. Draft Convention, supra note 830, art. 3.
833
Draft Convention, supra note 830, art.4. Fastiff, supra note 835, at 483.
834
For instance, transient jurisdiction in the United States, see Burnham v. Superior Court of California,
1 10 S.Ct. 2105 (1990) (affirming the principle of transient jurisdiction in the United States), see also
jurisdiction based upon nationality, French Civ. CODE arts. 14 & 15. See also supra note 621
.
835
Draft Convention, supra note 830, art.4. Fastiff, supra note 825, at 484.
Draft convention, supra note 830, art. 26.
837
Draft Convention, supra note 830, art.27.
Supra, note 88.
839
See Fastiff supra note 825, at n.33.
Supra, notes 125-127, 633 and accompanying text.
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status of the person and bankruptcy proceedings . Indeed, just as the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions from which it borrows its language, the draft convention would
further uniformity and certainty of recognition of foreign country judgments except as far
as major categories of non-money awards are concerned. However, unlike their position
on
during the drafting of the 1971 Hague Convention , the United States do not wish to
exclude all categories of non-money judgments from the scope of application of their
proposal, since all types of awards falling within the scope of application would be
843
subject for recognition, as they are under the Brussels (or Lugano) Convention
Submitted to the Seventeenth Session of the Hague Conference , the U.S.
OK
proposal was not given a priority status . Instead, it was referred to a Special
Draft Convention, supra note 830, art. 1
.
" Hague Convention on the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, supra, note 757.
Supra, text following note 127.
Hague conference on Private International Law, Seventeenth Session, May 5-20, 1993.
It is also believed that the low number of ratifications of Hague conventions by the United States has
the unfortunate result that American delegates do not have the same influence that they
otherwise would. Regarding the decision as whether or not to adopt an American
suggestion, foreign delegates today will not be influenced by fear that if they do not, the
United States will not ratify the convention under consideration. U.S. ratification in any
event is improbable.
Reese, The Hague Conference on Private International Law: Some Observations, supra
note 696, at 886.
Ill
Commission instructed to make recommendations to the next (Eighteenth) session of the
/-> x" 846Conterence
As of today, it therefore appears that the drafting of a general convention on
recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments does not generate the
enthusiasm of the international community otherwise eager to promote uniformity of the
847
rules of law in private international law .
Working Document n°8. Commission I, Seventeenth Session, General Affairs, May 5, 1993, Hague
Conference on Private International Law.
See supra, text accompanying note 753.
UNIVERSITY OF GEOR
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION
American and French courts offer two very different approaches towards the
recognition and the enforcement of foreign-judgments. In France, courts follow the four-
prong test for granting an exequatur which consider issues of jurisdiction, choice of law,
due process and public policy of the forum. United States courts concentrate on
jurisdiction and due process and generally recognize foreign country judgments meeting
these requirements. The comparison between the two methods and their results has
highlighted the specific needs of litigants who, in a transnational environment, are facing
uncertain situations with regard to their status and capacity, or risks with regard to their
property which mere money damages could not compensate.
In such situations, hardship over the parties may be much greater than in
situations compensated by money damages. Courts in both systems analyzed above
appreciate those particular circumstances to some extent and accordingly act to relieve
the concerned parties of the burden created by the relativity of their status according to
territorial boundaries. However, much uncertainty and unpredictability remains present in
the field. The availability of specific remedies other than money damages indeed differ
from one system to the other. While these differences underline the limits of the possible
enforcement of non-money judgments from one system to the other, they should not
weaken the possibility of recognition of these remedies. Over the past thirty years, the
doctrine in the United States have worked to identify what they qualify as the "true basis"
beyond recognition. The concepts revealed therefrom have in turn pleaded for a
heightened recognition of equitable remedies and other types of non-money judgments as
may be found in various practices.
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Legal commentators have identified different components to be included within
the general goal of certainty and uniformity in the field. Ideally, recognition of non-
money awards would be furthered by unification of the rules regarding such recognition
among the various nations and by unification of substantive rules of law and procedure ,
particularly with regard to jurisdictional requirements which, when different as is often
the case in areas dealing with non-money awards, may easily block the recognition
process. It does so in both systems analyzed.
Methods to reach unification include unilateral reform and coordinated solutions.
Out of all the proposed methods of furthering uniformity and acceptance, unilateral
federal legislation seems currently the most likely of all possibilities for the United
848
States , but it would fall short of most goals of a worldwide scheme of uniformity and
acceptance in the field. Such goals would only be furthered by means of international
treaty in the field.
Because they are easier to negotiate, bilateral conventions presently dominate the
field, and France has signed a significant number of these. Multilateral conventions
appear in more limited number and shadowed success, but substantive multilateral
conventions exist in areas in which need for coordinated practice is particularly acute,
such as family law. and they have proven -so far- to be the most efficient manner of
furthering actual recognition and unification of the rules of law in the field. Here again,
while France has engaged in such practice, the United States have not.
It is felt that recognition of non-money awards will only be significantly
849
heightened by the negotiation of a general convention in the field . The success of the
Brand, supra note 64, at 257-58. See also Pfund, supra note 753, at 517 ("While the international
process of law unification by convention is a deliberate and ponderous one, there remains a long and
arduous process before the United States can actually become a party...").
849
Id., at 326.
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Brussels and Lugano Conventions " signed among the Member States of the European
Union and of the EFTA has provided the international community with a model.
The first attempt at such a general convention, achieved by the approval of the
1971 Hague Convention "
,
proved to be a failure. It is believed that the 1971 Hague
on
Convention was completely shadowed by the Brussels Convention
,
negotiated at the
same time. Another draft with provisions similar to those of the Brussels Convention was
recently proposed by the United States to the international community acting through the
Hague Conference on Private International Law. Addressing a larger community than that
of the Brussels Convention, the draft proposes a few additional concessions to the states'
853
sovereignty, such as a "gray area" " , and accordingly it may seem the most appropriate
solution to further and unify the recognition of foreign country judgments generally.
That such a proposal is initiated by the United States, historically absent from the
conventional scene in the area of recognition, is significant. The United States have been
victim of a lack of recognition worldwide of the judgments issued by its federal and state
courts, whether because its rules of law and jurisdiction are generally incompatible with
other nation's rules, or because other countries have a restricted recognition practice.
Absent from any treaty in the field, the United States have not been able to further the
recognition of their own judgments abroad, and such furthering is now one of the goals of
the general search for uniformity and acceptance in the field of recognition of foreign
judgments
855
It must however be remembered that the Brussels and Lugano Treaties "" are part
of a much wider goal of unification among the nations parties to each ' , and that such
Supra, note 88.
Supra, note 742.
" Droz. supra note 626, at 107.
853
Supra, note 830 and accompanying text.
854
See Brand, supra note 64, at 257-58, and Fastiff, supra note 825, at 498.
Supra, note 88.
See supra, notes 1 1 7-20 and accompanying text.
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goal had already triggered and disrupted the usual mechanisms of sovereignty of the
member states at the time the two Convention were implemented. Such factors are absent
from the international stage, and the United States' proposal has not generated
enthusiasm.
The difficulties arising in connection to the negotiation of a general convention in
the field are much heightened as far as non-money judgments are concerned. While non-
money judgments are not expressly excluded per se from the existing and proposed
general conventions, the scope of application of those conventions leaves out some major
categories of non-money awards such as those regarding status of the person and family
law presently regulated on the international stage by way of substantive conventions of
limited application.
Accordingly, any proposal for a general treaty in the field of recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments should ideally expressly consider the specific problems
of some categories of non-money judgments which present urgent need for uniform
solution and furthered acceptance.
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